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A

COMMENT

ON

The Rev'd Mr. WARBURTON'S

ALLIANCE

BETWEEN

CHURCH and *STATE*.

SHEWING

That an *Ecclesiastical-Establishment* and a *Test-Law* are not supportable on his Reasoning; either, from the Essence and End of Civil Society, or, from the fundamental Principles of the Law of Nature and Nations.

HEREIN

His two famous Illustrations from *Prescription* and the *Game-Laws* are examined — The *Quaker's* Scruples about *TYTHES* are clearly resolved — And a few Observations on Mr. *White's* Letters to a Dissenting-Gentleman are occasionally interspersed.

TOGETHER

With some natural and useful Reflexions.

“ NO EXPERIMENTS, is the language indeed of POLITICIANS
“ (for in some things *Bigotry* and *Politics* agree; as extremes run easily
“ into one another, by their very Endeavour to keep at distance) because,
“ according to the *Politician's* Creed, Religion being useful to the State,
“ and yet not founded in truth, all inquiries tend, not to confirm, but to
“ unsettle, this necessary support of civil government. But can a Man,
“ who believes Religion to have come from God, use this language! ” (u)

(u) Warburton's remarks on occasional reflexions, Part II. p. 134.

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A N
ADVERTISEMENT
TO THE
READER.

THESE *Expository Notes* have professedly to do with the *Second Edition* of Mr. Warburton's *Alliance*, &c. corrected and improved; which was inscribed to the two *Universities of Cambridge and Oxford*, as a monument of his singular veneration for, and devotion to, those most illustrious Seminaries of all learning and virtue.—

The *Author* has not seen the Edition dedicated to a *Minister of State*; but takes it for granted, that Mr. *W.*

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

has not demolished any part of the monument he had so Sacredly devoted.

It has been the opinion of some, that a *Reply* to this celebrated performance should not have been made under the grave and serious Stile; but should have been conducted rather with a pointed ridicule: and perhaps, were the Work we are answering, and the Writer of it, to be only regarded, this Method would not have been altogether unjustifiable: but when we consider, on the other hand, that those Things which Mr. *Warburton* has treated in a manner that might have warranted this form of Reply, are in themselves the most Sacred, *viz.* TRUTH, RELIGION, and LIBERTY; the Author of the Notes was of Opinion, that a Respect to them required him to handle his Subject with Seriousness and Gravity.

T H E



A

Preliminary VIEW
OF THE
ARGUMENT,

Containing
Definitions and First Principles.



THAT Mr. *Warburton* has not demonstrated the *necessity* and *equity* of an *established religion* and a *test-law*; but, notwithstanding all he has offered, they remain *two* as great *Solecisms* as he found them charged to be in modern politics^a, will appear, from a careful attention to his *own definitions*, and the fundamental maxims upon which he reasons, com-

^a *Alliance, &c.* p. 1.

pared with the nature and design of true religion, and with the natural and civil rights of mankind.

I shall lay down his *definitions and maxims*, and refer my reader to the pages in his *Alliance* from whence they are taken.

Defin. I. "Religion, in the largest sense of the word, implies doctrine and morals ^b."

"Its *first end*, is to *procure the favour of God*: and its *second*, is to *improve our own intellectual nature* ^c."

"In its *strict and proper sense*, it is a commerce and intercourse with the supreme cause of all things, — and in suitable sentiments raised in us by *contemplation on his nature*, and on the relations we stand in towards him the proper and adequate object of all dependent beings, must needs advance and improve our intellectual nature to the height of which it is capable ^d."

Defin. II. "The *several acts of religious worship* are correspondent to the sentiments arising in us from the meditation on the several relations we stand in towards God, with design to aid and improve those sentiments ^e."

Maxim I. "By the law of nature every man has a right of worshiping God according to his conscience ^f."

Max. II. "Security to the temporal liberty and property of man, is the *only end* of civil government ^g."

Max. III. "Civil government is *defective*, because civil laws cannot conveniently take cognizance of the duties of *imperfect obligation*, such as *gratitude, hospitality, charity*, &c ^h."

^b *Alliance*, &c. p. 21. ^c P. 34. ^d P. 35. ^e P. 38.
^f P. 46. ^g P. 15. ^h P. 8 to 17.

A preliminary view, &c.

3

Max. IV. "Civil Society cannot *distinguish*
"the objects of its favourⁱ."

Max. V. "Civil Society could not *reward*,
"if it could discover the objects of its fa-
"vour^k."

Max. VI. "The civil Magistrate's office di-
"rectly leads him to *protect*, *cherish*, and *pro-*
"pagate the three fundamental articles of na-
"tural religion; namely—*the being of a God—*
"his providence over human affairs — and the
"natural essential difference of moral good and
"evil^l."

Max. VII. "As *Religion* only can supply
"the sanction of rewards, which society wants
"and has not, religion is absolutely necessary
"to civil government^m."

Max. VIII. "Religion could not operate with
"sufficient efficacy for want of a *common arbi-*
"ter, who had impartiality enough fairly to
"apply the rule of right, and power to en-
"force its operations. — Hence it was found
"necessary to call in the *civil magistrate* as an
"ally of religion to turn the balanceⁿ."

Max. IX. "*Religion* and *civil polity* lend a
"mutual aid to one another, not unlike that
"which two allies, in the same quarrel, may
"reciprocally receive against a common ene-
"my: whilst one party is closely pressed, the
"other comes up to its relief; disengages the
"first, gives it time to rally, and recruit its
"powers: By this time the assisting party is
"pushed in its turn, and needs the aid of that
"which is relieved; which is now at hand to
"repay the obligation. From henceforth the
"two parties ever act in *conjunction*; and, by

ⁱ Alliance, &c. p. 13

^k P. 14.

^l P. 23.

^m P. 16, 17.

ⁿ P. 5, 6.

“ that means keep the common enemy at a
 “ stand °.”

Max. X. “ Religious Society, as such, must
 “ needs be SOVEREIGN and INDEPENDENT ON
 “ THE CIVIL.——Cannot have a dependency
 “ either from essence or generation——the *im-*
 “ *periums* differ.——No dependency can arise
 “ from the law of nations P.”

Max. XI. “ Opinions are not in the *Magi-*
 “ *istrate's* ressort ^q. — Religion, or the care of
 “ the soul, not within his province——no part
 “ of his office ^r.——Civil Society has coercive
 “ power, religious Society has not ^s.——Care
 “ of religious Society does not extend to the
 “ body ^t.”

Max. XII. “ The great preliminary or funda-
 “ mental article of the *alliance* is this, THAT THE
 “ CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLU-
 “ ENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE ; AND
 “ THAT THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PRO-
 “ TECT THE CHURCH. —— To the perform-
 “ ance of which agreement there must necessa-
 “ rily be a *mutual communication of their respec-*
 “ *tive powers.*—— But, these Societies being
 “ naturally *independent* one on the other, a mu-
 “ tual concession cannot be safely made with-
 “ out one of them, at the same time, giving
 “ up to the other its right of independency ^v.”

Max. XIII. “ The *Church-representatives*
 “ compose no *third* or *distinct* estate in the Le-
 “ gislature, or civil Society ; are only an *al-*
 “ *liance*, not an *incorporation* like the *Jewish* Oeco-
 “ nomy, and therefore the union is revocable ^w.”

° *Alliance*, &c. p. 17. P P. 41. q P. 21. By the French
 word *ressort*, used by this Writer, I understand he means *juris-*
isdiction or *authority*. r P. 23. 26. s P. 41.
 t P. 42. v P. 72. w P. 79.

“—So that, when the alliance is broken, and
“the establishment dissolved, the Church reco-
“vers back its supremacy.”

* P. 80.



CHAP. I.

*The nature and end of the ALLIANCE be-
tween Church and State examined.*

THE alliance, contended for, is very im-
properly called an alliance between Church
and State, if the above definitions and maxims
may be depended upon: Since religion in its
true and proper sense, cannot have an establish-
ment from civil power or national laws: it be-
ing impossible in the nature of the thing, taking
for granted Mr. *Warburton's* principles. And,
altho' he would sily insinuate that his perform-
ance is written in *defence* of such establishment,
yet he seems to own he had some notion, nay
that he understood very well *the real state* of the
case;—as when he says, “That defenders of an
“established religion have all along been sedu-
“ced by an ERROR, namely, that it was to be
“maintained on the motives of TRUTH, and
“not of UTILITY. That is, that religion was
“to be established and protected, AS IT WAS
“THE TRUE RELIGION: not for the sake of its
“CIVIL UTILITY; which is the great principle
“whereby we erect an *established religion* and a
“test-law.” Here he plainly enough owns,

* P. 142.

that to defend an *establishment* upon the motives of *truth*, or as the *true* religion, is the foundation of *mistake* among all Writers in defence of Establishment ; and which he throws away with contempt in his scheme. And, again, he says, “ we observe,—that our establishment, “ made only on the motives of *civil utility*, “ really gains that end, which, in the other “ scheme, is the sole view in establishing a “ Church, which yet, by pursuing in a vain “ and visionary manner, cannot by that scheme “ be effected : I mean, *the advancement of “ truth*.”

This is full enough to the purpose.— However, as a saving clause, he makes a supposition, namely, “ that, *if* public utility and truth coincide, then, to provide for that *utility*, truth “ must be provided for ; which will not fail of “ being found, as being sought after by a sure “ method of success. On the whole we see, that, “ in this case, to aim at *truth* is losing it and “ *utility* together ; but to aim at *utility* is gaining both one and the other.”

Truth, by the confession of Mr. W., is by no means the proper aim or design of an establishment.—He leaves *truth* to drag after *public utility*.

§. 1. Let us see what encouragement Mr. W. has provided for *truth* to lacquey after *public utility*. And he says, “ that, if there be more “ than one religion in a State at the time of “ convention, the alliance is made by the State “ with the *largest* of the religious Societies. It “ is fit it should be so, because the *larger* the “ Society is, where there is an equality in other

1 *Alliance, &c.* p. 147.

2 *ibid.*

“ points,

“ points, the better enabled it will be to answer
 “ the ends of the alliance ; as having the great-
 “ est number under its influence. It is scarce
 “ possible it should be otherwise, because the
 “ two Societies being composed of the same in-
 “ dividuals, the greatly prevailing religion must
 “ have a *majority* of its members in the assem-
 “ blies of State : who will naturally prefer their
 “ own religion to all others ^a.”

Poor encouragement given for *truth* to follow
public utility. No coincidence can be supposed
 between truth and public utility in this founda-
 tion of an establishment ; unless we are sure that
truth has her pavilion always among the *most*,
 or, that the crowd, the majority, favoured by
 the civil Government, always have been her most
 faithful advocates.

But this very sentiment Mr. *W.* burlesques ;
 for, when he has supposed the *tolerated* to be the
true religion, he says, “ that those, who are
 “ tempted by civil advantages to quit the tole-
 “ rated for the established religion, are the most
 “ *unworthy* and *abandoned* of men. Men that,
 “ while they continue of the true religion, must
 “ disgrace and highly injure it. Unless it be
 “ supposed to be more for the interests of true
 “ religion to have large crowds, tho’ of false
 “ and unworthy members, than numbers of sin-
 “ cere professors ^b.”

But what concern *truth* has in this compact,
 we are left to infer, from “ the covenant being
 “ made between *two* Societies composed of the
 “ same individuals, for that the compact cannot
 “ be made, unless a majority of those members
 “ which constitute the Legislative, or Magistra-
 “ tic power, are of the number of contractors or

^a Alliance, &c. p. 113, 114.

^b P. 133, 134.

“covenanters : because the greatly prevailing
 “religion must have a *majority* of its members
 “in the assemblies of State, who will naturally
 “prefer *their own religion to all others*.” So that
 the expression, *where there is an equality in other
 points*, can be no saving clause respecting *religion*;
 because the greatly prevailing religion must
 have a majority of its members in the assemblies
 of State, who will naturally prefer *their own religion
 to all others*. I shall therefore leave him
 to make what he can of the, *where there is an
 equality in other points*. Hence the very origin
 of Church Establishments confessedly does not
 lie in *truth*, but in *power and numbers*. Nor is
 it possible to mistake this part of Mr. *W.*’s
 scheme. No matter whether *Pagan, Mahometan,
 Papal, or Christian* happen to be the *pre-
 vailing* religion, such only can have a claim to
 establishment.

That *truth* is quite out of the question, in
 point of religious establishments, Mr. *W.* farther
 demonstrates. — “Since, to have *the ad-
 vancement of truth in pursuit*, he declares to
 “be a *vain and visionary* thing.” And the pro-
 per way of defending an establishment is to strike
truth out of the whole scheme. Mr. *White*, in
 his defence of his three letters, p. 23, perfectly
 agrees with Mr. *Warburton*, as appears by the
 vile citation he has made from Dr. *Hoadley*’s an-
 swer to the representation, p. 99, where he makes
 him say, “that the want of learning is no dis-
 “qualification, but rather an excellent quali-
 “fication for judging of christianity.” — Than
 which, nothing can be more foreign to the truth
 of all that great writer has advanced. But it
 seems *lying* for the Church is a virtue in the opi-
 nion of some church-men. And it supports Mr.

Warburton's scheme of throwing truth out from the basis of an Establishment. The sentiment is no new one. *Pilate*, the Roman Governor, thought so, as well as Mr. *W.*: for when *Jesus* tells him that the sole end of his Kingdom, and of his coming into the world, was *truth*, and the propagation of it: *Pilate* sais, *What is truth?* He knew very well that *truth* had little or nothing to do with the maxims of worldly policy: That he, that is *Jesus*, was not at all likely to be a competitor with *Cesar*: That a *kingdom of truth* could not interfere with the claims of his Master: That it was trifling to accuse him as an enemy to *Cesar*. But then, had *Jesus* said that he was setting up a kingdom that claimed an alliance with the State, and which pretended to a *supremacy*; *Pilate* would have had whereof to accuse him.

The demonstration is given in other words, which I call Max. XV, as I shall have occasion to refer to it hereafter.

Max. XV. "If religion is to be established
 " and protected by a test-law, only because it is
 " the *true* religion, then opinions are encouraged
 " as opinions; that is, as *truths*, not as *utilities*:
 " and discouraged as opinions; that is, as *errors*,
 " not as *mischiefs*". The consequences of which
 " are, " I. An establishment is unjust. 1.
 " Because the civil Magistrate hath no right
 " to judge, as a Magistrate, which is the *true*
 " religion; this power not being given him on
 " man's entering into Society: nor could it be
 " given him; because one man cannot impower
 " another to judge for him in matters of
 " religion—— 2. It is unjust, because, if the
 " Magistrate was a competent judge, he would
 " yet have no right to reward its followers, or
 " discourage its opposers, because matters of
 " opinion belong not to his jurisdiction. II.
 " An

“ An establishment is absurd. It being impossible that the end of it should be attained.”
 And, in the reasoning of Mr. *W.*, “ a *test-law* regarding *truth* will appear *unjust*.”

§ 2. Examine we into the nature of this alliance, and observe how far he has made the compact promise *public utility*: either from the *State's* receiving greater power, efficacy, or safety, by such alliance; or from the Church's receiving greater efficacy or safety; or from their increased energy conjointly taken, or considered as one united body.

And 1st the pretension is, that the civil Magistrate stood in need of this alliance: “ inasmuch as civil laws could not take cognizance of the duties of *imperfect obligation*,” by Max. III; and by Maxims IV and V, “ civil Society can neither distinguish nor reward the objects of its favour.” But, by Max. VII, “ religion only can supply the sanction of rewards, which civil Society wants, and has not.” — And, yet, “ civil society is allowed to have a magistracy belonging to it, whose province does extend so far as to *protect, cherish, and propagate* the three fundamental principles of natural religion; *namely*, the being of a God — his providence over human affairs — and “ the natural essential difference of *moral good* and *evil*.”

The *Magistrate's power* is here allowed a sufficient compass: since in such *protection*, &c. the proper subjects of its favour are distinguished, and duly rewarded. And by the *alliance* the civil Magistrate can obtain no more sagacity or power, either of distinguishing or rewarding his

“ *Alliance*, &c. p. 143, 144. “ P. 145. “ P. 23.

favourites: since, by Max. XV, "a Magistrate has no right to judge, as a Magistrate, which is the *true* religion. — "This power cannot be "given him, because one man cannot impower "another to judge for him in matters of religion."

If no man can give the Magistrate this power, no number of men can give it him; because no number of men can by consent confer that, which its several individuals are in no degree possessed of. For every individual being absolutely destitute of such power, as contrary to the nature of true religion, numbers will only be an aggregate sum of incapables.

And yet Mr. *W.* sais, "that the *State* was induced to *seek this alliance*, as the Church confers on the *State* the *application* of the efficacy of religion, and puts it under the Magistrate's direction ^f." — By the *efficacy* of religion here, we are to understand, "that *authority* "which the *Church* confers on the *State* to prescribe public exercises of religion, and in such "a manner as the exigencies of the *State* require." — But the reason of this is very peculiar, *namely*, "there are peculiar junctures "when the influence of religion is more than "ordinary serviceable to the *State*: and these "the civil Magistrate only knows ^g."

Doubtless, the *State* is infinitely indebted to the *Church* for this courtesy. But is it not marvellous that the civil Magistrate, who is not, neither can be, as such, a judge of religion, or have it in his power to reward, should yet understand the *application* of the efficacy of religion? nay, in some conjunctures, be the *only* judge! Especially will this appear astonishing when we

^f *Alliance*, &c. p. 62.

^g *ibid.*

consider,

consider, that the *alliance* has not been able to confer any thing upon the State: for “the Church, as a religious society and distinct from the civil, had nothing to confer of a civil nature: *this independent religious Society hath not in and of itself any coercive power of the civil kind*.”^h”

Its inherent authority and powers, being in their nature and use intirely different from those of the State, will fix the absurdity: and is thus proved; the Church cannot confer on the State any of its own distinct authority and powers; since that authority and those powers have nothing to do with the *bodies* of men: “for, did the care of the religious Society naturally extend to the *body* and its concerns, then would the State run a great risque of becoming dependent, and a creature of itⁱ.” — The Church could not confer what it had not: and what it had, or pretended to have, *namely, the care of souls*, is absolutely unalienable or untransferrable: “because the Magistrate’s office cannot extend to the *care of souls*: If it did, it seems that, then, religious society would be subservient to, and a creature of the State^k.”

§ 3. Would we know, in a word, the advantage which the State gains by the alliance, it is a *supremacy in matters ecclesiastical*^l. viz. “The Church

^h *Alliance*, p. 43. ⁱ P. 42. ^k Ibid.

^l It is pity but Mr. *W.* had been as lucky as a brother of his, who has told us of an *obligation* that the State is under to the Church, viz. “from her being content to exclude *Non-juring Clergymen*, for the safety of the State: which he thinks the State can do no less, in regard to the safety of the Church, than to return the civility by keeping the enemies of the Church

“ Church resigning up her independency, and making the Magistrate her supreme head, without whose approbation and allowance she can direct, order, and decree nothing^m.” And, yet, the Magistrate, “ by vertue of this supremacy, cannot make or confer the character of priest or minister; tho’ the exercise of it be solely by his allowanceⁿ.”

What can this *supremacy* signify? The Magistrate has, he can have, no concern with religion, or the care of souls. This investiture is, besides, absolutely inconsistent with and repugnant to the nature of the Magistrate’s office: for he is expressly said to have no concern with opinions or doctrines, with truth, or the care of souls: and, yet, the Church has made the civil Magistrate her *supreme head*! Is there not something like a *solecism* in this? What sort of demonstration? Is not this a false representation of the Constitution? What; Has the civil Magistrate no hand in conferring either the character of Priest or Minister? Does not the King make, constitute, appoint every Bishop? If so, he virtually confers the character of every Priest or Minister. But will Mr. W. say, that his thus interfering, in making character, is impertinent? or that, by giving up this right to the Magistrate, the Church is *dissolved, lost, and absorbed* in the State. — That to interfere, in making character, is *unjust, nay impious* °. — So much freedom has he been pleased to use with the supreme Head of the Church.

“ Church out of its service^{*}. — This would have been a masterly stroke indeed! as it would have shewn the consummate modesty of a Churchman, in calling a *Statute-Law*, by which a Non-juror is disqualified, a compliment paid by the Church to the State, and would have suited Mr. Warburton’s demonstration.

* Mr. White’s Letter to a Gentleman dissenting, &c. p. 12.

^m Alliance, &c. p. 87. ⁿ P. 88, 89. ^o P. 89.

§ 4. Another advantage, the *State* is said to gain by the alliance, is, “the Convocation cannot sit without its permission ^p.”

But how does this appear to be an advantage to the State?—— “The Church denies that she “has any *coercive power* over the bodies of “men^q.” And Mr. *W*. has defined *religion*, to be a personal thing; so that no man can impower another to judge for him in matters of religion. The fitting of Convocations then can be no advantage to the State.

However, we are told, “that the State can “impart a *coercive power* to the Church to invigorate the influences of religion, in those cases where the civil law had no force.—Civil laws not prescribing a remedy. It must be a tribunal regarding *irregular intentions* as criminal, which can do this; and that is no other than the tribunal of religion^r.”——Hence is deduced the true and only end of *Spiritual Courts*, “a Church tribunal with coercive power “being necessary in all these cases, and, a religious society having in itself no such power, “it must be borrowed from the State^s.”

Nothing but *solecisms*.——A State can lend that which it never had, namely, a power to sit in judgment upon the *minds* of men, or upon their *irregular intentions*. How is this consistent with its having *nothing* to do with the care of souls?——The Magistrate’s office extends to the protection of the three great fundamentals of natural religion: and no alliance can make it extend farther, upon Mr. *W*’s own principles. Nevertheless, we hear of “excommunications “for *doctrines* and *matters of opinion*, even when “authorised by the State^t.” Tho’ we are

^p Alliance, &c. p. 90. ^q P. 43. ^r P. 61. ^s P. 62.
^t P. 92.

assured over and over, that the State has nothing at all to do with *doctrines* or *opinions*. See Max. XI. — It will follow, that such excommunications, authorised by the State, do manifestly *debase* and *vilify* the end of civil government; for, according to Max. II, “ Security “ to the temporal liberty and property of man “ is the *only end* of civil government.”

The compliments paid by Mr. W. to the Church and Ecclesiastical Courts will afford us matter of reflexion.

As when speaking of those fundamental principles of natural religion, which the State has an inherent power to restrain, he says, “ that the “ exercise of that power is of so great moment “ and importance to the State, that it would *not* “ be safe to intrust it in any other hands: especially as it is very liable to be *abused* in Ecclesiastical Courts, and very little in civil.”

The Church, it seems, is not fit to be trusted with a power to restrain those opinions which concern the principles of natural religion. Power is very liable to be abused in an Ecclesiastical Court. And, yet, “ the abolition of these “ courts would overturn the very foundation “ on which the establishment is erected.”

How amazingly strong is the basis of the establishment! — But if the *State* is much more to be trusted with power than the *Church*, even in respect of the doctrines of natural religion, the Church cannot be more fit to be intrusted with power, with respect to the doctrines of revealed religion. For, if she is likely to be an unsafe Executrix in a trust where the principles are incontestably plain and obvious, we may be assured that it must be unspeakably dangerous to give

her a power, where she herself is *interested*, or has a pretension to the moulding and forming the doctrines. Look to Max. VIII, and you will find, that the Church had not *virtue*, had not *impartiality* enough to be a *common arbiter*. She could not *fairly* apply the rule of right: so that religion was not able to operate with *sufficient efficacy*, 'till the civil Magistrate was called in, as an ally of religion. Can this intend the *religion*, or the *Church of Jesus*? His religion, we are sure, borrows no efficacy from the civil Magistrate, nor is it possible that it should. His Church has no *common arbiter* but himself, who will ever judge with infinitely more impartiality than even the civil Magistrate can.—He will fairly apply *the rule of right* without any prejudice—and his authority is the *only* authority that can enforce the operation of the rule of right in his Church. It is pity but Mr. *W.* had better digested the design of the Bishop of Bangor's famous sermon on *Christ's Kingdom*.——But,

By Maxims XIV and XV, Mr. *W.* seems wholly to exclude the idea of *true religion*, when he is mentioning the *established religion*. Truth is not the *design* of an establishment.

If Mr. *W.* has any notion of the Church, as the *Kingdom of Christ*, he must have borrowed it from that of our Lord's apostles, during the time of their expectation that *Jesus* would be a *temporal Saviour*. As, when their *Master* had shewn how impossible it was for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven, *Matt. xix*, they ask, *who then can be saved?* They think his kingdom would never be safe or secure, unless the *great men* and the *rulers* established an alliance. And might we not reply to Mr. *W.*, as *Jesus* did to his apostles, *With men* [that is, such who favour the things that are of men] *this is impossible; but with*

with God all things are possible. The Kingdom of God can support, tho' all the powers on earth should endeavour to destroy it. It has done so; and with more glory and greater lustre than it has ever done under the props of an human establishment.

§. 5. "The Magistrate's office is designed for no other end, *than the security of the temporal liberty and property of man.* For this end civil Society was invented, and this, civil Society alone is able to procure^x. But a pretended regard to virtue and religion hath in all ages disposed the Magistrate to deviate from his proper office, the legitimate end of Society; till at length the *care of the soul* got the upper hand of that of the body, in his administration; to the infinite damage of Mankind in all his interests^y."

One would be tempted to conclude from hence, that an alliance of the State with the Church cannot possibly *benefit* human Society; but must endanger its welfare, as the Magistrate is tempted, from the alliance, to imagine he has a concern with the *care of souls*; for nothing can contribute more to his being thus led from the legitimate design of his office: which, Mr. W. says, is to the *infinite damage* of mankind!

The State, then, can have no advantage by the alliance: We must therefore, 2dly, examine what *gain* the Church has from it.

§. 6. The *Church of Christ*, rightly understood, is that *body of Christians* that do exist in the world, who own the *Scriptures of the New Testament*, to be the *only rule* of their faith and worship, and who are

^x Alliance, &c. p. 21.

^y P. 26.

forming their own spirits and actions upon its precepts and examples. This is the idea of the *Church universal*, or the *Catholic Church*. And, when any more restrictive and partial, yet religious idea is intended by the word, *Church*, it is then a Society or number of persons who are formed upon the same principles^z.

But, by the *Church*, in the language of Mr. W., we are to understand a *fictitious thing*, that has assumed the name, from its having a *majority* in the State; whether it be *Church Pagan*, *Church Mahometan*, *Church Papal*, &c.

What is this Church?—"Why, it is a religious Society *sovereign and independent* on the civil^a. It has no *coercive power* of the civil kind^b.—It needs no coercive power, forasmuch as the good, which religious Society aims at, cannot be effected by outward practice: therefore coercive power is altogether unfit for that Society^c."

^z N. B. Mr. John White, in his *third Letter to a Gentleman dissenting*, &c. p. 5, has given us a very surprizing representation of the Church.—His words are, "And since the Church, as a Church, or not considered under the immediate and extraordinary guidance of the Holy Spirit, has the same power and authority in all ages, the apostolic no greater than the present, I can't see why it should be thought a more unwarrantable thing, in the *present Church*, to join the use of the *sign of the Cross*, in the administration of one sacrament, than it was in the *apostolic*, to ordain the *kiss of charity*, in the celebration of the other." Here the Church, as a Church, is said to have the same power and authority now, as in the apostolic age, without considering it under the extraordinary guidance of the Spirit; and, if he means any thing, the *kiss of charity* was ordained by Church-authority without the suffrage of the Holy Spirit, even in the apostolic age. *i. e.* Church authority has no dependence on the suffrage of the Holy Spirit, and so may be allowed to do whatsoever the Church, as a Church, has thought fit to do in any age: and is consequently independent as well on the Spirit of God, as on the State.

^a *Alliance*, &c. p. 40.

^b P. 43.

^c P. 44.

But

But then, the Church reserves to herself a *right of excommunication*, or the power of expelling refractory members from its body.—“*And this is all which religious Society stands in need of,—*”
“and more is unfit and unjust,—for this excep-
“tion we always had in mind, when we main-
“tained, that a religious Society had no inhe-
“rent coercive power^d.”

If this be the true state of the case, then the Church has no *greater efficacy* by the alliance; but, rather, is led to pay an *hypocritical* compliment to the State. For, notwithstanding this inherent right, it is asserted, “that no member of
“the established Church can be excommuni-
“cated, or expelled the Society, without the con-
“sent and allowance of the Magistrate^e.”

How ridiculous is the argument for the alliance on the side of the Church? It has no coercive power,—it needs none,—and yet it reserves to itself a power of excommunication, as an inherent right, at the same time it cannot excommunicate without the consent of the civil Magistrate!—That it should seek an alliance, when it wanted no more coercive power than it inherently has in itself, and when all the benefit of such alliance is, that that very inherent power is thereby made *no power at all*, but wholly dependent on the State for efficacy; this is wonderful! but no manner of proof of the alliance conveying greater power and efficacy to the Church than it had before such alliance.

In this very point of *coercive power*, if we consider it as the result of such alliance, that the Church can *safely* exert it with the consent of the State, it will even yet be far from appearing a real benefit to Society. And therefore the great

^d *Alliance*, &c. p. 45.

^e P. 95.

point to be proved, viz. the *public utility* of an alliance, wants support; nay, it has no real subsistence.——For it is said in defence of *simple expulsion*, which is the utmost exertion of coercive power that can be made with safety, “that such member is so far from being debarred by that expulsion of his right of worshipping God according to his own conscience, *that he is thereby put into a way of exercising his right*†.”

What now must be thought of those *within the pale* of the establishment?—Do they not appear, by this concession, to be under the guidance or direction of a *public conscience*? And to be a people who exercise not the rights of a personal or private conscience,—and, until this expulsion, to have been *formal, implicit, and prejudiced* Religionists, or Church-men! Happy, unspeakably happy they, who have given occasion for this expulsion! inasmuch as the alliance can never operate with so much advantage, as when, by its excommunications, it *puts men in the way of exercising the rights of conscience*.

In this declaration, Mr. *W.* plainly intends, by the *Church*, something *merely factitious*; since no sooner is a man by *simple expulsion* driven out of the *established Society*, but he becomes a member of the *true Church*: that is to say, if he pleases to exercise the rights of conscience, to which such expulsion so happily leads him; than which, nothing is more essential to the *religious character*.

§ 7. It is yet asserted, “that the Church receives, from the State, a *public endowment* for its ministers: a separate and certain portion of the national property, assigned for the

† Alliance, &c. p. 46.

“ maintenance and support of the Clergy; for
 “ these reasons, *namely*, to render religious
 “ Society more durable, — to encourage the
 “ Clergy’s best service to the State — to
 “ destroy that mutual dependency between the
 “ Clergy and People, which arises from the
 “ *former’s* being maintained by the voluntary
 “ contributions of the *latter* &.

“ This is the legitimate benefit, which being
 “ *considerable*, is the Church’s motive to the
 “ alliance ^h. ”

And, yet, two motives are expressly condemned by this Writer; “ the one is the propagating the established religion by civil force,
 “ — the other is the bestowing *honours, riches,*
 “ and *powers* upon it. The first of which is
 “ unjust; the second impertinent. The first
 “ *unjust*, because it would be to violate the
 “ *natural right* every man has of worshipping
 “ God according to his conscience. The
 “ second *impertinent*, because they are things,
 “ which, as a Church, she can neither use nor
 “ receive profit from ⁱ. ” He would here distinguish between the *motives* of the Clergy, and that of the whole Body, both Laity and Clergy! the *ultimate* end of which, he says, could not be riches, honours, and power, but the salvation of souls. But this distinction is vain and groundless; because it is greatly to our purpose to enquire what were the motives of the Clergy; as they were the great *contractors* or *covenanters* in this alliance; and, doubtless, are the persons who hold that *supremacy* with which he sometimes threatens the State, from their resumption of it, *that is*, if the State should not keep close to her contract. And besides, we know that the Clergy,

& Alliance, &c. p. 74. ^h P. 68. ⁱ 68, 69.

at the time of this convention, had full direction of the laity, who were their implicit and very devout followers. So that the motives of the *Clergy* may be reckoned upon, as the *true motives* to the *convention*; and these Mr. *W.* seems to own might be riches, honours, and power, notwithstanding these were not *legitimate* ones. The Reader will do well to keep this in mind. And again, the Church's motive "could not be riches, honours, or power; because they have no natural tendency to promote the ultimate end of this Society, namely, the salvation of souls: neither the immediate end, namely, purity of worship. We conclude therefore, that the only *legitimate* motive, she could have, was *security and protection* from outward violence^k." Thus lies the reasoning of this Writer.

But how is his public endowment consistent with these declarations? Or how reconcileable with civil Society having no right to *reward* any of its members by admission into a religious Society, or to *punish* by excluding from it, deserves consideration. — *Public endowment* can be no legitimate motive; because "the only legitimate one, the Church could have, was *security and protection* from outward violence^l." Hence, demonstration arises against public endowment being a legitimate motive, unless *public endowment and protection from outward violence* be one and the same thing.

Indeed, public endowment this Writer would distinguish from *riches, honours, and power*; which, he says, could not be the Church's motive: but, with what truth, let any man judge, who takes a survey of his public endowment. but this may be farther illustrated under the next Section.

^k *Alliance, &c.* p. 69.

^l *ibid.*

§ 8. A corollary made from the original grant of privilege, which the Church enjoys by the alliance, is, “*that as the Bishops right of sitting in Parliament begun, so it must end with the establishment.—They sit in the Legislative as guards and watchmen over the Church, ne quid Ecclesia detrimenti capiat.* — But, when the alliance is broken, and the establishment dissolved, the Church recovers back its SUPREMACY^m.” I own, I am quite confounded at that awful, majestic word, — SUPREMACY ! Its mystic energy may be very terrible ! — We have a hint given us of its importance ; “*so that the State losing that means of injuring the Church, and having no longer a right of making laws for it.*”ⁿ Again, upon a dissolution of the establishment, “*the Church has no more pretence of representation in the Legislature. Nor will their Baronies save them— for these Baronies being part of the public maintenance which the State assigns to the Clergy of an established Church, and that maintenance having been granted only during an establishment, the foundation of the right utterly fails, when the establishment is abolished.*”^{*}

With what truth *public endowment* is contradistinguished from riches, honours, and power, when *Baronies* and *Deaneries*, &c. are a part of the public maintenance, I would only mention as a sample of the humble spirit of this Writer, who has so much grace as enables him to treat *Baronies*, or a seat in the *house of Lords*, with so much contempt, that it is scarce worthy a comparison with that *supremacy*, which these Dignitaries would immediately resume upon quitting

^m Alliance, &c. p. 80.

ⁿ *ibid.*

^{*} *ibid.*

their seats in that house Who can once mention *tythes*, when Baronies are thus degraded? And it is enough to astonish the mind, beyond measure, to contemplate the great self-denial and mortification of the Church, that, in giving up her *independency* to the State, has paid the compliment of a *Diadem* far superior to what is found in the crowns of Princes, namely, that of her SUPREMACY!

§ 9. Another aid, which the Church receives by the alliance, is “her being intrusted with a
“jurisdiction enforced by civil coercive power;
“or an ECCLESIASTICAL COURT FOR REFOR-
“MATION OF MANNERS.— a *succedaneum* to the
“civil judicatures. And it is fit the Church
“should be strengthened with this authority,
“that it might not be left quite naked and de-
“fenceless, after having given up its supremacy
“to the State.”

“Now, no *matters of opinion*, — nor *civil*
“*matters* that temporal courts can conveniently
“take cognizance of, can possibly come within
“the jurisdiction of *Ecclesiastical Courts*: be-
“cause, 1. the Church cannot lawfully exercise
“coercive power in matters of opinion. 2. Be-
“cause, if it could, the State had no right to
“bestow such power——and if *criminal causes*,
“which civil courts can commodiously take
“notice of, belong not to the Church’s jurif-
“diction; what pretence hath she to *civil causes*,
“or the determination of private property?
“The great founder of her religion said, WHO
“MADE ME A JUDGE OR DIVIDER BETWEEN
“YOU? And what he would not assume himself,
“he would scarce bestow upon his Church.

! ° *Alliance*, &c. p. 80, 81.

“ And

“ And that the State should ever intend to give
 “ her what was the peculiar right of temporal
 “ courts, is as difficult to think P.”

“ We conclude then, that ecclesiastical jurif-
 “ diction with coercive power was given SOLELY
 “ FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS. From hence
 “ it appears with what justice our constitution
 “ hath subjected *all sorts of Dissenters* from the
 “ established Church to this jurisdiction. The
 “ State’s care of reformation of manners extend-
 “ ing to men of all sects, and no sect can pre-
 “ tend conscience for their exemption q.”

This is such reasoning as must certainly make
 a man of a weak head reel or stagger. — Because
 the Church neither has, nor can have power in
matters of opinion, nor in *civil matters* any jurif-
 diction, that can be exerted by the State ; there-
 fore a jurisdiction is given to the Church SOLELY
 FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS. And
 hence the justice of subjecting *all Dissenters* to
 this jurisdiction of the Church appears ; inasmuch
 as the State’s *care of reformation extends to all*.
 But,

The State’s care or concern in the reformation
 of manners has absolutely nothing to do with
opinions, by Max. XI. And therefore the civil
 Magistrate can confer no coercive power on the
 Church, in the article of her own impotency.
 But if the Church has no coercive power neither
 in *matters of opinion*, nor in *civil cases*, how can
all Dissenters be said to be subjected to the
 Church’s jurisdiction ? Why truly, says Mr. W.,
 the Church lends her aid in order to inforce the
duties of imperfect obligation : such as *gratitude*,
hospitality, *charity*, &c. which he thinks to be

one main buttress of the alliance he contends for.

But will it not yet be an insuperable task, for him, or any other man, to demonstrate, that this Ecclesiastical Court, erected *solely for the reformation of manners*, has any capacity of enforcing such duties, as it is constituted? Or, are there any instances upon record to prove that *in fact* this Court has enforced *gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c.*?

The Church, if considered as a Church or a religious Society, can have no power but from *Jesus*. And every distinct sect of Christians who dissent from the Establishment, in the judgment of truth and charity, derive equal power from *Jesus* to enforce duties of *imperfect obligation*, both by precept and example.

And yet no *Protestant Dissenter* will deny, that the State has an undoubted right to exercise power *for the reformation of manners*. But if the proper province of the Magistrate is to protect, cherish, and propagate the *three* fundamental articles of natural religion, then the concern he has in the reformation of manners can extend no farther; and so far, and no farther, are all Dissenters, equally with men of the Establishment, under his coercive power. So that an ecclesiastical jurisdiction, instituted *solely for the reformation of manners*, is absurd. But a subjection to the civil Magistrate, in the three great branches of natural religion, is all that is needful, or can be conducive to the reformation of manners; and all that the State can express any just care about, since opinions, or religious sentiments, they have nothing at all to do with, as this Writer declares; —so that coercive power, extended farther, is both impertinent and impious. How then can it be made appear, that an *Ecclesiastical*

fiastical Court can be requisite for the good of Society, or as a *succedaneum* to the civil judicatures?

Another observation may be made, and that is this, *viz.* that, whatever *justice* may appear in our Constitution having subjected Dissenters of *all sorts* to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, there does not appear much *wisdom* in it. *Vindictive* justice there possibly may be, or rather rigorous, party resentments, but no wisdom, as there are no apt means made use of to recommend the duties of imperfect obligation, such as *gratitude*, *hospitallity*, and *charity*; unless they can be promoted by those *lucrative* measures which are made use of towards such who feel the lashes of her maternal correction. But what probable tendency have these to reform the manners of men, upon religious principles? And, if this be the truth, then the *State* hereby receives no manner of aid from its alliance with the *Church*——neither can any benefit accrue to civil Society from the institution of Ecclesiastical Courts. Their censures, mulcts, penalties, and penances are not calculated to spread *gratitude*, *hospitallity*, or *charity*. . . . But, before Mr. *W.* had built so much upon this *reason* of the alliance, he should have shewn, that these *virtues*, which are discoverable in the duties of *imperfect obligation*, which civil laws cannot enforce, do not flourish as much out of the reach, as they do under the influence of an Ecclesiastical Court.

I would further observe, that, if we form our ideas of the *Church of England*, from our own *Statute Laws*, we shall perceive it to be absolutely under a *civil Head*, which civil Head has the sovereign power invested in itself; *viz.* the power of purging, correcting, and reforming the errors and enormities that may be found in this Ecclesiastical

fiastical Body. So 26 of *Hen. 8. c. 1.* "Albeit
 "the King's Majesty justly and rightfully is,
 "and ought to be the *supreme Head* of the
 "Church of *England*, and so is recognized by
 "the Clergy of this Realm in their Convocations,
 "yet nevertheless, for corroboration and con-
 "firmation thereof, and for increase of virtue
 "in *Christ's* religion within this Realm of *Eng-*
 "*land*, and to repress and extirpate all errors,
 "heresies, and other enormities and abuses here-
 "tofore used in the same: be it enacted by
 "authority of this present Parliament, that the
 "King our Sovereign Lord, his heirs and suc-
 "cessors, Kings of this Realm, shall be taken,
 "accepted, and reputed the ONLY SUPREME
 "HEAD in earth of the Church of *England*,
 "called *Anglicana Ecclesia.*"

And, by another Statute, all *Church-power* is
 expressly asserted to be derived from this *civil*
Head, 1 *Edw. 6. c. 2. §. 3.* "Seeing that all
 "authority of Jurisdiction spiritual and temporal
 "is derived and deducted from the King's
 "Majesty, as SUPREME HEAD of these Churches
 "and Realms of *England* and *Ireland.*"

With which agrees that of 1 *Eliz. c. 1. §. 17.*—
 "That it may be established and enacted by the
 "authority aforesaid, that such jurisdictions,
 "priviledges, superiorities, and preheminencies
 "Spiritual and Ecclesiastical, as by any Spiritual
 "or Ecclesiastical power or authority hath here-
 "tofore been, or may lawfully be exercised and
 "used for the visitation of the Ecclesiastical state
 "and persons, and for reformation, order, and
 "correction of the same, and of all manner of
 "Errors, Heresies, schisms, abuses, offences,
 "contempts, and enormities, shall for ever, by
 "authority of this present Parliament, be united
 "and annexed to the *Imperial Crown* of these
 "Realms."

From

From these Statutes it appears, that the *Church of England* hath no other than a *civil Head*, the several sovereign Princes which sway the *British* sceptre—that all *Ecclesiastical power* is unalienably invested in this Head by Parliament.—And that all Mr. *W.*'s boastings about the importance of an *Ecclesiastical Court*, erected *solely for the reformation of manners*, amounts to no more than this, *viz.* that they have no power at all, as spiritual men, but just as the civil Head is pleased to license them: and are themselves supposed to be liable to *errors, heresies*, and other *enormities and abuses*, which the King may, at his pleasure, as he is authorized thereunto by the laws of the land, *visit, chastise, and punish.*

And, yet, Mr. *W.* denies that the *civil Magistrate* is any judge in *matters of opinion*: and will allow him to have *no authority* in religion. We are therefore obliged to understand all the *errors, heresies*, and *schisms*, which our Laws have invested the Sovereign of these Kingdoms with a power to punish; to intend no more, than some immoralities that disturb the order of civil Society. For, if they intend *opinion*, or *matters of religion*, then Mr. *W.* gives the lie to our *Statute Laws*, by his denying that the Magistrate has any thing to do in this province. And, if the supreme Magistrate has no power in matters of religion, then, forasmuch as *Ecclesiastical Courts* can exercise no authority but by grant or commission from the supreme Magistrate, it must be impossible that they can have any effect, as Courts Ecclesiastical. *i. e.* They can have nothing to do to give law, or direct, or censure men for matters of opinion, or in things which concern religion.

“ Even the power for the visitation of the Eccle-
 “ siastical state and persons, and for reformation,
 “ order, and correction of the same, and all
 “ manner

“ manner of errors, heresies, schisms, offences,
 “ contempts and enormities are for ever united
 “ and annexed to the Imperial Crown of these
 “ Realms.” A Statute enacted in direct denial
 of all or any manner of power with which Eccle-
 siasties had pretended to be invested.—And as
 Mr. *W.* absolutely denies that the civil Magistrate
 can have any thing to do with opinions, and that
 the care of the soul is not within his province, it
 must follow, that his *Ecclesiastical Courts* can
 have neither *sense, energy, or any degree of vigour*
 belonging to them, as Ecclesiastical Courts. And
 he very weakly asserts of them, as well as very
 falsely, that they were instituted *solely for the*
reformation of manners.

§. 10. III. Having considered the argument
 from the State's receiving advantage, and, then,
 the advantage that accrues to the Church from
 the alliance, we are next to examine whether
 there is a *greater energy* in the Church and State
conjointly taken, or considered in *union*, by which
public utility is procured. And here I find myself
 as much at a loss how to discover a true reason
 of such an union as is that contended for by
 Mr. *W.* and must, upon his own principles,
 suppose it to be a very *unnatural* and *absurd*
 union: or, that in reality there can be no such
 union or alliance defended upon the principles of
 reason and religion. For, “ Christian Society
 “ is by divine institution, which pure natural re-
 “ ligion is, *he sais*, only by human^r. Christian
 “ Society is superior to natural religion, and to
 “ the *Jewish*, in being *perfectly free*, and in-
 “ *dependent* on the civil^s.—Religious Society
 “ must needs be *sovereign* and *independent* on
 “ the civil^t.—

^r *Alliance, &c.* P. 99. ^s P. 100. ^t P. 40.

“ The *Christian* religion was not only left independent of the State, by not being united to it like the *Jewish*, for, being so left, by the law of nature it must needs be independent ; but its independency was likewise secured by divine institution, in that famous declaration of the great founder, MY KINGDOM IS NOT OF THIS WORLD. Which bears this plain and obvious sense, — that the Kingdom of Christ was not, like the *Kingdom of God*, confined to the *Jewish* people, where religion was incorporated with the State, and therefore of *this world* as well in the exercise of it, as in the rewards and punishments by which it was administered ; but was *independent* of all civil communities, and therefore neither of this world as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it was administered.”

Who does not see a difficulty in the Christian Church’s uniting with the State ? — But no difficulty is unsurmountable to this Writer : for he says, “ that because this religion extended to all mankind, and was not confined, like the *Mosaic*, to the *Jewish* people : consequently, that very reason that made it proper for the *Mosaic* religion to be united, by institution, to the State, made it fit that the *Christian* should be made *free* and *independent*.” But for what ? — “ that it might be at liberty to adapt itself to the *many various kinds of civil policies throughout the world* by a suitable union and alliance — whereby the famous prophecy of *Isaiah* might receive its *ultimate completion* : Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people. — And Kings shall be thy

* Alliance, &c. p. 101, 102.

“ nursing

“nursing fathers, and their Queens thy nursing mothers.” — An alliance then the Church was at liberty to make, notwithstanding this independent nature, and this spiritual design of Christ’s Kingdom. — Mr. W. must be a man of an astonishing penetration to make such conclusions arise from the premisses!

To excite and indulge our admiration we will go over the reasoning again with attention: “A Society perfectly free and independent on the civil: greatly superior to the Jewish, in that it was not only left independent on the State, and so by the law of nature must needs be independent; but its independency farther secured by divine institution. — Christ’s Kingdom is not of this World. — Not like the Jewish, incorporated with the State. — A distinguished Society or Kingdom, as it was to be extended over all the world.”

And to what great purpose all this? Why truly Mr. W. says, “that it had this divine freedom and independency, in order that it might have the advantage of the Jewish religion, in being at liberty to adapt itself to the many various kinds of civil policies throughout the world by a suitable union and alliance.” — That is to say, ridiculously enough, the Christian Society was made more distinct, different, and independent on all civil Society, that it might more easily and universally mix with civil Society, and give up its independency! — for, “the Societies, naturally independent on one another, cannot make a safe union, unless one gives up to the other its right of independency!”

On the contrary, if the *independency* and *supremacy* of the Church, so much boasted of, be any thing worthy of esteem, it must, one would think, intend its freedom from any *worldly attachments*; its principles, its maxims, its aims being more sublime, noble, pure, and spiritual. The Church, if considered as truly a religious Society, and compared with the State, can have no *independency* nor any *supremacy*, but what consists in a *disinterestedness* in the riches, the honours, or the indulgences of worldly favours. Hence it was, that our Lord mentioned his Kingdom, as *not of this world*: that is, as a polity quite distinct from worldly polity. So that, in the reason and nature of things, it is impossible that his Kingdom should be capable of any alliance with this world. Accordingly the disciples of Jesus are enjoined to *lay up their treasures in heaven, and not on earth*: because *men cannot serve God and Mammon*. Or, because that a man, who is fond of worldly good things, *can no more enter into the Kingdom of God, than a camel can go through the eye of a needle*. And because Jesus pronounceth that man a *fool*, who layeth up treasure for himself, and *is not rich towards God*.

As to the principle of *ambition*, or a fondness of honour, and power, which is also a worldly principle, and obtains in all earthly States and Kingdoms, *this* is declared by Jesus to be, in its own nature, *irreconcilable* with the maxims of his Kingdom; “*The poor in spirit, the meek, the humble only can be blessed.*” And all Christ’s disciples must become as *free* from high-mindedness as *little children*.—Is it possible then for a Church, made up of such individuals, so to change her nature in Society * as to become the

* Alliance, &c. p. 72.

very reverse to what she is, considered separately, or as individuals? This masterly stroke in sophistry has, we know, invented the *infallibility* of *Oecumenical Councils* in the Papal-Church, which, taken separately in their constituents, are allowedly fallible.

But to return to the article of *ambition*; the *Christian* doctrine does no where encourage a thirst either of *priority*, or of *superiority*: but, on the contrary, if the *sons of Zebedee* want posts of honour, or pre-eminence, *they know not what they ask*. To sit on Christ's right hand; or on his left, will be only the result of men's having preserved humility of mind, and a becoming modesty to the death, from a fear and reverence of God and truth. Lordship and rule cannot belong to any of the subjects of Christ's Kingdom; but they who rule over the Gentiles, or in civil States, *exercise lordship over them, and their great ones exercise authority upon them*, by enacting laws suitable to the condition and exigencies of the community; but said Jesus, *it shall not be so among you, no, not among you my apostles; but whosoever will be great among you, shall be your minister: and whosoever of you will be the chiefest, he shall be SERVANT OF ALL!* that is, he shall be under a curse of the same import with that *Hebraism*, Gen. ix. 25. a *servant of servants*, i. e. *base and vile*, in the eye of him whom he pretends to call *Master*. Which title, by the way, the *Pope* has taken to himself with the utmost propriety.—Ambition is condemned in all the disciples of Jesus; for a *Christian* must not so much as take upon him the title of *Doctor*, *Master*, or *Father*, as intending by it any *superiority* over his brethren: or intimating any *authority* with which he is invested. The *Christian* has but *one* Master, whose directions he is

to follow, in his religious character; and but one Father who has appointed for him that *one* Master. Such an abhorrence does the *Christian* scheme express of *all human authority* in religion, or in things which pertain to the unalienable rights of conscience. It follows, that fire and water may as well mix and become united, as the maxims of state policy with the maxims of Christ's kingdom.—See, in confirmation hereof, the citation from Mr. *W.* in the title-page.

§. 11. That the *virtuous Reader* may not become squeamish, or his antipathy rise so high as to keck at the alliance, Mr. *W.* sais, “ It is “ impertinent in the Church to aim at riches, “ honours, or power; because these are things “ which, as a Church, she can neither use nor “ receive profit from^y.” These, the good man saw, were absolutely excluded by the *Christian* law, as *being of the world, and not of the Father*: and therefore, he asserts, that the Church can have no aim at them, as a Church; that is, whilst she remains a part of Christ's Kingdom, or the subject of his rule^z.—but, in an alliance

D 2 with

^y *Alliance*, p. 69. ^z By Max. XI, “ *the care of the soul* “ is the immediate province of the religious, and not of the “ civil Society.” Take this for granted, as an *axiom*, what I would build upon it is this, *viz.* that no farther than a *love* to the souls of men reacheth, expressed by a care to promote their virtue and happiness, can any set of men be truly esteemed *spiritual guides*, or instructors. But, upon the apostolic plan, there is, *no other foundation* to be laid for *Christian-teachers* to build upon, but that which was laid by *Jesus Christ*; which had no alliance with any state in the world, but had all the civil politics in the world at variance with it. And Mr. *W.* would do well to consider the argument of St. Paul, 1 Cor. iii, where he has concluded, *that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.—That the Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain. And that no man should glory in men.* That if any man build upon the Gospel scheme, or foundation, *gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble*: his work will be tried with fire, of what sort it is.

He

with the State, she, that was the Church, alters her condition; she now claims large benefices, and distinguished honours, no less than a number of Baronies! And the State lends her a coercive power to enforce duties of imperfect obligation: and she, in her turn, confers on the State the application of the efficacy of religion! And, more than this, the Church, by the alliance, monopolizes to herself all State-favour and protection!

Should an enquiry be made into the occasion of all those animosities, broils and commotions, inhumanities and blood-shed, which have stained Church-history, throughout the ages of *Christianity*, should we not find, that the claim which the Church makes on the State, in virtue of Mr. *W*'s alliance, has been the *very source* of all that evil? Nor can any thing bid fairer for the sowing the seeds of discord and contention, than the State's partiality to its members. All the established Churches in the world, who have made such a contract with the State, might, if they would, witness the truth of this observation . . .

But it will be best for us to take our instructions from Mr. *W*.—And, by Max. IX, the Church and State are compared “to the armies of two
“ Princes in alliance: who reciprocally are engaged to face the enemy.”—But what can be the matter of contention? And who the *enemy* that dares to attack both Church and State? The matter of contention can only be occasioned by the *inequality* and *injustice* of the alliance: the
Church

He should prove, that his Church, by the alliance, has not built on the foundation any of these things. And that the contract, he so much dwells upon, is not *that wisdom of this world, that is foolishness with God*. And that the *Christian* Church, supposed in such alliance, does not lead its members to glory in men, as if none but they had the foundation to build upon. —

Church having inveigled the State into a compact manifestly injurious to all the other members. And, only because she happened to be the *greatest* member, she has bargained, that the *Head* shall only be allied to her, and allow no other member equal protection or nourishment. The militant State of the Established Church is then occasioned by her own avarice and ambition, which has made her unnatural, and without any tenderness towards her fellow civil members. And, tho' but a member of the body herself, yet she will make a part of the *Head*: and she sais to the foot, *I have no need of you!*—

Which view enables us to answer the 2d question, namely, *Who are the enemies that dare attack both Church and State?* It can only be the other *lesser* religious sects, or parties, that are found in the civil Community: which, by Max. IX, are called the *common enemy*. Exceedingly formidable, no doubt! Even so dangerous, that, for want of a test-law, we are told^a, “that the Sectaries, in the time of King *Charles the First*, destroyed the Established Church.” But this is a notorious misrepresentation of fact: since the revolution or change of public affairs, both in Church and State, was chiefly owing to the Army. An Army first raised, and then supported by a Parliament, made up of the *sons* of the established Church. So that a *test-act* could have been of no apparent use; since the Officers of the Army must have looked upon the designs of that Parliament as just, because it so manifestly opposed the arbitrary measures of that King—Unless we must suppose a *test-act* calculated to inspire men with the most reconciling views of slavery! for, to *despotic* power and *breach* of

^a Alliance, &c. p. 115.

faith in the King, were owing all the fatal catastrophe's of the civil war. Had he been faithful to his word, it would not have been in the power of *Oliver Cromwell*, nor of all the *Seſtaries*, to have purſued their meaſures of violence.

And with reſpect to the Parliament, the fountain of *that power*, which oppoſed that arbitrary King^b; the teſt-law would no more have affected the members of it, than it does now. Therefore it is nothing more than *mere declamation*, to lay the confuſions of that reign to the *want of a teſt-law*. Yet, upon this falſe representation we have theſe flouriſhes which Max. IX. contains. As if the Church and State were conſtantly under arms, in the field of battle; which favours much of *Romance*, and would ſuit the chivalry of *Don Quixot* perfectly well: but can have no foundation in reality or truth. Where are the reciprocal rallyings, and the mutual onſets of Church and State that the *maxim* repreſents? In this whole alliance, when moſt minutely examined, there can be found nothing like them. Nor is it poſſible that the *religious Societies* found in the State, conſidered as religious, ſhould ever offer to moleſt or diſturb the public peace. Nay, it is a rigid truth, that even Mr. *W.* himſelf cannot look out of countenance, namely, that the *preſent government*, in the illuſtrious houſe of *Hanover*, has more hearty friends, in proportion to numbers, *without* the Eſtabliſhment, I mean, among Proteſtant Diſſenters, than it has *within* the pale of the Church. But to what purpoſe then does the *teſt-law* ſerve? Or how is it that the Church and State are alternately rallying till they are out of breath; and again,

^b His Character ſee delineated in a late Eſſay to ſettle the idea of it; published by *Noon*.

alternately relieving each other? But, in this imaginary peril of Church and State, the masked batteries are planted: that is, “the State lends the Church a coercive power to enforce the duties of imperfect obligation: and the Church, in her turn, confers on the State the application of the efficacy of religion.”

§. 12. Tho’ the Christian religion was left independent on the State, by not being united to it, like the Jewish, and also its independency secured by divine institution, in that Christ’s Kingdom is not of this world, yet, anon we are told, “that all Churches, even the Christian, do in part partake of human policy.”

This is said in support of what this Writer had before advanced, namely, “that, in order to preserve the simplicity, decency, and significance of acts of religious worship, persons must be set apart for this office, whose peculiar employment it shall be to preside in, direct, and superintend the acts and offices of religion, lest any thing childish, profane, or superstitious should obtrude themselves into them.—Now, public Officers and Ministers must act by some common policy, which may regulate and settle their several employments, powers, and subordinations d.”

Even more than this, Mr. W. has had hardiness enough to assert, viz. “that the author and finisher of our faith has actually formed our holy religion into a Society, on a common policy, with public rites, proper officers, and a subordination of the ministry;—so that an established religion has its equity demonstrated by institution e!”

e Alliance, &c. p. 31.

d P. 38.

e P. 39.

This is to assert roundly, and in confidence of the assertion to imagine demonstration arises from it. For it still wants proof that our Lord formed our holy religion into a Society on a *common policy*. So far from being true, that the blessed *Jesus* absolutely forbids any degree of *precedence*, *pre-eminence*, or *subordination* in the ministers of his Church.—He will not suffer any of his subjects to call any man *Master* upon earth, or to be called *Master* of any. He severely condemns the desire of pre-eminence, or the notion of subordinations! And, altho' the miraculous gifts varied, yet the *Corinthians* are condemned by *St. Paul*, for supposing that they gave them *superiority*. This was not the intention of them, but the mutual edification of the Church. They *varied*, as best suited the planting of the *Christian* Church; but not, by any means, as establishing it on a *common policy*, because they all *ceased*. Neither is there any investiture of *power* and *authority* in any one member of Christ's Church, that can shew it to be established on a *common polity*.—And to what purpose can this serve in an union of the Church with the State, when Church *Mahometan*, Church *Pagan*, Church *Papal*, may as well be the established Church, as Church *Christian*, Church *Episcopal*, or Church *Presbyterial*? Since, upon the first principles of an establishment, “the State must enter into an
 “alliance with that religious Society that hap-
 “pens to have the *greatest number* of members
 “belonging to it, in the community: and it is
 “*fit*, nay *best*, that it should do so^f.” It is then very possible that an establishment may admit of any thing *childish*, *profane*, or *superstitious*, if such things have place and distinguish such

^f *Alliance &c.* p. 113.

religious Society. *Establishments* are far from securing *simplicity*, *decency*, or *significancy* in acts of religious worship: witness the wide difference between established *Popery*, established *Protestant Episcopacy*, and established *Presbytery*, and the *simplicity* of truth and worship, as it lies in the New Testament.

And it is the same as to the *diversity* of officers and ministers, and their employments, powers, and subordinations, tho' in alliance with the State.

N. B. If Mr. W. had intended to prove, by his reasoning, that the *Protestant Dissenters*, considered as *Christians*, have no right to an alliance with the State, or a civil establishment, I should heartily have joined issue with him: And would go farther and say, that, if any religious sect could have such claim, in any nation or state, it must be the greatest or most numerous sect: but I am obliged to dissent from his opinion, by denying that any sect, as *Christian*, have any the least shadow of claim to such union and establishment. And he seems to have been led into such confusion in his reasonings, from the *condition* of the *Jews*; and perhaps by casting his eye on the state of the *Mahometan* and *Popish* Kingdoms, where the alliance seems to be quite natural, in order to subserve the ends of *worldly policy*. For, “according to the politician’s creed, religion “being useful to the State, and yet not founded “in truth, all inquiries tend not to confirm, “but to unsettle, this necessary support of civil “government*.”—But for a man, who believes religion to have come from God, to use this language, or to plead for a civil establishment of it, is what Mr. W. has himself called in

* See again the citation in the Title-page.

question the *probability* or possibility of ; tho' his whole alliance is a testimony of his being guilty of the thing Unless we must conclude, that, notwithstanding what he has said of the *divine* nature and origin of religion, yet he does not believe one word of all he has said about it.—

Would to God all *Christians* would shew themselves to be truly *such* ; by their *humility*, their *heavenly-mindedness*, their *self-denials*, and *non-conformity* to the world ! for assuredly the Church of Christ can never appear in her true character, where *pre-eminence*, *power*, and *subordination* is the matter of contest : or where she puts on the face of a politic Society.

But [after all that Mr. *W.* says of its being *impertinent* in the Church to aim at riches, honours, or power in the alliance] is it not as plain as facts or demonstration can make it, that this *impertinence* has been the foundation of all religious establishments ? If it has, then, upon Mr. *W.*'s own principle, the Church establishment is impertinent. And if Church *independency* and *supremacy* should be understood to mean Church-principles, maxims, and aims, as being the *reverse* to those of the State, or of civil Society ; then an alliance between Church and State is as impossible as the union of opposite principles and maxims can make it. And, if the Church should resign and give up that her *independency* and *supremacy* to the State, she can be no longer considered as a *religious* Society, but as a prostitute, who has sacrificed her chastity, in order to her incorporating and uniting with an alien.

§. 13. Yet, Mr. *W.* says, “ that the State
“ could not offer any advantage to the Church
“ without an alliance, that is, any security from
“ outward violence ^h. ”

^h *Alliance*, &c. p. 67.

This great Divine does not consider, that the Church, as a religious Society, cannot want any such security, "because sovereign and independent on civil Societyⁱ;" and because "the care of the State does not extend to the souls of men. See Max. XI."

But perhaps, by *outward violence*, we are to understand what only concerns the *bodies* of men, or their external, alienable properties. Yet, if so, the State could give such security without any alliance, from Max. II, "as security to temporal liberty and property is the *only end* of civil government." Unless Mr. W. can farther prove, that what is the *only end* of civil government was *no end* at all of civil government.

And if, by *security* given to the Church from the alliance, he means the security of men's right of worshipping God, according to their conscience; then, by Max. I, the Church did not need this security from the State by an alliance, because this the *law of nature* gives every man. And, by Max. II, it is the end of civil government to secure every man's *temporal liberty*. Hence it is manifest that the proposition of Mr. W's can have no meaning.

§. 14. This Writer has also said, that the *independency and freedom of the Christian above all other Societies* lay in this, namely, "that it might have the liberty to adapt itself to the many various kinds of civil policies throughout the world. — wherein that prophecy receives its ultimate completion, namely, — *I will lift up mine hand to the Gentiles — and Kings shall be thy nursing fathers^k, &c.*"

ⁱ Alliance, &c. p. 40.

^k P. 102.

This was mentioned above, but deserves a more distinct consideration.

And surely the *prophet*, or rather the *Spirit of God*, could never have had such a sense in view, as Mr. *W*'s; since it is the most *profane* and *vile* sense that could be put on the Church's *independency* and *supremacy*! Can any pious man suppose it given the Church by divine institution for so base and sordid an end, as that she might become, as it were, a common strumpet, and *take the liberty of uniting with the* VARIOUS KINDS *of civil policies* throughout the world!—

Kings may surely become nursing fathers, and *Queens* nursing mothers, without this union or alliance. Such alliance would rather suppose *Kings* to be husbands, and the Church to be *Queen-Consort*—or *Queens* to be wives, and the Church their *Reigning-Consort*—— But may not *Kings* and *Queens*, when they see the pure, the spiritual, the moral, and friendly spirit of the *Christian* doctrine, be excited to protect and favour the professors of it, as most loyal and useful subjects of Government? And may not this be much more properly done as nursing *fathers and mothers*, than by an alliance making the Church a *co-ordinate*? The *end* of civil government will ever secure protection to the Church, as a religious Society, whilst it is kept in view, and needs no such convention or contract; tho' Mr. *W*. is pleased to assert the contrary¹. His words are these, “The State
“having by this alliance undertaken the pro-
“tection of the Church, and *protection* not being
“to be afforded to any person or body, without
“power over that person or body, in the person
“or body protecting.” Which in the present

¹ *Alliance*, &c. p. 87.

case, he before tells us, "is owing to a confession the Church has made to the State, namely, constituting the Magistrate her *supreme Head*." This is the power which the Church has given the State to exercise over it.

But can any thing like this power of the Church, constituting the civil Magistrate her *supreme Head*, be shewn, as once signified either by Christ, or his apostles? Does it not rather appear from the most express passages of Scripture, that the Church, as the Church of Christ, has no *supreme Head* but Christ? And that *Christians* are enjoined subjection and obedience to the civil Magistrate, as God's minister? The Church's resigning her *independency* is nothing more than a mere whim, or the roving of the imagination of a proud Church-man. For RELIGION, by definitions I. and II, both in its internal nature, and in its external worship, is a spiritual thing, "*a commerce and intercourse that the mind has with its Maker. The first end of it is to procure the favour of God: the second end is to improve our intellectual nature. So that the several acts of religious worship must be correspondent to the sentiments of the worshiper.*" And, by Max. I, "every man has a right, by the law of nature, of worshipping God, according to his conscience." Hence civil Government and religious are not capable of an alliance. For, by Max. II, "the only end of civil government is security to the temporal liberty and property of man."

And altho' civil government is said to be *defective*, Max. III, as not taking cognizance of the duties of *imperfect obligation*; and as not distinguishing objects of favour, Max. IV. and as incapable of rewarding the objects of its favour, Max.

Max. V. —yet, it appears, that civil government is so perfect, that no manner of alliance with the Church, contended for, can remove its defects, or make it *more perfect*. For, by Max. VI, the civil Magistrate's office leads him to *protect, cherish, and propagate* the three great fundamental articles of natural religion; namely,—*the being of a God—his providence over human affairs—and the natural and essential difference of moral good and evil*. This shews, that civil government is not defective, but that it takes every whit as much cognizance of the duties of *imperfect obligation*, as it can take when in alliance with any Church; since this answers the great intention of religion: for *he who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them who diligently seek him*.

To protect, cherish, and propagate the three great principles of natural religion, is to take cognizance of the duties of *imperfect obligation*; because, by men's discerning that *God makes his sun to rise on the evil and on the good—and his rain to descend on the just and unjust*; the duties of *gratitude, hospitality, and charity* are pointed out to them, as they would imitate their Maker. So that the grand reason for an alliance with the Church is come to nothing. It can no way inforce them. Hence Max. VII. is false, for religion, in Mr. W.'s sense, is not absolutely necessary to civil government: that is to say, an alliance between Church and State is not necessary. The *sanctions of rewards*, which respect a future world, and which religion does propose, however inforced by an alliance, which, we have shewn, cannot be in any degree; yet, if this was possible, the mind of man could either attend to them, nor not;—for religion is not capable of any compulsive force. And the
very

very appearance of force must disgust, rather than recommend. So that Max. VIII. is false; for religion cannot operate with *more efficacy* by calling in the aid of the civil Magistrate. Or, Church and State in alliance can have no more right or power to enforce the operation of religion, than they had before such alliance. Hence Max. XI. proves a deceitful representation of religious and civil polity; since no *mutual aid* can be lent by them. For, by Max. X, “religious Society, as such, must needs be *sovereign* and independent on the civil—the *imperiums* differ—No dependence can arise from *essence*, *generation*, or from the *law of nations*.” Besides, by Max. XI, “religion is not within the Magistrate’s province”—it is therefore a “perversion of the *end* of Magistracy, to make him *common arbiter*—or to “make opinions his resort.” Nevertheless, in order to the performance of the contract, Max. XII, “there must be a mutual communication of their respective powers—and a giving up to each other the right of independency.” And, by Max. XIII, “this union is not an incorporation like the *Jewish* œconomy; and, therefore revocable. So that, when the establishment is dissolved, the Church recovers back its supremacy.” Behold, what an heap of absurdity and contradiction Mr. *W.* builds his Establishment and Alliance upon!

§. 16. Would we know more fully yet, what is intended by this *security from all outward violence*, that the State is to give the Church by this alliance? We may learn it from a notable declaration of this *Writer’s*, with which I will close this 1st Chapter, namely, “Another mischief there is still more certain and fatal,
“ when-

“ whenever above *one* religion is found in a
 “ State ; which an alliance only can prevent.
 “ For every sect or Church thinking itself alone
 “ the *true*, or at least the *most perfect*, is na-
 “ turally pushed to the *advancing its own scheme*
 “ on the ruin of the rest ; so that, if this suc-
 “ ceeds not by dint of argument, they are apt
 “ to have recourse to civil power ; which is
 “ done by *introducing a party into the public*
 “ *administration* : And we find that they have
 “ been but too successful in the art of making
 “ the State believe that its interests are much
 “ concerned in these religious differences. Into
 “ what frequent and strong convulsions these
 “ contentions must throw the State may easily
 “ be apprehended. Now, to these mischiefs,
 “ an alliance is the most effectual remedy : by
 “ establishing one Church, and giving a *full*
 “ *toleration* to the rest, but *excluding* their mem-
 “ bers from the *public administration* : from the
 “ admission into *which*, these disorders a-
 “ rise ^m. ”

Some remarks on this notable passage will make a part of the next Chapter.

^m Alliance, &c. p. 67.

CHAP.



CHAP. II.

Which contains an enquiry into what is farther intended by an ESTABLISHED CHURCH: how it took its rise, its worship and discipline.

IT S *rise* is easily accounted for, from the last citation; which gives us the origin of an established Church——from which it appears, that it takes its *origin* in an *ambition of priority*, or *pre-eminence*: and in advancing its own schemes of worldly power and dominion, honour and riches, to the utter exclusion of the rest from any share with it. Yet, with such complaisance as to ask, or, rather, *suffer* the State to grant a full toleration to the rest: only excluding their members from the public administration! so that, by getting into the administration, this established Church is enabled to secure to herself the art of making the State believe *that* its interests must stand and fall with the establishment. *No Bishop, no King.*—by the alliance, it effects with security what every sect was attempting to do, *namely*, to recommend itself as alone the *true*, or at least the *most perfect* Church, by the monopoly of all State favour and protection.

And truly there is something more to be said, by this Writer, —— attend to the lively description which he gives of it, in the words following, “ An *established religion* is, as we
“ may say, THE UNIVERSAL VOICE OF NATURE;
“ and not confined to certain ages, people, or
E “ religions.

“ religions. So *John Baptist Tavernier*, speaking of the Kingdom of *Tunquin*, thus delivers himself: — I come now to the political description of this Kingdom, under which I comprehend the *religion* which is almost every where in concert with the civil government for the mutual support of each other^m.”

This view of establishments, however it may shine as a divine reason in the eye of Mr. *W.*, will fill any *Christian heart* with great grief, as it is the fatal reason of the spread of *Paganism*, *Popery*, and *Mahometanism*! This *universal voice of nature* is the most evident reason of the obstruction *Christianity* has met with, or the hindrance of its spread in the world. And the very reason of its wanting universal progress! A very comfortable view of establishments! But indeed such is the foundation on which Mr. *W.* builds his establishment, that *Christianity* could never have had any place in the world, if this reason of its establishment had been the voice of God. For, how could *Christianity* ever have had a place in the world, if it had not thrown contempt on all such alliances, as are those which Mr. *W.* contends for? But what of this? This Writer pretends not to concern himself about the interests of *Christianity*, but of establishments. He is for following the *universal voice of nature*; and whatever religion happens to have a majority in the body of the people, must have a first right to the favour of the Magistrate, and is sure of an establishment; which, no doubt, proves, to a demonstration, the truth of this alliance, or the divine right of establishments — for the voice of the majority is, with him, the *universal voice of nature*! and the fondness they have of monopoly

^m *Alliance*, &c. p. 70.

lizing power and riches, gives an undoubted right to the possession of them; to the exclusion of all others!

And yet saith this *Divine*, “the alliance with
“the State must not admit of any *Legislator* into
“Christ’s Kingdom but himself: for, if it did,
“*this would make his Kingdom of this world*.”

Notwithstanding this, “the State lends the
“Church a *coercive power* to enforce duties of
“*imperfect obligation*.” But is not this *coer-*
cive power, borrowed from the State, a *foreign*
power? And is not this *Legislative power*? The
State lends it the Church, therefore the Church is
the executor of this *civil* coercive power. And it
exercises this, from the authority of the State.
There is then a *Legislator* admitted into Christ’s
Kingdom, which makes it *of this world*.

Yet, to avoid the force of this conclusion,
Mr. *W.* saith, “that this coercive power of the
“*civil kind* is unfitly and unjustly applied by
“the Church to its own use and service. — But
“the State lent it the Church to be employed in
“its own service.”

Nevertheless, he elsewhere declares, “that
“this coercive power of the civil kind may have
“a good effect in a tribunal regarding irregular
“intentions, as criminal, which is no other than
“a tribunal of religion.” *

E 2 Is

Alliance, &c. p 103. o P. 61. p P. 82. q P. 61.

* Mr. *White*, in his third Letter, P. 23, advises the *Pro-*
testant Dissenters, “not to call upon the Church to revive and
“restore the antient discipline; for, by the rules of *that* disci-
“pline, open Schismatics were treated almost as roughly as
“any sort of offenders whatsoever.” I have made this citation,
as it may illustrate the sense of the text, which is somewhat
obscure. And as it is the current sense of all bigotted Church-
men, who want such a tribunal of religion to be erected, that
they may handle a little roughly those *damnable Schismatics*,
the

Is it possible for any man to know what is the meaning of these declarations? The coercive power cannot be applied by the Church to its own use, but for the use of the State: And yet it may have a good effect in a tribunal, which is no other than a tribunal of religion: A tribunal that sits upon *irregular intentions*! Now the State cannot so much as take cognizance of the duties of imperfect obligation—and has no concern with the souls of men—and yet can lend the Church a power, a coercive power to sit as judges upon *irregular intentions*! And the Church can exercise this power as a tribunal of religion, but not for her own use and service, but for the service of the State. —

Again, Ecclesiastical Courts “are not erected “for the sake of the Church, but of the State^r.” Church power is therefore, from the alliance, no such thing as Church power, but State power: for “a religious Society has in itself no coercive “power of the civil kind.”

§. 17. Behold and wonder! tho’ the Ecclesiastical Court does not exercise its power for its own sake, but for the sake of the State, yet “there is no unfitness in the application of coercive power to the immediate end of religious Society, which is *purity of worship*, and the “necessary means of preserving purity is *uniformity of worship*; which uniformity cannot be “maintained but by *expelling* from the community all who refuse to comply with the public “worship^s”. — This power of expulsion, or right of excommunication, is a power, “which

the *Protestant-Dissenters*. See what sort of usage they have had, in the Histories of the reigns of *Charles I.* and *Charles II.*

^r *Alliance*, &c. p. 85.

^s P. 45.

“ a

“ a religious Society has in itself, and all that it
 “ stands in need of.” — nevertheless, “ no
 “ member of the established Church can be ex-
 “ communicated or expelled the Society, with-
 “ out the consent and allowance of the Magi-
 “ strate; expulsion being an act of *supremacy*
 “ and *independency*.”

Hence it appears, that all the power, which the Church needeth, it has in itself, and must have, namely, that of *expelling members*: notwithstanding, it seems, that the Church, in alliance with the State, has no such power in itself, tho’ necessary and essential to a religious Society. So that she loses her essence by the alliance, that is, she is no more a religious Society: forasmuch as “ *this power is inseparable from its essence*.”

Again, the State has no resort in matters of opinion; no concern in the care of souls; nothing to do in religion, — and yet, by this alliance, the State has a chief, a first concern with religion, even with the immediate end of religious Society, which is *purity* or *uniformity* of worship! — And, what is much more surprising, “ *civil Society* has “ no right to reward any of its members by ad- “ mission into a religious Society, and no right “ to punish by excluding from it.” — From these inimitable strokes of Mr. W’s pen, the Reader is to form his idea of a Church-establishment.

§. 18. As nothing more than a power in the Church of *simple expulsion* is pretended to, from, in, or by this alliance, so the DIVORCE does not suppose that a want of *uniformity* is any manner of proof of the want of a *religious* character. For, tho’ *purity* of worship is the immediate end

* Alliance &c. p. 45. v P. 92. w P. 45. x P. 47.

of religious Society, and this requires outward conformity; yet, this Writer owns, “that the
 “outward conformity should be accompanied
 “with a suitable internal disposition of the mind
 “—and that force cannot be applied to the will
 “—and that, by the law of nature, every man
 “has a right of worshiping God, according to
 “his conscience.”—When therefore it so happens that a member of the established Church-Society cannot conscientiously join in the public worship, and is on that account expelled the Society; “such member is so far from being
 “debarred, by that expulsion, of his right of
 “worshiping God, according to his conscience,
 “*that he is thereby put into a way of exercising his*
 “*right.*”

It follows, that a *Church-establishment* is no longer a *religious Society*; neither can *uniformity* in worship be at all necessary for *purity* of worship; or necessary to the immediate end of religious Society. But, if religious Society has this end in view, *uniformity* cannot secure *purity* of worship. On the contrary, an established uniformity, Mr. *W.* assures us, so hinders the mind from exercising the rights of conscience, essential to a religious character, that by an act of expulsion, the person so excommunicated, is put into a way of exercising that right.—If therefore *true religion* be absolutely needful to the State, it must be mistaken in its policy, if it seeks in an alliance to preserve true religion, by *uniformity of worship*: and for this plain reason, namely, because “*an act of expulsion for non-*
 “*conformity puts a man in the way of exercising*
 “*the rights of conscience.*” This I think worthy

of frequent repetition, as it is such an *important truth* dropped from the pen of this Writer*.

§. 19. Neither is an establishment of religion at all essential to its having a *public worship*, and a public leading. Tho' the great SIDNEY's notion of *Christianity* was, "that it was like a
"divine philosophy in the mind, without public
"worship, or any thing that looketh like a
"Church." For what has *Sidney* said different from Mr. *W.* See *Def. Ist.* "Religion, in a
"strict and proper sense, is a commerce and
"intercourse with the supreme cause of all things,
"— a contemplation on his nature and on the
"relations we stand in towards him, the proper
"and adequate object of all dependent beings."

— What is there of public worship, or of any thing that looks like a Church, *essential* to the strict and proper sense of religion, in Mr. *W.*'s definition?

Will it hence be of any avail, that Mr. *Woolaston* says, "were it not for that sense of virtue
"which is principally preserved by *national*
"forms and habits of religion, men would soon

* Mr. *White*, in his *Letter to a Gentleman dissenting, &c.* P. 88, 89. after having spent above 80 pages in defence of the Establishment: says, "that, if the *Episcopal* party had been
"only the *tolerated*, he dares say they would have been the
"sober party, more strict in holiness of Life, than the *Presby-*
"terians established. And he is ready to think it is so all
"the world over. The inferior tolerated Sects, he guesses,
"will be found, for the most part, to walk more orderly
"than those of the established religion of the country. The
"public established national religion, whatever it be, most
"abounds with mere *nominal* professors; and in the nature of
"things it cannot well be otherwise; for those who are void
"of religion, and have it to choose, will naturally choose
"that which is uppermost." This citation I have made, to
shew Mr. *Warburton* that he is not singular in his opinion, by giving *true religion* her seat among the *Non-conformists*.

“ lose it all, run wild, and prey upon one another².”

This proves nothing at all for an *establishment of religion*, in a strict and proper sense. And, could it prove any thing, it would prove too much; for it would prove, that, during the *three hundred and more years* that *Christianity* was not an *established religion*, nor in *alliance* with any State, and had no *national* forms and habits, the men, who professed it, *ran wild*, and *preyed upon one another*! But would Mr. *Woolaston* say this? Would he abide by the consequence of his own unguarded declaration! I presume not. And can the *Christian* religion be supposed, in any after age, to stand in more need of an alliance than it did during the time it had no *national* forms and habits? And yet, during this time, it had a *public worship*, and such a *proper leading*, that it grew and increased in the world, notwithstanding the violent oppositions that it underwent. Even so great was its spread in the *Roman* empire, that *Constantine* could venture to pay it the compliment of an *establishment*. But what was the advantage it received? Till that time, was it ever heard, that *Christians ran wild*, and *preyed upon one another*? That *Christians* set up the trade of persecuting and destroying one another? This was truly the result of its *alliance* with the State. So that the *truth of facts* lies full against the authority of Mr. *Woolaston*.

However, let us see what Mr. *Woolaston* farther says in defence of *national* forms and habits of religion. His words are these, “ Tho’ he
“ who reads the forms of public prayer reads it
“ to *all* at the same time; that all may unite in

² *Alliance*, &c. p. 56. *Woolaston's Religion of Nature* delin, p. 124.

“ one common act, which otherwise they could
 “ not do: yet still every particular person, who
 “ minds the prayers at all, has a separate per-
 “ ception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he
 “ offers them, or the sense contained under them,
 “ with *more* or *less* application and ardor. And
 “ since no man can be said to *pray*, any further
 “ than he *does this*; and it cannot be known to
 “ any body in the congregation beside himself,
 “ how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality
 “ as *private*, as if he was inclosed within a thou-
 “ sand walls^a. ”

Thus, by the authority of Mr. WOOLASTON,
national forms and habits give no energy at all to
 religion; but every particular person *either minds*
them, or not, and has a *separate* and *distinct* per-
 ception of the sense contained in the public
 prayers, as he attends to them with *more* or *less*
 application and ardor. There is therefore no
 more *unanimity* secured by *forms*, than there can
 be by *free* prayer: since the attention of the mind
 will be sufficient to alter the sense of the one as
 well as of the other. And, if we may rely on
 what this Gentleman says, “ he will venture to
 “ affirm, that all true prayer is *private*^b. ” Then
 the argument is clear, that *national forms*, and
public liturgies, give no energy to prayer. But
 that may be as proper a guide, and *public direct-*
ory of prayer, which is the produce of the *private*
 sense of the mind of a minister, as that which
 has been the *public* and *national* sense. In the
 former case, the minds of the people are at full
 liberty to give their own sense of every petition
 and thanksgiving, as well as they are, when a
 public form is read. And with this advantage,
 that, where *free* prayer is used, the rule of wor-

^a *Religion of Nature delin.* p. 125.

^b *ibid.*

ship is not under the *sanction* and *authority* of men; but the rights of private judgment, or of conscience, in the language of Mr. *W.*, are then exercised; or *men are in the way* of exercising them. And truly, *forms of prayer* can secure no more *unanimity* in worship, than *free prayer* can. For, as Mr. *Woolaston* farther says, “a man
 “ may be present in a congregation, and either
 “ pray the same prayer in which others seem to
 “ join, or some other, or none at all, for aught
 “ any body there can tell besides himself. And
 “ he quotes *Chrysostom* as saying, that some are
 “ so unmindful of what they are about, that they
 “ know not so much as what they say them-
 “ selves.” And might I reason and conclude, from the general taste and sense of mankind, it would appear, that a formal, unvaried address, in order to excite their virtue, and disengage their affections from wrong biasse, would not long engage or excite attention: The same rotation of phrase and argument, repeated upon every time of public instruction, would make men very careless and remiss: And when the infinite spirit, his perfections, his laws, the appearances of his providence, the obligations men are under, are to be contemplated, owned, and acknowledged; together with the behaviour of men under varied dispensations, can it be more proper that an imposed, stinted form of address, under *human authority*, should take place? For my own part, I know of no *one prescribed liturgy* in all the Bible: But, on the contrary, can perceive, that the several pieces of devotional address, recorded, are always adapted to the historical circumstances, which gave the occasion of them.

c *Religion of Nature delin.* p. 125.

Objection. It has by some been objected, “ that
“ men can better regulate their devotions, when
“ they know, before-hand, what petitions or
“ praises they are to offer.”

In reply, let it be considered, that the mind is as capable of judging and then of assenting to a petition or a thanksgiving audibly and intelligibly delivered by the mouth, and immediately dictated by the heart of a minister, as it can be when a petition, &c. are *read* over by him, and the words wrote down before them^d. And, from the liberty which the minister has of *varying* his address, the attention is more fixed in those who join with him, than by a written, unvaried form. Besides this, what reason can be assigned, why the minister should not piously employ himself by studious applications, in order to assist the people, to whom he ministers, in addressing their Maker, as that he should labour in such applications, which imply his being *the mouth of God*, or a *minister of truth* to the people? If the *Bible*, and the instructions of nature and providence, are a sufficient furniture of *matter* of address to the people, *in the name of God*; — How comes it to pass, that they are not sufficient to enable him to assist them in invoking his name? Moreover, if *prayer* is the highest act of religion that is instrumental, it is very strange that a minister of religion should have no more concern in it! That it should require no *study*, no *application*, no *improvement*, but remain a service that any vain, idle, immoral man, may perform as well as he; that is, if he can but read distinctly, and has as good a voice. But inasmuch as *true* prayer requires moral character, that a man give

^d No prescribed form is required in *conversation*, in which truth is of religious importance. *Eph.* iv. 25. *Phil.* iv. 8. *Pf.* xv. 2.

up himself to it, by constant practice, and an holy life, which are indispensably requisite to a growing acquaintance with God; such an acquisition would determine the *sacredness* of the ministerial character. Therefore, to debar him from giving the people the advantage of his piety, in a religious address to God, is a great impropriety, and I think altogether indefensible.

By the way, I am not intending to say any thing against *forms of prayer*; but against any one invariable, any one prescribed and imposed form. Every *Christian* minister has an undoubted right to direct his prayer, as his own judgment, and the condition and circumstances of his people, and of the public, seem to require.

Obj. But it is yet objected, “that a congregation had better direct their public addresses, by a *set form*, composed by a number of *reverend*, and *right reverend*, than trust to, or depend upon the uncertain guidance of a minister, whose *disposition* or capacity for prayer will be variable.”

Under this objection, let it be remarked, that a *Christian* congregation, in their own choice of a minister, should have regard to his qualification and habitual ability for prayer. And, when he is chosen by them, his *method of praying* is supposed to be approved. And, altho’ he may at times be under indispositions of body, this is no more than a *Minister* is liable to in his reading a form. But, if able to officiate publicly, he, who prays freely, must be supposed capable of offering up prayers *suitable* to the purposes of devotion. And as to a prescribed form, *imposed* on a congregation, there is something in it quite unsuitable to that *freedom* or liberty, which seems necessary to constitute a service *reasonable*: for who has, who can have a right to *oblige* me, and

a number of other *Christians* met together for worship, to address the God of nature and providence, the God and Father of *Jesus*, in no other words, but those which they have been pleased to put together? *Jesus Christ* has not done this, nor his *apostles*. And, as they have not, might it not be said with propriety to these imposers: *Jesus we know, and Paul we know, but who are ye?*

Let but a minister be a man of *true piety*, not only well informed in the nature of moral obligation, but well exercised in it; such a man cannot offer up a prayer that would be unsuitable; but is as well qualified for leading a congregation in their public address, as by a prescribed form composed by the *greatest Council* of Clergy, and the most *learned* that ever were assembled since the apostles. And *free prayer* should have the preference given to it, as an improvement in it much depends on the preservation of moral character, and upon an advance in the divine life; so that it is of great and eminent advantage.

One might appeal, to the experience of every truly pious man in the world, for the truth of this observation, *viz.* that, the more, at any time, he has been *off his watch and guard* against temptation, the more this world has taken possession of his imagination and affections, the less has he found himself disposed and prepared for prayer. But a man's reading a prescribed, imposed form of words, does not infer any prayer at all; as he may do it, with his thoughts wandering, without the least degree of reverence or devotion: but such absence of the mind cannot be so easily supposed, where the *prayer is the*
result

result of pious temper, mental labour, and intense application."

Obj. "It is indeed said, that there is often
"want of method; and sometimes crudities,
"inconnexions, and unsuitable petitions, &c.
"in *extempore* effusions."

Should this sometimes be the case, through some *disorder* of the animal spirits, or a faulty remissness, the audience or praying congregation may correct, and not make these a part of their own address. They can dissent, disown, or throw out such improprieties; yea, in the language of the devotional HERBERT, *turn his faults into confession*: put up a swift petition for him who leads the service. Neither are *prescribed forms*, i. e. any that I know of, free from inconnexions, and some pieces of phraseology, which, to many, are reckoned no better than *crudities*, and which they can by no means approve. And, what is still worse, these disapproved phrases are constantly repeated, and whatever is offensive, not to be remedied. But should this become the case with the Minister of any *Christian* free congregation, if he himself is not aware of his repeated *improprieties*, he may be informed of them; and, if he is fit for the office, he will remove every matter of offence.

I am persuaded, that, to some *worthy* and *learned* men, it may be difficult to pray without a form publicly; especially at the beginning of their engaging in the ministry: but, then, it is not at all difficult for them to pray without a prescribed, imposed form; tho' it would be difficult for them to pray with one. Such therefore

And one thing lies in favour of free prayer, *viz.* that the public worship may be conducted without any thing offensive; nothing of party opinions or disputable notions introduced in it, which never is the case with an imposed liturgy.

ought

ought to digest the *matter* of their address into a form most agreeable to their own conceptions of the divine perfections, and to the obligations, complaints, and wants of their fellow-worshippers.

At the *Reformation*, there was both a prescribed form of prayer, and a prescribed form of preaching, I mean the *Homilies*. If improvement in learning and in a knowledge of the *Christian* scheme rendered the one unnecessary, why not the other? And, whatever may be pretended of the Church having a power to decree *rites* or *ceremonies*, no such power can with the least colour be affirmed of the method of prayer. The mind of man, I have observed, is apt to have its *attention* and *ardor* more weakened, by unvaried, set forms, than by an open, unlimited variation of thought and sentiment. And tho' it may sometimes be the case, that improprieties may be dropped by the Minister, who prays publicly without a form, yet these cannot easily rise higher than those of which men are chargeable, under the best regulated form, from a want of attention and pious affection: Unless we can suppose that the harmony of numbers, and the smoothness of periods, can supply the want of the spirit of prayer. The object of prayer principally looks at the *heart* of every worshiper, and not at the *form* of his address.

Another great Writer is quoted in support of an Establishment, and that is the Lord Shaftsbury, who says, " This was antient policy [*viz.* the Union of the civil and religious interests] and hence it is necessary to have a public leading in religion. For to deny the *Magistrate* a *worship*, or take away a NATIONAL Church,

" is

“ is as mere enthusiasm as the notion which sets
 “ up persecution.”

With what face this quotation is made, the Reader may judge, when I lay before him the reasoning of that *noble* Writer; who quotes *Harrington*, as saying, “ it is necessary a people
 “ should have a *public leading* in religion.” Take notice how he explains himself, in the very same page,—“ but to prescribe bounds to fancy
 “ and speculation, to regulate men’s apprehen-
 “ sions and religious beliefs and fears, to sup-
 “ press by violence the natural passion of enthu-
 “ siasm, or to endeavour to ascertain it, or reduce
 “ it to one species, or bring it under one modi-
 “ fication, is”—what he ridicules, as being like
 a man’s endeavouring to grow mad with reason*.
 —and in the next page he says,—“ but a new
 “ sort of policy, which extends itself to another
 “ world, and considers the future lives and hap-
 “ piness of men, rather than the present, has
 “ made us leap the bounds of natural humanity;
 “ and, out of a supernatural charity, has taught
 “ us the way of plaguing one another most
 “ devoutly. It has raised an antipathy which
 “ no temporal interest could ever do, and en-
 “ tailed upon us a mutual hatred to all eternity.
 “ And now *uniformity in opinion* (a hopeful pro-
 “ ject!) is looked on as the only expedient
 “ against this evil. The saving of souls is now
 “ the heroic passion of exalted spirits; and is
 “ become in a manner the chief care of the
 “ Magistrate, and the very end of Government
 “ itself.”

What can this *noble* Writer mean, by a public leading in religion? Surely not an establishment.

* *Alliance*, &c. p. 112. † *Characteristicks*, Vol. I. p. 17.
 ‡ P. 18, 19.

* Nihil plus agas

Quàm si des operam ut cum ratione insanias.

—much less, such a one contended for by our *Demonstrator*.—How discordant the raillery he bestows “on prescribing bounds to fancy and “speculation, and the regulating men’s apprehensions, their religious beliefs and fears, and “reducing the natural passion of Enthusiasm to “one species and bringing it under one modification?” How opposite is this to Mr. *Warburton*’s declarations, “about man’s meditations “on the divine nature drawn out into ARTICLES “OF FAITH—and his meditation on his several “relations to him into *correspondent forms of worship*, to be professed and *established* by the civil “Magistrate?” For he says, “it is to be observed, that the unity of the object of faith, “and conformity to a formulary of dogmatic “theology, as the terms of communion, is the “great foundation and bond of a religious “Society^h.”—

But a *public leading* in religion, in the sense of *Lord Shaftesbury*, differed infinitely wide from the sense and design, to which Mr. *Warburton* would make it serve. And, no doubt, a *public leading* would be perfectly well secured without an establishment; for the very nature of *true religion*, according to Definitions I. and II, will ever excite men to acts of social worship; since the forming just sentiments of God, and viewing the several relations we stand in to him, must fill us with social affections, and inspire us with benevolence towards one another. The argument lies thus: the way in which we ourselves attain unto, and preserve an intercourse or commerce with Deity, is, by *reading his word*, by *praying unto* and *praising him*; we shall therefore, in proportion to our own acquaintance with religion,

^h *Compaign Alliance, &c.* p. 37 and 99.

be recommending such actions to others ; and by our own example we shall be glad to influence others to acts of homage to the *preserver* and *father* of men. And as we receive *in common* social blessings, and are exposed to evils as societies, so we shall be for keeping up and encouraging supplications and thanksgivings to the Guardian and Benefactor of kingdoms and nations. And only admit, that the Gospel is embraced in any country, what danger can there be of men's neglecting public worship, who paid the Gospel any regard ? If we yet add, that the civil Magistrate, who is naturally concerned to protect, support, and propagate the three great branches of natural religion, if he be but persuaded that the *Christian* scheme of truth and morality is the most perfect, he will then protect and defend the several societies of *Christians* in their religious observance of one day in the week, sacred to the honour of *Jesus*. It will be the *interest* of the civil Magistrate to do it, and good policy in him.

To suppose that Christianity would not have a *public worship*, and a *public leading*, without an establishment, or as secure without, as with one, is to contradict the following facts : (1.) That of its having these, for above three hundred years, without any establishment ; nay, in opposition to all the establishments in the world. (2.) It contradicts the experience of all ages of the Church since *Constantine*, where *Christianity* has been embraced and professed, in a *non-conformity* to the national Church ; which has been the case in many parts of the world. (3.) It supposes Christianity to be less efficacious than *Judaism* has been ever since the *abolition* of that constitution. This, notwithstanding, is every where attended with public worship, and a *public leading*, where the Magistrate attends to the ends of government, and

and protects and defends the natural rights and properties of men. Or, in the language of Max. II, where the Magistrate attends to the *only end* of civil government; which is to secure the temporal liberty and property of men. The concern therefore about securing a public worship, and a public leading, by an establishment, is no other than an artifice to give a false alarm to the *passions* of men. And to make an alliance between Church and State needful to this end, is to act a like part with *Uzzab*, 1 *Chron.* xiii. 9, 10. *namely*, to pretend that the ark of God, or the religion of *Jesus*, would not be preserved safe, without the hand of the civil Magistrate to support it.

But, from Definitions I. and II, *national forms and habits* cannot aid religion, tho' they may superstition: for religion cannot endure an established *uniformity* of modes, or an *unanimity* of sentiment, because “ *the several acts of worship* “ *should correspond to the sentiments arising in us* “ *from the meditation on the several relations we* “ *stand in to God* ” — which actions, or gestures and public services, are, or should be such as will best aid and improve these sentiments. But a constant established uniformity of words and actions [which would become universal, if an establishment became so] cannot suit the *end* proposed by an establishment: for unanimity of sentiment is impossible. But since the several acts of worship should correspond to the sentiments arising in us from the meditation on the several relations we stand in to God, and these sentiments must vary; it follows, that no *one formulary of dogmatic theology* of human institution, tho' solemnly rehearsed, can be expressive of every individual's faith, or aid religion, or serve the purposes of virtue. On the contrary, if men are

induced by education and custom, under the influence of human authority, to make use of a set of words, of which they either have no understanding at all, or which are inconsistent with, or contrary unto their inward sense of the nature of truth; they must hereby be led to esteem religion as lying in mere sounds; or else, that *prevarication* and *falsehood* may be very consistent with acts of public worship. The effects, which this custom may have upon human conduct, are too dreadful to be expressed! —

If therefore *Establishments* have their *public formularies*, or *creeds*, repeated as parts of public worship [at the same time that the individuals, which compose these Societies, must differ in their sentiments about the articles which compose them] it is more than probable, that great numbers of grown persons who rehearse these creeds, without being able to see the sense and meaning of some of their articles, and many who have very different sentiments must be constantly guilty of great prevarication, in that very rehearsal, which they call an act of religious worship. And they cannot plead that they gave no consent, or expressed no approbation of them: but, by their public rehearsal of them, they set to their open and public seal, that they acknowledge them as parts of religious worship^w. Thus difficult is *lay conformity*!

If it should be objected, that among *Non-conformists* there are great numbers who are as fond, as any men, of imposing *formula's of dogmatic theology*. This will be granted to the ob-

^w The honest and learned Mr. *Whiston*, from a conviction that, in the public Liturgy, the Church does condemn, or exclude from Salvation, some of her best members, has, I am informed, thereupon renounced communion with her.

jector. But, then, this will only prove, that they know not the true principles of religious liberty: that they are the most inconsistent men in the world: and that their *pride* and *vanity* is glaring! This will be no argument in favour of the Establishment; because, I am persuaded, that persons of this complexion, among *Protestant Dissenters*, have always been such, who have fallen into a fond opinion of the established *formula's of dogmatic theology*; and hence they have had the confidence to attempt to impose on their own brethren. This imposing spirit takes shelter under the protection of established *credenda*.

§. 20. We will, in the next place, take notice of the difference Mr. *Warburton* has put between the *Jewish* and the *Christian Church*.

“ And both of them,” are said by him, “ to have had an *inferior* jurisdiction in common, in order to be a *political* Society by divine appointment; but differed in this, that God, for wise ends, *minutely* prescribed the *whole mode* of *Jewish* polity: and Christ, on the contrary, for the same wise ends, only constituted the Church a *policied*ⁱ Society in *general*; and left the mode of it to human discretion^k.” — It is a divine institution^l. — And he calls it a *Kingdom* — “ Jesus, and his apostles appointing officers, degrees of subordination, and exercise of power in his Kingdom^m.”

Again, “ Religion constitutes a *political Society* and, it being of the nature of *political Society* to seek support from alliances, the Church was in a proper and reasonable pursuit, when it

ⁱ The phrase, *a policied Society*, is Mr. *Warburton's*.
^k *Alliance*, &c. p. 94. ^l P. 99. ^m P. 100.

“ aimed at its *own advantage* in this conventionⁿ. ”

But what requires that religion should constitute a *Society*, is, “ that men must have the
 “ meditation on the divine nature drawn out
 “ *into articles of faith*, and the meditation on our
 “ several relations to him, into suitable corresponding *acts of religious worship*; and both of
 “ them to be professed and performed in common: which things require the aid of *Society*
 “ to establish, regulate, and preserve^o. ”

The *Jews* had, it seems, a manifest advantage of the *Christians*, in their divine policy; “ since
 “ God, for wise ends, minutely prescribed the
 “ *whole mode* of the *Jewish* policy. But Christ,
 “ *on the contrary*, has only constituted the Church
 “ a *policed Society* in general; and left the
 “ mode of it to *human invention*, or *discretion*. ”
 And yet is it a *divine institution*! that is to say, *it is so in general*. The mode of it is so far from being any thing like a *divine institution*, that it is merely human. Nay, tho’ it is a Kingdom, the *Kingdom of Jesus*, and *not of this world*, yet is a *political Society*, and is animated by motives and principles *only* proper to a political Society; *namely*, seeking aid and support from a worldly or civil alliance. And the Church did act reasonably and properly in its pursuit, as aiming at its *own advantage* in this alliance with the State. This is the vile and base character that Mr. *W.* gives us of the *Christian Church*! —

Yet this very man tells us, “ that *Christianity*
 “ is superior to *natural religion*, and to the
 “ *Jewish*; to the natural, as by *divine appointment* — to the *Jewish*, in being a *Society*
 “ perfectly free, and independent on the civil
 p.” —

ⁿ *Alliance*, &c. p. 117.

^o P. 37.

p P. 100.

If what he says in the last quotation be true, which is his declaration in that place; then his other assertions, of the *Christian Church* being a *policied Society*, are false.

§. 21. I shall consider what he says of the *mode* left to human discretion. If by *mode* be understood any thing essential either to the being or well-being of the *Christian Church*, it surely cannot be left by *Jesus Christ* to *human discretion*.

If indeed by *mode* be meant *standing*, or *kneeling*, or *prostrating*, in public prayer, it cannot be said, that *Jesus* has pointed out which of these shall be most acceptable to him; for he made use of every of these postures himself: and, as he confined not himself to any one, the *mode* is indeterminate, and cannot be at all essential either to the *being* or *well-being* of *Christian Society*. So that, if in the same Society, at the same time, some should *stand*, and others *kneel*; nay, if some, through infirmity, should *sit* at prayer, the want of uniformity in *mode* would have nothing at all to do with the efficacy of prayer. If, then, the *mode* be left to *human discretion*, it must intend the discretion of *every individual*. For such *gestures* are most proper which have the greatest suitability to the sentiment and circumstances of the worshiper; which agrees also with Defin. II.— And the same thing may be affirmed of any other *modes* of religion. I know no act of religious worship, but what any man may decently perform, or any Society of *Christians*, without the least difficulty about the *mode* of performing it. The Scriptures, for instance, are generally and very decently read by the Minister *standing*; and public praises offered either *standing* or *sitting*: prayers made *kneeling* or *standing*: public instructions delivered *standing*, to a congregation

either *sitting* or *standing*, as suits the auditor. The memorial Supper celebrated *sitting*, as at a meal. Or, if any think that *kneeling* is preferable to *standing*, whilst they receive the elements, who has any authority to censure by the law of Christ? If the mode of receiving the Supper be essential, it should be the *reclining posture* in which the Supper was instituted. So that it must be the *perfection of insolence* to pretend an authority to make any other mode essential. Or if, by *modes*, Mr. W. intends the order in which the public acts of worship shall be performed, every Church, every society of *Christians*, can easily agree in this, without the aid of a civil establishment. Ay, and upon the length of their services too. — These are circumstances, which, with all others essential to the being or the well-being of *Christian Society*, are as easily settled among themselves, as if they had the *civil aid*. There may be *varied* circumstances attending different Churches, that may require the observance of different modes. So that what Christ has left undetermined, has put no part of the *Christian world* under any difficulty, but what the *common prudence* of every *Christian Society* can with ease get over.

Indeed the *Christian* scheme excels the *Jewish*, in its having thrown aside all the *pageantry* and *shew* of rites and ceremonies. There is something very pertinent in a great Writer, who says, “ If
 “ it were not repugnant to the wisdom of God
 “ to superadd *rituals* and *ceremonials*, to morals
 “ and naturals ” [meaning the *Noacic* and *Patriarchal* dispensations to which the *Mosaic* succeeded] “ Why should it be to take down the
 “ *scaffolds* of *ceremonies*, when God’s spiritual
 “ temple, the Church of God, is come to its
 “ full height? Is there not more reason that
 “ rituals

“ rituals should give way to substantials, than
“ that such should be superinduced to morals.⁸”

The Church of God is at its full height: but rituals and ceremonials are a *demolished scaffolding* quite unbecoming this spiritual building. A power claimed of decreeing *rites* and *ceremonies* in religious use, is no other than a power of rearing again a *demolished scaffold*, and reducing the Temple of God, from its full stature, to the dwarfish size of *Judaism*, in the sense of this testimony given by that learned Prelate. It is the disposition of the mind, that the infinite Spirit regards; and it is a perfect freedom from all *carnal ordinances*, from all pomp and ceremony, that is the *truth* opposed to the *shadowy* services of the *Jewish* religion. And, as to *places* of worship, a necessary circumstance of public worship, this is left by Christ to the choice or convenience of all Christian societies. And in this the *Christian* excels the *Jewish* dispensation, in that no one place is more holy than another. *Neither at this mountain, nor in the temple of Jerusalem, shall men worship the Father; but he who worshipeth him must worship him in spirit and in truth.*—Any one place in any part of the world, where a number meet together to ask any thing in the name of Jesus, is a fit place for worship. There was no such thing as consecration of places among the first Christians, nothing like it in the New Testament, but the reverse of it.

And as to the *season* of public worship, which is another circumstance, this seems determined by the *quantity of time* made holy from the beginning. *One day in seven.* And very fitly is the honour done by *Christians* to the day on which the *Lord of life* rose from the dead, in that character.

In short, there is not the least room of doubt, but that the more *plain* and *simple* our social acts of homage are, the more acceptable they must be to our Maker.— The true difference then between the *Jewish* *policed religion*, and the *Christian* religion, is, that the former was full of *rituals*, of *pomp*, and *ceremony*: but the latter is without them, and is as simple as possible. So that the *Christian*, by presenting his body a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable, offers to him a reasonable service.— And, from the practice of the first *Christians*, we read of no more modes and rituals, than “ their meeting together to
 “ read and hear God’s word, to sing his praises,
 “ to make contributions for the supply of the
 “ poor, and to eat and drink in remembrance
 “ of their Lord :” for even *men inspired*, and invested with miraculous gifts, were so far from discerning *modes* as of any importance, that they *too eagerly* exercised their gifts, and neglected that *decency* and *order* which is manifestly requisite in such religious society. *e. g.* It was quite irregular that *two* or more of them should be giving instructions to the same company, at one and the same time. Or, that, whilst one was reading the word, another should be singing, and a third praying openly and audibly. This was *indecent* and *without order*. Yet, of so little account were the *external modes* of worship among the first *Christians*, that the inspired men are found to pay no regard to *order*. Now, as this would defeat the end of public worship, St. Paul joins, that they do all these things *decently and in order*, 1 Cor. xiv. 40.

Modes of the *Christian* religion, cannot possibly intend the *manner* of the mind’s exercising itself; for this we are assured the *alliance* or *establishment* cannot reach: it cannot then

then be the *mode of religion* that *Jesus* has left to human discretion, because religion is an internal, personal thing. And, if we should take religion to imply *doctrine* and *morals*, I hope it will not be said that *Jesus* has left these to *human* discretion, or even the *mode* of them: for every man must form his own sentiments according to his own ability and application: and therefore *formula's of faith* cannot confine him, tho' drawn up and imposed by *human discretion* and authority.—And who will pretend to assign a standard of the *external* gesture, or manner in which an act of *justice*, or of *mercy*, shall be performed? So that *morals* cannot have any *mode* established by *human discretion*, that is, by a public authority of Church and State in alliance, which is the plain meaning of Mr. *W's* *human discretion*.

And if *modes* should be referred to *officers*, *degrees of subordination*, and *exercise of power* in Christ's Kingdom——let Mr. *W*, when he is able, shew the least foundation for these modes in the New Testament. We can plainly see, such that, in order to make religion a *political* Society, degrees and orders of men, with such powers, must obtain. But, then, let no man, who has any reverence for *Jesus*, or would support the truth of his Gospel, dare to say, that he has either authorized or even tolerated any such thing as *degrees of subordination*, or the *exercise of power* among men in his Kingdom. This would be to give the lie to the plainest and most express injunctions in all the Gospel.

§. 22. We will attend a little more particularly to the *exercise of power*. The *Jews*, in our Saviour's time, shewed the exercise of power in their *excommunicating* men, for professing to believe

lieve in *Jesus*. But our Lord denies that their excommunications could have any effect, in the nature of truth; because he himself was the *door*, the only door by which they could enter the true Church of God. This seems to be the Argument of *John* x. at the beginning. And he calls such *thieves* and *robbers* who pretend, by virtue of any delegated powers, to exclude men from the favour of God, or from final happiness! and, without doubt, this is their true character. They are base and sordid mercenaries, who deal in excommunications: they are not *true shepherds*: for a true shepherd has too much compassion for the sheep, to think of ever excluding any, on account of *modes* and *forms*, from the refreshing pastures; or of *shutting the door of life upon them*.

In this sentiment Mr. *W.* agrees, where he gives us that good-natured account of *Church power*, when exercised in expelling a member from its society; by which expulsion, *the man is put into the way of exercising the rights of conscience*.

And, without all controversy, *the power of sitting in judgment on the consciences of men* is the peculiar province of God, or of him only who is commissioned by him, and specially qualified for that purpose. It is the peculiar province of the Deity; insomuch as that a presence of him, which is called *the Spirit without measure*, can only enable *Jesus* to execute the office of universal judge. For men therefore to understand, by *Church power*, a capacity of *binding* and *loosing* the conscience of men, is to assume a province which does not belong to them; to burlesque common sense; to disrobe *Jesus* of the authority with which he is invested by the Father; and to anticipate the proper and peculiar business of the final judgment. — And is not this, in the language

guage of SOLOMON, *religiously to play the fool, by throwing about firebrands, arrows, and death?* The apostolic rod was manifestly a power of miraculously inflicting *bodily pain* upon a refractory, scandalously vicious member of the Corinthian Church; which was intended to convince him, the incestuous person, and others [who were rather wanton and elevated upon it than depressed] that such crimes would not consist with the profession of Christianity:— But the *act of expelling* was the people's, the laity, not the Clergy, but the Church: *Therefore put away from among yourselves that unclean person*^r.

So the method of reconciling or making up differences, alluded to by our Lord, is, *If a brother trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But, if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And, if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it the Church: but, if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man, or a publican*^s.

This seems to be a relation of the manner, in which the *Jews* were directed and obliged to proceed in their reconciling differences; and is grounded on that statute *Lev. xix. 17*, and agrees with the sense of it, that, *Answorth* says, the *Hebrew Doctors* had. See *Answorth's Comment*. The word, Church^t, should surely be confined here to a *Jew neighbourhood*, or society, as in any

^r 1 Cor. v. 13.

^s Matt. xviii, 15, 16, 17.

^t The word *Church*, is confessedly allowed to signify an assembly of people, whether met together on a religious occasion, or not. St. Luke has thrice used the word *ἐκκλησία* where one time it signifies a tumultuous mob, Acts xix. 32. the assembly [Church] was confused. And the second time for a court of judicature

any small town or village; because of the treatment to be given the offender, *let him be unto thee as an HEATHEN MAN, a Gentile, one of another country, or a Syrian^v, and a publican.*—It must respect *private offence*; for it does not say, the Church shall excommunicate him, but *only*, let him be *to thee* an heathen man, and a publican. Having made this allusion to the *Jew law*, and rule of reconciling differences, our Lord addresses his disciples thus: *Verily I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, &c.* The rules of peace and friendship, that you shall publish among men, shall be ratified,

judicature or a *law court*, v. 39. It shall be determined in a lawful assembly [Church.] And, a third, for the whole body of the *Jewish* people, when in the wilderness, *Acts* vii 38. —the Church in the wilderness. And, when the word is used of *Christians*, it is most commonly, if not always, of the greater or less collective body. *Yea*, the Church is thus distinguished from the apostles themselves, chap. xi. 26. xiv. 23. 27. xv. 3, 22. xviii. 22. 1 *Cor.* iv. 17. xiv. 4, 5, 23. & many other places.

And, as to *sacredness of character* among the ministers of religion, neither Mr. *J. White*, nor the Dissenting Writers which he cites, make it at all needful to give efficacy to the public services: “The efficacy whereof does not depend on the worthiness of the minister. That we may lawfully attend upon the ministry of those whose lives and conversations are offensive, if their doctrines be sound and good.” See his *IId. Letter*, p. 12, 13.—This is to give up wholly the *sacredness* of character. And, in the nature of things, an honest ploughman is better qualified to preach the Gospel, than the most learned debauchee in the world. Examine—1 *Tim.* ii. 8. ch. iii. ch. iv. 12. to the end. v. 17. vi. 17. 2 *Tim.* i. 13, 14. ch. ii. iii. 2-15. iv. 1-5. *Tit.* i. 6—to ch. ii. 9. St. Paul teaches, that *sacredness of character*, lies in a gospel minister, not in his ordination, but in his *conversation*. For the truth of which I refer my Reader to the above passages. Yet neither *Papists* nor *Protestants* seem to be of St. Paul’s mind in this matter. Hence what is called a CHURCH, may possibly consist of an assembly of men, minister and people, of no better moral character than the *Ephesian mob*, or Church.

^v *Jones’s Can.* Vol. I. p. 130, 131.

confirmed,

confirmed, and established by *signs, wonders,* and *miracles*, which you shall be enabled to perform, as testimonies from heaven of your divine mission. So the passage is plain and intelligible.

Even Mr. *W.* has condemned the sentiment of *authority*, by explicitly denying that any power, either of the Church or of State, can bind the conscience. “No power of legislation can be admitted into Christ’s Church, without making it a *worldly Kingdom*”. And again, All the power, “which the Church stands in need of, is only the power of excommunicating her refractory members, which, if exercised, (has a kindly effect,) leads them into the way of exercising the rights of conscience”.

§. 23. Should it be objected, that Jesus said to *Peter*, *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell [death] shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, so that whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven, Matt. xvi. 18, 19?*

What if this is said? It is impossible that it can refer to a power given to *Peter* over the consciences of men. Or a power that could at all injure the rights of private judgment. It could not suppose, or imply in it, any thing like this. But the *rock* must plainly signify that fundamental principle, upon which alone the Christian Church could be built; *namely, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST, THE SON OF THE LIVING GOD.* This confession must be the *rock* or foundation of the *Christian Church*, against which the gates of death should not prevail. The *person* of *Peter* could not be this *rock*, because he, like the other

other apostles, was to give way to death. And the declaration of *Jesus* being *the Christ, the son of the living God*, intimates, that this was the *rock*; inasmuch as God's raising him from the dead would confirm the proposition, and make it immoveably firm and stable.

Peter's having the *keys* of the kingdom very evidently refers to his *first opening* the doctrine and kingdom of the *risen Jesus*, both to *Jews* and *Gentiles*. He testified to the truth of *Christ's resurrection*, which very fact or event gave the finishing proof of his being the son of the *living God*; since the *pains of death* could not hold him; and *God* suffered not his *holy one* to see corruption. The preaching of a *risen Jesus*, and testifying to the truth of the doctrine, both to *Jews* and *Gentiles*, was first done by *Peter*; who thereupon is said to have the *keys*, as he *opened* the door of faith: not that this implied any degree of authoritative power which *Peter* was invested with; but the doctrine he taught would either *loose* men from the vassalage of the ceremonial law, and the yoke and burthen of carnal ordinances; or leave them the *bond-slaves* of their prejudices and lusts. It would either loose men from their *idolatries* and *vices*, by their embracing of the doctrine, or it would leave them the slaves and vassals of them: And so would prove, in the language of *St. Paul*, either the favour of life unto life, or of death unto death. Not that this was peculiar to *St. Peter's* preaching; but, purely from his being the *first* publisher, this is said of him: for the same would be true of the preaching of every other apostle, equally with his, afterwards.

No *priority* was to obtain among the apostles, in point of power and authority. For *St. Paul* saith, that he, with regard to his *credentials*, was
not

not a whit behind any of the apostles. And, as an indelible mark of their being the true ministers of *Jesus*, they were to disclaim all *pre-eminence*. Even the diversity of gifts, necessary for perfecting the plan of this spiritual building, the Church, nearly ceased with the apostolic age. And as well might men now pretend to the *varied charismata*, as to such diversity of office which did then subsist. But if character that is SACRED was to derive from one apostle, rather than from another, one would be inclined to give the turn of the scale in favour of the *great apostle of the Gentiles*. Yet he disclaimed all dominion over *the faith of men* *. And it was not *power* he conveyed to those whom he ordained, but a *charge* to preserve their character unspotted, and to keep the Gospel pure and unmixed, as a most sacred deposit.

§. 24. Another reason is assigned, why religion should constitute society, and that is, “Men must have the meditation on the divine nature drawn out *into articles of faith*; and the meditation on our several relations to him into suitable and correspondent *acts of religious worship*: and both of them to be professed and performed in common. Which things require the aid of Society to establish, regulate, and preserve x.”

This has already been noticed. Nevertheless some further views of it shall be taken.

We ask, whose meditation must this be, that is to be drawn out *into articles of faith*?

By Defin. I, religion is a *personal* thing. My own meditations on the divine nature, and the relations he stands in to me, cannot be the medi-

* 2 Cor. i. 24.

x Alliance, Sec. p. 37.

tations of another man; from thence only can the articles of my own faith be drawn, and not the articles of another's faith: consequently the *aid* of Society is not at all requisite to draw out the articles of my faith. And, if it could, it would only be the articles of my faith. But, if the articles of every man's faith were to be drawn out by the aid of Society, then there must be as many formula's of faith, as there are different opinions and sentiments found among those who profess the *Christian* religion: which difference would serve no valuable purpose at all in being thus drawn out. More than this, there would be no end in drawing them out; forasmuch as my meditations on the divine nature may be daily attended with more strong, clear, and just ideas of my Maker, as my intellectual powers are advancing and improving towards that degree of perfection of which they are capable. Hence my *creed* may be daily altering, in proportion to my advance in knowledge. And just in the same proportion will my acts of homage become suitable and correspondent.

The establishing of certain *credenda* for judgments of all sizes; or to men who have scarce ever meditated on God, and to men whose meditations must have a vast variety of ideas attending them; don't seem to be very consonant to reason or religion: any more than the authoritative fixing on certain *forms* and *modes* of worship can be suitable and correspondent to the meditation of different men.

It is every way sufficient, that the *rock* or *foundation*, on which Christ's religion is built, is simple, plain, and intelligible; *namely*, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST, THE SON OF THE LIVING GOD. In which all real *Christians* are agreed, and the article of faith needs no drawing out or removing

removing from the place where it is : but has more authority in the New Testament where it stands, than if marked with the suffrage of all the Fathers, or Councils, that have ever had any existence in the Christian world. That faith which is essential to the *Christian* character, or that constitutes men *Christians*, is what leads them to attend to the command of God, *which is to believe in the name of his son Jesus Christ, and to love one another, as he hath given us commandment* — for, *whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Christ, God dwelleth in him, and he in God. — This is life eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent.*

So plain and simple are the *credenda* of the Gospel, that the articles cannot admit the least improvement, or additional force, from Councils and Fathers. The only apostolic Council, *viz.* at *Jerusalem*, presumed not to draw up a *creed*, or any articles of faith, for *Christians*. They only gave judgment upon *matters of offence* between *Jew* and *Gentile* converts, who were mixed with idolaters ; and determined, that the *Gentile* convert had no need of circumcision ; and that he should abstain *from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication* : which *decree* was given with the suffrage of the Holy Ghost.

So far from having any concern in decreeing *rites* or *ceremonies*, to be observed by the *Christian* Church, that the whole of it is directly pointed against the *Jewish* rite of *circumcision* continuing in force, and against idolatrous customs of the *Gentiles*.

It is very remarkable, that this *Council* was occasioned by the *Jew Christians* tacking salvation unto the observance of a *Mosaic* rite, *viz.* *circumcision* : — *Except ye be circumcised after*

the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved. Here-upon this Council condemned the *Jewish* bigotry, and decreed an abolition of *rites and ceremonies, Jewish and Pagan.*

We read of no Oecumenical Council till the *Nicene*, under *Constantine* in the Year 325. And even that Church Writer, *Dupin*, owns, that, through the first three centuries, the way of opposing errors and heresies was, — “every Bishop instructed his own people in the faith of the Church, and refuted errors by the authority of Scripture and tradition.” Had he said, by *Scripture* only, that had been sufficient; and a far better method than any of the after Councils took, whose measures were unchristian; *darkening and confounding the very foundation-principle* on which Christ’s Church was to be built: declaring *the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father*: and *anathematizing all such who should say, there was a time when the Son of God did not exist.* — &c. &c.

Their pretended power of decreeing *rites and ceremonies* is not a copying “after this authentic Council of the Apostles, but to reverse the measures of it.” *Other foundation can no more lay, than that laid by Jesus Christ.* The apostles themselves could not alter the foundation of the *Christian Church*. But to shape, form, and then impose articles of faith, and to decree *rites and ceremonies*, is to assert a dominion over men’s faith, no way helpful to their joy.

§. 25. Mr. *W.* adds, “It is to be observed, that the unity of the object of faith, and conformity to a formulary of dogmatic theology as the terms of communion, is the great foundation and bond of a religious Society. — This the several Societies of *Pagan* religion wanted, “ in

“ in which there was only a conformity in national ceremonies : but, as to points of opinion and belief, it was not judged to be of moment to determine whether their Gods were real persons, or only the symbols of natural powers y.”

This passage, taken from the *Alliance*, is used in support of the *superior* excellence of the *Christian religion* to that of the antient *Pagan* religion of *Greece* and *Rome*, from its being better fitted to fall into a firm and lasting Society. But with what propriety ? For where is the man who examines those *formula's of dogmatic theology*, or *the creeds*, which are made terms of communion by any Church establishment, who can clearly determine whether the number of the Gods, mentioned in them, is to be confined to *trinity* or *unity* ? Or whether their *numbers* are not made absolutely uncertain ? Since, when applied to Gods, *three* may be but *one*, and *one* may be no less than *three* ! Or, whether *mathematical certainty* be not openly burlesqued in them ? — As difficult it is, from *formula's of dogmatic theology*, to determine whether the number of Gods, mentioned in them, be *real* or *nominal* persons, or only the *symbols of natural powers*, or distinct conscious beings, of co-ordinate power, equal independency, and unorigination, and so *three* proper Deities ? If this very confusion is introduced by the *formulary of dogmatic theology*, then the *Christian religion* is so far from being superior to the *Pagan*, from this great foundation and bond of religious Society, that it does not seem so much as on a *par* with it : since *Pagans* made it of no moment to determine in such abstruse points of speculation, and did not make them the

terms of their communion. Whereas, by such established *formula's*, there is not only such confusion introduced, but a most famous and highly celebrated symbol has damnation affixed to both ends of it, the better to support its character, as being a compend of the *true catholic faith*!—Would not any unprejudiced mind, viewing the *Christian* and *Pagan* Religions in this light, readily prefer the *Pagan* to the *Christian*? And if Mr. *W.* saw this, [as who can doubt but he did, that considers his great abilities,] it is then no other than a piece of drollery; a dry, but pointing burlesque on the Establishment! which, not having so good a foundation of support, as the *Pagan* religions of *Greece* and *Rome* had, “must soon be lost, and absorbed in the State, or, at least, fall into the lowest condition of slavery and dependence upon it.”

But it should be observed, that Mr. *W.* has mentioned the *unity of the object of faith*: which, as he has been pleased to connect with a *conformity to a formulary of dogmatic theology, as being the terms of communion, &c.* deserves some notice.

If he intends to insinuate, that the *unity of the object* of faith is more secured by these formularies, he could not have said any thing more ridiculous! Unless he can prove the *unity* of the object, in such like articles as these—*we worship one God in trinity, and trinity in unity*—And when he can prove, *that there are not three eternals, but one eternal; at the same time that the Father is eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.*—And *that tho' the Father is almighty, and the Son almighty, and the Holy Ghost is almighty; yet there are not three Almighty's, but one Almighty*—&c.

Or,

Or, will he prove an unity of object, in men's thus addressing; *O God the Father of heaven; O God the Son the Redeemer of the world;—O God the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son;—O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons and one God*, have Mercy.—Or, will he be able to prove an unity maintained between these objects of address, and those other petitions, of, *Good Lord deliver us, by the mystery of thy holy incarnation; by thy holy nativity and circumcision; by thy baptism, fasting, and temptation; by thine agony and bloody sweat.*—Can this varied address be made only to one person? If to more than *one* person, then where is the *unity* of the object of faith? What?—Does it necessarily belong to the *great* bond of religious Society, that men shall vary the object of their address, in order to assert the *invariable unity* of it?

N. B. It would well become Mr. *W.*, or any other contender for an established formulary of religious public address, to remove every thing that is senseless, absurd, or contradictory, from the *liturgies*, before they express so much disgust at *free or conceived* prayer, among *Protestant Dissenters*. For will it not remain a difficulty to charge more *confusion, jargon, or nonsense*, and other *indecencies*, on the prayers of any Dissenting Minister, than what has the suffrage of an establishment?

Men may indeed, from the dint of education, and custom, be prejudiced strongly in favour of certain *forms* of expression, and reckon them very *devotional*! but, if there be no sense, no distinct, no determinate ideas that belong to them, they might full as well be without them. And, however venerable the *bond*, it deserves not

the name of a *religious bond*; much less, to be made use of as the *great foundation and bond* of a religious Society. It may be the bond of such a Society as Mr. *W.* contends for; *namely*, one that has resigned up all her virtue, all her innocence to the State; in order that she may reap all the civil emoluments and profits of an establishment and a test-law.



C H A P. III.

Of a Test-Law.

A Further reason for the alliance between Church and State is this, *namely*, “that no other provision could be made for the safety of the Church, than engaging the protection of the State. Therefore we conclude that the Church’s stipulating for that protection, was, not only what she in justice *might*, but what in *duty* she was *obliged* to do.”

But this security of protection, it seems, could not be given to the Church by the State, without a *test-law*. For “the not securing her by a *test-law* is betraying her, and the delivering her up bound to her enemies.”

§ 26. An inquiry into the sense and meaning of a *test-law* will be proper.

Mr. *Warburton* defines it to be “some sufficient security given to the State by those ad-

² *Alliance &c.* p. 118.

⁴ P. 117.

“mitted into the administration of public affairs, that they are members of the religion established by law^b.”

And its importance, he shews us, in that not only the security of the Church, but also of the State, depends upon it! for, saith he, “the State lies under the most indispensable necessity of providing a TEST-LAW for its own security^c.”

Examine we into the truth of these declarations. — And, if by the Church, should be understood the Kingdom of Christ, which is not of this world; its safety cannot be provided for by this world, or by the State; for its natural independency will render the thing impossible. And as a Church or Kingdom, of which Christ is the Head and Lord, it is an impeachment of his capacity and care to suppose that no other provision can be made for its safety, but by engaging the protection of the State. But Jesus, we have already observed, has declared, that upon this rock he will build his Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. If by the gates of hell we should understand DEATH, the result of persecution upon the first propagators of the Christian doctrine, or the murder of the Head and Lord of the Church; then we find that the State was so far from being the natural ally of the Church, that it was the power against which Jesus promiseteth to defend his Church. — For he has said, Lo I am with you always, even to the end of the world. And his apostles assure us, that God has made Jesus both Lord and Christ — Head over all things to his Church. — The position is therefore preposterous, namely, that no other provision can be made for the safety of the Church, but

^b Alliance, &c. p. 113. ^c P. 118.

that of engaging the protection of the State. It is an unpardonable perversion of truth : and will be treated as such, by all who have a due reverence of the *New Testament* doctrine.

And yet, “ not to secure the Church by a *test-law*, is betraying her, and delivering her up bound to her enemies.”

This *form of expression* appears to have been borrowed from the *chief priests and elders* of the *Jews* binding and delivering up *Jesus* to *Pilate*. But without any analogy in the application. For *he*, to whom they delivered *Jesus*, they had under their own management in this respect, and did actually put him under a *sort of necessity* to become the instrument of their rage. They who delivered him up, were equally, if not *much more* his enemies. But who are the enemies into whose hands the Church would be delivered *bound*, if not secured by a *test-law*? Are there any invested with State-power to crucify the Established Church, if she was not secured by a *test-law*? But if there be any reason of enmity against her, it is certainly owing to a *test-law*, and to nothing else. For, should the Magistrate *equally* protect and encourage all *Protestant Christians* under his administration, none could complain of his *partiality*, or of his undue application of the rule of right. And forasmuch as the *majority* has certainly as good a right to observe such *forms of worship*, as to them shall appear most conducive to the ends of religion, as any *lesser* bodies, or communities of *Christians* can have ; no *molestation* could possibly arise on this score : forasmuch as *lesser* bodies do manifestly *differ* in their forms and modes of worship, and in their religious sentiments too ; and so are not likely to *unite* in any measures of opposition to the majority : no *disturbance* could arise from them to the injury of
of

of the majority, who differed from one another upon a *common ratio*; also without any reason of offence to one another. And if we add, that the civil Magistrate's office is to keep the peace, and, by Max. II, to secure the temporal liberty and property of man, he would not suffer any injury to be done to the religious, or to the natural rights of conscience. So that Mr. W.'s Church would not only be *safe*, but absolutely *safer without*, than she ever can be *with* a test-law.

A *Writer*, of the best character, has made the following observations, under the chapter of *Constantin the first Christian Emperor*:

“ *Constantin* should not have made himself a
 “ party with any of the sects, into which the
 “ Christian profession was then divided. — In
 “ short, liberty was still given to those only,
 “ who were of the Emperor's religion: and lit-
 “ tle regard was had for those, who preserved a
 “ supreme reverence for him, who is King of
 “ Kings—sovereign Lord of the whole world,
 “ and judge of the thoughts, reasonings and
 “ determinations, as well as the outward actions
 “ of his rational and intelligent creatures. Cer-
 “ tainly there remains a rest for the people of
 “ God: there is a future recompence in ano-
 “ ther world for the strictly and inflexibly vir-
 “ tuous of all denominations. For in this world
 “ they scarce ever have security and protection:
 “ but under almost all governments, without
 “ any offence whatever against the State, they
 “ are treated as impious, profane, and disaffect-
 “ ed. —

“ —A Prince can protect and defend peace-
 “ able, innocent men in their several civil em-
 “ ployments, and in their pursuits of truth, and
 “ the profession of the principles of religious or
 “ philo-

“ philosophic Science. Nor have any, like him,
 “ ability to reward and encourage the virtuous
 “ and the skilful. —

“ ——— But for a prince to pull down men’s
 “ temples, where nothing is done contrary to
 “ the peace of Society, to deprive them of their
 “ statues, and other consecrated ornaments, and
 “ to forbid them to worship in the way they ap-
 “ prove, and that under heavy penalties: what
 “ is this, but to vindicate, so far as he is able by
 “ his conduct, all instances of persecution in
 “ times past? and to encourage and excite to the
 “ like injustice in time to come all princes and
 “ emperors towards such as differ from them:
 “ and as it may happen, those of his own reli-
 “ gion*.”

To what purpose then a *test-law* in defence
 of the Church? A solution of this question will
 be the better given, after we have explained the
 terms *Church* and *test-law*—and have considered
 the *reason* and *end* of such *test-law*.

§ 27. (1.) By *Church*, in the sense of this
 Writer, is to be understood, “ *that sect of re-*
 “ *ligionists* which happens to have the majority
 “ of numbers in any state, nation, or kingdom
 “ —because it would not be *fit*, nor *wise*, nor
 “ *practicable*, that the State should enter into an
 “ alliance with the minority^d.” So that what-
 ever opinions *the majority* happen to hold, they
 have the *first* right to the establishment; nay,
 the *only* right. And these must be understood
 to be the *Church*. —

(2.) By the *test-law*, we are to understand,
 “ some sufficient security given to the State by

* See Dr. Lardner’s *Credibility*, &c. P. II. Vol. VII.
 p. 420, 422, 424, 425.

^d *Alliance*, &c. p. 113.

“ those

“ those admitted into the administration of public affairs, that they are members of the religion established by law.” This, I own, is an odd sort of a definition, but, as it is Mr. *W.*’s, one might expect it to have some sort of meaning. *Members of the religion!* — that is to say, members of the *majority*. Members of the Church — no matter what that religion is, which is professed by the majority. Whether *Paganism*, or *Popery*, or *Mahometanism*, or *Christianity*. — And the scheme is certainly well laid for security of State favours; since, whatever happens, the *test-law* secures public benefits to the majority. And it is a good reason why a man, who is fond of establishment, should be at no loss where to make his profession of religion. For, go where he will, he must profess with the *majority*, in order to prove himself a good Church-man, and secure the benefits of a *test-law*! so that at *Constantinople*, or *Pekin*, or *Rome*, or *Geneva*, he would be a conformist. And this is in perfect agreement with the sense of Mr. *W.*; for, says he, it is no matter what that religion is, “ for it is not to our purpose to defend *this* or “ *that* national form or mode, but a TEST in “ general.”

(3.) The reason of such a test-law, is, the obligation the State is under from the Church’s giving up her supremacy and independency to the State. For, “ this enables the State to perform “ this sole condition of protection f.” — What this *supremacy* and *independency* is, we have already taken a full view of.

But the reason or *necessity* of a test-law, in order to the security of an established Church, is further argued, “ from every society aiming at

* *Alliance*, &c. p. 113.

f. P. 116.

“ an advancement of itself upon the ruins of the
 “ rest: which it calls a bringing into conformity
 “ with itself: and, when reason fails, will at-
 “ tempt to do it by the civil aid. — As was
 “ the case of the Sectaries in the reign of *Charles*
 “ *the First*.” — And hence the State is under
 the highest obligations of *justice* to provide this
 security ^b.

Those whom Mr. *W.* calls *Sectaries* in the
 time of *Charles the First*, were, in his sense, pro-
 perly and truly the *Church*; that is, if they had
 the majority. And that party, which till then
 was called the *Church*, must have become a *Seet*:
 for *numbers united with the State*, or with civil
 power, undoubtedly make a good establishment,
 in the sense of this Writer: and have a first right
 to the appellation, CHURCH.

And even yet, on the principles of truth, a
 society, which aims at the advancing of itself on
 the ruin of the rest, is so far an *antichristian* so-
 ciety.

§ 30. This *base* principle can be owing to no-
 thing else but a desire of such an alliance or esta-
 blishment, that is contended for. And this Mr.
W. owns, when he says, “ that now (that is to
 say, since the establishment of one sect, and giv-
 ing a general toleration to the rest) the zeal for
 “ opinions would be out of measure inflamed by
 “ *envy* and *emulation*; which the temporal ad-
 “ vantages, enjoyed by the established Church,
 “ exclusive of the rest, always give birth to.”
 This, he says, would be the case, if the tolera-
 ted religions were permitted to enter into the
 public administration. But this is a delusive
 way of representing things. For it is the true

^a *Alliance, &c.* p. 115.

^b P. 115.

^c P. 119.

state of the case from a *test-law*, and plainly shews, that, as the case really stands, the temporal advantages, which the established Church enjoys, *exclusive* of the rest, is the very occasion of *envy* and *emulation*, that had no birth given to it, but by a *test-law*.—The excluding of all the members of other sects from having any share in the administration, is one great occasion of *envy* and *emulation*.

A *zeal for opinions* could not be more inflamed, by giving a free admittance to every sect into the administration, than it can be, or has reason to be from a *bill of exclusion*, viz. the test-law! That law itself is a natural provocative to *envy* and *emulation*! And cannot but be so, as it is an act of *injustice*, open and manifest injustice.

And Mr. *W.* has discovered a very uncommon degree of assurance, in his claiming a test-law, in defence of the Church, when he has so positively declared, “that the Church, in seeking alliance with the State, had no aim at riches, honours, or power: because these are things, which, as a Church, she can neither use, nor receive profit from: and it would be *impertinent* in her to have any such aims^k.”

Thus evidently has one of the Church's very learned and very zealous sons fixed *impertinence* on his Mother.

§ 31. And, yet, some *merit* is pleaded.—For it seems that the *Clergy*, the guides of the Church, have a claim to *public munificence*, as well as *public maintenance*. No doubt, in favour of their flocks as well as themselves; and this lies, “in that the *Clergy* is now under the MAGISTRATE'S DIRECTION^l.”—That is, the

^k *Alliance*, &c. p. 69.

^l P. 74.

Clergy are become the most obsequious and humble servants of the Magistrate. An abundant reason for a *test-law*, in favour of Church-emoluments being kept inviolably sacred—and an unanswerable reason for TYTHES, as well as for the monopoly of all State-employments.

The Clergy is now under the Magistrate's direction. What an amazing harmony, with those declarations of our Lord's? — *If ye were of the world, the world would love its own—but, because ye are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you—no man can serve two masters—ye cannot serve God and mammon—one is your master, even Christ.*

But, by the Clergy's being now under the Magistrate's direction, it plainly appears, “that this maintenance of TYTHES is not assigned by the public for the support of opinions, but for the use and necessities of the State^m.”—And hence we learn the meaning of that passage of Mr. W's, where he tells us, “that members of a Church *unestablished* have no right to a public endowment—since the State could not wisely nor justly affix a public maintenance to the Clergy of a Church with which it was not in allianceⁿ.” That is, if such Clergy are not under the Magistrate's direction. Hereupon it is unreasonable in any to refuse the payment of tythes, who scruple not to pay other civil taxes; for the difference between *merely civil officers* and *ministers* is only ACCIDENTAL.—Church-officers *happen* to have religious opinions, and civil officers sometimes none^o.

If then the people, called QUAKERS, would but reason coolly with themselves, they might thus be led to a perfect reconciliation to the payment of

^m Alliance, &c. p. 76. ⁿ P. 77. ^o *ibid.*

tythes. For, from this declaration, they need but consider that the difference between *civil officers* and the *Clergy* is merely accidental; and that Church officers may happen to have no religious opinions, and civil officers may have some. And they are further to consider the *Clergy* as the civil Magistrate's *servants* and *instruments*: and that their maintenance is not intended for *the support of opinions*, but for the use and necessities of the State. Hence all *squeamishness* about paying *tythes* will be quite removed; and the *Quaker*, who is willing to contribute to the support of civil government, will, upon the very same principle that he pays the King's tax, or any excise, pay *tythes*, as they are allotted for the maintenance of the *Clergy*, who are the Magistrate's most humble servants, under his direction, and so the useful and necessary instruments of the State. The reasoning is conclusive; for no rational *Quaker* would expect a builder, workman, or an artificer, to execute his plan without hands or tools: and the civil architect, or governor, must have these provided for him. It is but their considering the *Clergy*, as Mr. *W.* says, *not as ministers of religion*, but as ministers, necessary instruments, or useful tools of the State, and the man may certainly pay his *tythes* without any manner of scruple. The religion of the thing is quite given up: and it remains no more a matter of *divine right*.

§. 32. (4.) The *end* and *intention* of a test-law is to give the Church a distinguishing characteristic, as it enables her to keep all places of *profit* and *trust* to herself, and to treat all Dissenters as *slaves*. This seems to be the high honour intended by Mr. *W.*'s sense of the test-law: which may easily be inferred from his saying, "that

H

" the

“ the Church, without reserving a right of representation in the Legislature, would be making itself, instead of a subject, a *slave* to the “ State P.” If he means by this, the *representation* the Church has by her Bishops sitting in the house of Lords, as Barons; if to be without such a representation be a mark of slavery, then all the Sects of *Protestant Dissenters* may be looked upon as slaves. But I apprehend this unhappy man means more. He wants such a test as would disqualify all Dissenters from sitting in the house, either of Lords or Commons. And probably he wants, what the *enemies of liberty*, but *bigotted sons* of the Church, would have had in the reign of Queen ANNE, *namely*, to take away the vote of every Dissenter. — —

He has gloried much in the Bishops making a part of the Legislature, *as they watch over the interests of the Church*, it being one of the principal ends of their sitting in Parliament, “ to “ take care that that protection which the State “ affords it, by a *test-law*, be not violated q.”

And yet, in what a wretched condition is the *Church-security* here in *England*! for he tells us, “ that though the number of Church-barons are “ enough to watch over the safety of the Church “ *in general*: yet they are evidently *too few* to “ deliver the sense of so large a Society, when “ particular cases of importance come under “ deliberation r.”

Possibly Mr. *Warburton* would have his apprehensions removed, if he had a seat among the *Right reverend*. He would not think the centinels, on the van-guard, too few; or be in any fear of a surprize from the enemy. — If I injure him, I ask his pardon. — But such is my present opinion of him.

† *Alliance*, &c. p. 78.

q P. 79.

r P. 92.

§. 33. Another view of things is now to open upon us; “for, from the State’s obligation to support the Church, proceeds the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY of the civil Magistrate! which, on the other hand, introduceth the right of *Church-men* to partake of the Legislature.”—And a right also of a *test-law*, the sole condition of the convention, as it excludes all others but Church-men.

The *justice* and *equity* of this law is defended upon this maxim, *namely*, “that every sect attempts to establish itself on the ruin of the rest. —A principle not peculiar to one Sect, but common to all.” Nevertheless he would have us believe that this pernicious principle is restrained by the *test-law*.

Whether there be any truth in this, we shall see by and by. There is no likelihood of any, because the very nature of the law excludes all Dissenters from the Established Church from the *common rights* of men, and the reasonable claim of fellow-subjects; tho’ equally capable of contributing to the safety and welfare of the public. It is built on the very pernicious principle that it is said to *restrain*. And this Writer has certainly laid its foundation on no better a basis.

It has already appeared very plain from him, that *establishments* must be founded on *falsehood*, and be every way unworthy a Society that has a claim to the *Christian* character.—And the very *nature of truth* must condemn men, who, by any compact, so *seek their own things*, as to manifestly *injure* the natural and just rights and claims of others.

To evade the force that there is in *truth*, he has denied that an establishment can be defended

upon it^v. And he has found out a way of perverting the common ideas which we have affixed to the *law of nature*. “For, saith he, by the “*law of nature*, we must not understand that “which right reason, taking in all circumstances, “dictates, in every case, to be done.—But we “must follow that signification in which it has “been used by all the *wise* and learned Writers “on natural and civil laws—and mean *what* “*reason prescribes under the sole consideration of* “*men’s nature, and their mutual relation to each* “*other, whether in or out of society, without any* “*regard had to the peculiar frame, genius, and* “*constitution of civil policy*”^w.—Hence we are told, “that many municipal laws are formed in *direct opposition* to what the law of nature prescribes. The writings of the civil “Lawyers, and of those who treat of the law of “nature and nations, are full of these cases; “where the laws of civil society in general, not “of this or that particular state, are *total deviations* from what the law of nature directs “to^x.” And he immediately instances in that civil acquisition, called PRESCRIPTION. And afterwards, in the GAME-LAWS^y. “For, he “saith, he will content himself with one or two “cases. Because it would be endless to enumerate all those in the writings above-mentioned.”

These two instances of PRESCRIPTION and the GAME-LAWS are singled out by Mr. *W.* to serve the purpose of proving that the *test-law* stands on a like basis, and may be defended by the law of nations; tho’ it should be considered as directly opposed to the law of nature, and as a

^v *Alliance, &c.* p. 147.
^y P. 132.

^w P. 129.

^x P. 130.

total deviation from it. And in these illustrations Mr. *W.* has appeared greatly to hug and caress himself! It must then be very proper to attend with great care to his reasoning.

§. 35. We begin then, with observing, that, in order to shew the *justice* and *equity* of a *test-law*, the *law of nature* is not to be understood as it is, but as *learned Writers* have been used to represent it; forasmuch as the *justice* and *equity* of it rests upon a like foundation with those municipal laws which have a *direct opposition* to the law of nature. This is saying something. — And the first instance in evidence of its truth, which is brought, is *PRESCRIPTION*, the law of prescription. “Now *prescription*, in the “sense of Lawyers, is a *title acquired by use and “time, and allowed by the law.*” This I find is the standard sense of *prescription*, among Lawyers. — But then we must also add, “that *prescriptions* are properly *personal*; and therefore always alledged in the person of him that “prescribes. — And moreover, *prescription* be- “longeth to one or a few only.” —

From this sense of the law, which is the true and orthodox sense, we plainly perceive, that, which way soever *prescription* is defended, the defence will not serve equally for a *test-law*: which Mr. *W.* has asserted that it will². — For what if the “*law of prescription* directly con- “tradicts the law of nature, because the true pro- “prietor is dispossessed of his own, without his “consent²?” — Yet, it differs greatly from a *test-law*: since “the right, which *prescription* “begets, is from a presumption in law, that a “possession cannot continue so long quiet and

² *Alliance, &c.* p. 131.

² P. 130.

“ not interrupted, if it was against right, or injurious to another^b.—Or what if *prescription* should not be against the laws of nature, but only allowed as evidence of a right, without putting the party on producing particular evidence, from a presumption that there was formerly such evidence, tho’ now lost? — And if it is not so properly a *title acquired*, as an *evidence* of a title? ” Then it will follow that Mr. *W.* is as little acquainted with Statute-law, as he is with the laws of Christ’s Kingdom.

Puffendorf says, “ though *prescription* is not plainly commanded by the law of nature ; yet, upon supposition of things being divided into distinct properties, the peace of mankind seems to favour it ; lest otherwise the *titles* to things should remain always in doubt *.”

What two things could have been put in comparison, that have a less likeness to one another, than the law of prescription and the test-law? There is no more agreement than there is between a *sphere* and a *cube*, or than between *fire* and *water*. In the case of *prescription*, there is a title acquired by use and time. — In the case of a *test-law*, nothing at all to answer it, but the arbitrary pleasure of the majority. — *Prescriptions* are properly personal, never belong to many, but are always confined to *one* or a *few* — the *test-law* to all sects but one that are found in a State ; so that it may extend to a *majority* of the King’s subjects^c. — *Prescription* begets a right only from a presumption in law, that it is not against

^b 3 *Salk.* 278.

* *Of the law of nature, &c.* B. II. ch. iii. § 22.

^c I say, a *majority*. For, tho’ Mr. *W.*’s Church must be the largest sect found in the State, yet the others taken collectively may be greater.

right, or injurious to another—the *test-law* is unable to plead any thing like it, but on the contrary, takes place to the manifest injury of others, in violation of their natural rights and claims. —

The right, which *prescription* gives, supposes a long, quiet, and uninterrupted possession — the *test-law* can suppose nothing like it. — Nay, we might add, that, as to *prescriptions* in general, the law supposes a *descent*, or *purchase* originally^d. Pray, good Mr. *W.*, what *descent*? What *original purchase*? on which your *test-law* supports.

— I must observe here again, that Mr. *W.* shews his ignorance: “For *descent* derives from, “but never gives a title. There is an original “agreement supposed; and the *title* is not acquired by use and time, but the *descent* is itself looked upon as an evidence of good “title.”

Numbers, in the case under consideration, surely will not be pleaded as *descent*; because these were merely accidental. For, a while ago, another sect had the majority. Or any other might by the same chance have had the advantage of numbers. But numbers surely cannot plead a right by descent, when there are other children of the same stock, and some as old, and perhaps older than the possessors, also equally qualified for possession.

Will an *original purchase* be pleaded? What was it? Can the *test-law* plead any valuable consideration that gave it being? No, nothing like it: for the Church had nothing to give but her own *independency* and *supremacy*, which indeed Mr. *W.* says she resigned to the State. But what these are, or whether they imply a *quantum meruit*, yet remains matter of great scruple. If her

^d *Cro. Eliz.* p. 709.

independency and *supremacy* were any part of her virtue, it is to her eternal reproach that she resigned them. And the making such resignation, as the term of contract, must be enormously wicked. For, if the Church could not enter into alliance, without resigning her *virtue*, or her chastity, the *test-law*, as the purchase, the original purchase must be the wages of iniquity.

But, if there was no *virtue* or *value* in the things themselves given up by the Church to the State, but some empty, windy sounds, or the *eruclations* of swelling Church-men, — *independency*! — *supremacy*! — having no relation or connexion farther than with the tremulous air, — if this be the case, then the *original purchase* will not be presumed legal.

This *illustration* of the fitness and equity of the *test-law*, from the law of prescription, brings to my mind the story of a sign-painter in the country, “who could aim at no likeness but that
“ of a *wool-pack* : so that, when he was ordered
“ to make the likeness of a *lion* in red colours,
“ he drew out, in his accustomed way, a *wool-*
“ *pack*, painted it red, and wrote under it, *this*
“ is the sign of the Red Lion.” —

§ 36. Let us now consider the other instance Mr. *W.* has produced, in illustration of the *justice* and *equity* of the *test-law*, and examine whether he has succeeded better than he has in his former instance. And the second instance is, “that
“ of men’s property being interrupted in the
“ *Fere nature*, or as to wild creatures, by the
“ GAME-LAWS.”

Mr. *W.* says, “that the reason of the prohibition was, because it was not at all for the
“ *public good*, either to suffer peasants or me-
“ chanics to run up and down the woods and
“ forests

“ forests armed ; which not only brings them
 “ to neglect their proper trades and employ-
 “ ments, to the damage of the public, and of
 “ their families ; but, in time, inevitably draws
 “ them on to robbery and brigandage : Or to
 “ permit the populace, in towns and cities, to
 “ have, and carry arms, at their pleasure, which
 “ would give birth and opportunity to commo-
 “ tions and sedition^e.”

This instance of the powerful and useful influence of *Game-laws*, is a direct testimony against the necessity of a *test-law* : forasmuch as Mr. *W.* would lead his readers to suppose that places of honour, profit, and trust in the State, are *Game*. And he has expressly told us, that *such Game* is by no means to be pursued by the Church as a Church, or a religious Society. For to have honours, riches, and power, as the aim of an establishment, would be to make *Christ's Kingdom of this world*. And the *only* legitimate motive, that the Church could have, was security and protection from outward violence. But the design of the *test-law* is manifestly to secure all the public *Game* to the Church : which *Game* is supposed to be wild, or as the *Feræ naturæ*.—The *sacramental test*, being applied as a qualification for civil offices and employments, does, in a notorious sense, reverse all the principles and maxims of *Christ's Kingdom*. For, most unfortunately for this Writer, the sacrament of the supper, duly celebrated, is an eating and drinking *in a religious remembrance of Christ's body broken, and his blood shed for the remission of sins*. But how does it stand, and what is it made to signify, as a *test* ? Why it stands to signify a *qualification* of the devout communicant for civil

^e *Alliance, &c.* p. 132.

offices of *profit* and *trust*! Is there any possible connexion? What, am I to eat and drink in *remembrance of Christ's death, confirming the doctrine of pardon and remission of sins*, as my qualification for worldly honours, profits, and emoluments? And yet, this is the direct and immediate sense of its being made a *test*. With infinitely more reason would it have been made a test, for engaging a *renunciation* of all places of worldly honour and profit: and would have much better agreed with that other *Christian* rite, which, in the language of the Church liturgy, enjoins a *renouncing of the devil, and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of this world, with all covetous desires of the same, and the carnal desires of the flesh, so that we will not FOLLOW nor be LED by them*. Whereas the *sacramental test* stands in direct opposition to the *baptismal engagement*, in the sense of this very Church: it having prevailed with the State to make a test to secure all that *Game* to itself, which it obliges every of its members to *renounce*, in order to their being initiated members of it.

What must men think of a Society or Church, who not only suffer, but *defend* such bare-faced, such open and flat contradictions? To the shame and eternal reproach of any who would be called *Christians*, is this sacramental test made use of, in a sense so profane, and irreconcilable with the sense the same Church has affixed to another *rite*, as well as directly contradictory to its own institution. Let Mr. *W.* compare Defin. II. with the sacramental test, and coolly reflect upon it, and then assert, if he dare, "that all the posts of honour and profit" in the kingdom are worthy of such an affront "offered to the Son of God!"

But

But to the *Game-law* prohibiting men's partaking of common property.

The reason of the prohibition was "restraining the populace from carrying arms, at pleasure, which might have given birth to commotions, &c." Hence, says this Writer, "every one sees the *justice* and *reason* of the deviation from the law of nature[†]."

The *Feræ naturæ*, intending wild beasts, and birds, which, by nature, are no man's property, are by *Game-laws* restrained from becoming the property of persons who are not of such quality, or estate: for this very good reason, among others, namely, *that from an universal license, in a civil society, where arts and sciences are cultivated, the poor would be tempted to neglect their employments, in order to support themselves upon those common productions of nature.* Nevertheless, a man, not qualified by law to *hunt* and *hawk* in other men's grounds, may *hunt* and *hawk* at his pleasure in his own lands. And the *common law* allows the hunting of *Foxes*, and other ravenous beasts of prey, in the ground of another person. But we are further to consider, that a *poor* man, who has no property at all in land, such person in order to his *hunting* for *Hares*, or *hawking* for *Pheasants*, &c. must ordinarily go either upon the King's *forests*, and *chaces*, where the property is *ROYAL*, or upon some more private property; and therefore, his claim to the *Feræ naturæ* is not equal to that of others: since he has no such lands of *his own*, on which the *wild beasts* or *birds* may graze or feed: consequently, in this view, there is no manner of comparison will lie between the *reason* or *justice* of the *test*, and of the *Game-laws*. To introduce a

† *Alliance*, &c. p. 132.

parallel, it should first be shewn, that the property, the goods, or the privileges, from which the *test-law* restrains, are like the *Feræ naturæ*, that is to say, *wild by nature*; no man's property. Can this be said of the offices, and benefices, and profits, that the Church is securing to herself by a *test-law*? It should be shewn also, that the test-law found men, as the Game-laws did, by nature and providence so circumstanced, as that, like the poor man, they were destitute of all property. And that this was truly the condition of all those men whom the test-law excludes from the *public Game*.

Strictly speaking, it must be owned, that places of profit and trust are no man's property, because they lie in the disposal of the civil *Magistrate*; but then a qualification, a capacity, a right to be named or chosen by him to an employment, where this is found to be the result of the gift of nature, and acquired abilities, surely may be allowed to be every such man's property. The reason is evident, for it would be equally unjust to disqualify a man of equal abilities and qualification, *natural* and *moral*, from serving his King and Country, because of his private, religious sentiments, as it would be to deprive one man from Game, who had an *equal* estate with his neighbour, only because he did not fancy to make a *bow* to the east, when he went to public worship; or could not fancy to have his children signed with the *sign of the Cross*, when he had them baptized. I could almost conclude, that even Mr. *W.* would esteem it very *unjust*, if the *Game-laws* had such stupid limitations. And is not the limitation from the public Game, by the test-law, full as ridiculous? Nay, more so, since, in the latter case, men must not be at liberty to serve their King and their Coun-

Country, unless they will comply with a demand that is in no sense to be warranted. Besides, the *test-law* is a dishonourable infringement on the *Royal Prerogative*, as it disables the King from employing some of his subjects, who have at least an *equal claim* to his favour and confidence. And it is not good policy; for *Pufendorf* citing from *Grotius* his notion of *Providentia reatrix*, or *State-providence*, says, “ he is
 “ chiefly to be understood of the distribution
 “ of those rewards, to which the subjects have
 “ only an *imperfect* right; in which though a
 “ greater liberty may be taken than in giving
 “ those which are due upon contract, yet it
 “ would be perhaps more adviseable to proportion every man’s share to his merits, as the
 “ surest way to prevent strifes and complaints.
 “ Thus *Isocrates* observes of the old *Athenian*
 “ Ministers, *one thing which proved of great advantage to them in the management of the common-wealth was this; that whereas there are*
 “ *two sorts of equality, one which gives exactly*
 “ *the same portion to each man, and another*
 “ *which proportioneth men’s shares to their particular merits, they were not ignorant which of*
 “ *these two were most beneficial to a State: but*
 “ *rejecting that as unjust, which deals out the*
 “ *same allotment to good and bad men without*
 “ *distinction, they chose the other which assigns*
 “ *honours and rewards according as every man*
 “ *deserves, for the surest guide of their proceedings *.*”

This must be good authority with Mr. W., who says, “ we follow that signification of the
 “ law of nature, used by all the learned Writers

* Of the law of nature, &c. B. I. Ch. VII. §. xi.

“ on natural and civil Laws, from *Plato* and
 “ *Aristotle* down to *Hooker* and *Puffendorf*.”*

It should be shewn, that as a reason of the *Game-laws* was to prevent men's becoming idle, and neglecting their proper business, and employment in society, to the prejudice of the public and of their families, for want of such labour; that in like manner the *test-law* has such an useful tendency; and that, in order to prevent men's being diverted from more laudable employment, by their hunting after places of *profit* and *trust*, the *test-law* was made. Till these things are done, it will appear no better than a wild comparison, that, at the same time, adds to the evidence of Mr. *W.*'s talking of what he understands not.

§. 37. Yet he says, “ that men would as easily
 “ judge in one case as in the other, if it was not
 “ that *religion* is mixed in the affair of the *test-*
 “ *law*, and the jealousy men have been of late
 “ taught to entertain of its incroachments.
 “ Otherwise could one think it easier for an
 “ honest poor man to qualify himself, as the
 “ *Game-law* requires, for a participation of these
 “ natural rights, than for a Dissenter to qualify
 “ himself, or as the *test-law* requires, for a place
 “ in the government? Or could one be ignorant
 “ that *all* are justly concluded by a *test-law*, as
 “ well as by a *Game-law*, by having given their
 “ consent, by themselves, or their deputies, to
 “ its enacting?”

This is reasoning worthy of so great a reasoner.
 —It is true, Mr. *W.*, that an honest poor man
 may much more easily qualify himself for the
 benefits of the *Game-law*, than a Protestant

* *Alliance*, &c. p. 129.

‡ P. 132.

Dissenter can qualify himself to overcome the restraints of the *test-law*, if he attends to the nature of moral obligation: forasmuch as a poor honest man may, by labour, become possessed of so much property in time as may qualify him for Game. And, *vice versa* a rich man may also disqualify himself for Game, by his extravagancies. — But, in the case of the *test-law*, nothing but the sacrificing of a man's conscience, and making a prostitution of that, will qualify a *Protestant Dissenter* to overcome its restraints. And this you have said, “for if any under the discouragement of a *test-law* will, for the sake of civil advantages, come over to the established religion, — such must be the *most unworthy* and *most abandoned* of men ^h.” But there is no truth in that declaration, *namely*, “that all are justly concluded by a *test-law*, as well as by a *Game-law*, from having given their consent, by themselves, or their deputies, to its enacting.”

This must be false, unless Mr. *W.* can prove, that the *Protestant Dissenters* ever gave their consent, either themselves, or by their deputies, to the enacting of the *test-law*, in the sense, or with the views he is pleading for. But this is what he is unable to do — Nor can he prove, that the majority of those of the *Legislative*, in enacting the law, were influenced by any such motive. The very tenour of the act, as appears by its *preamble*, was the *preventing dangers which may happen from Popish recusants*. It was enacted with a direct intention to prevent King *Charles the Second*, or the Duke of *York*, from employing *Papists* in the administration of public affairs. The *Dissenters* were persuaded to think the act

^h *Alliance*, &c. p. 133.

would

would have this tendency ; and therefore, in that critical conjuncture, consented to be put under the same disqualification themselves, in order that the *act* might have its efficacy upon the *Papists*. But would any man, unless he has quite abandoned all sense of ingenuity, and be of a most debased character, hence conclude the *equity* and *justice* of the *test-law* against these very *Protestant Dissenters*? —

But I well remember Mr. *W.* has attempted to defend the power of Spiritual Courts, from their enforcing the duties of *imperfect obligation*, such as *hospitality* and *gratitude*. Which he has expressed great concern about ; the civil Magistrate not being able to assist in such pious attempts. And now his concern for *gratitude* shews itself in flaming colours! The demand he makes of a *test-law* against *Protestant Dissenters*, who submitted to it, to *save the Constitution when in danger*.—This *advocate for gratitude* now pleads against them, and concludes them justly under all the disadvantage of a *test-law*, from that their virtuous consent!

§. 38. We have further illumination, “ for
“ the truth is, parties must alway have a *watch-*
“ *word* to carry on their business. There was a
“ time, and that not long since past, when the
“ word was, THE DANGER OF THE CHURCH—
“ this seemed tolerably well, while it was seen
“ religion had any influence on the mind ; but,
“ since, a general spirit of license has prevailed,
“ it has been thought necessary to change the
“ cry, and we now hear of nothing but the dan-
“ ger of our civil liberties.”ⁱ

ⁱ *Alliance*, &c. p. 132, 133.

By this Mr. *W.* would insinuate that the *test-law* was contrived to serve a valuable end, namely, "that the party might have a *watch-word* to carry on its business: and that *watch-word* was what served tolerably well, whilst religion had any influence on the mind. But, now, the Church must certainly be in great peril, because the cry is changed into that of the danger of our civil liberties." And pray who made such very important use of the true watch-word, to wit, *the Church is in danger?* Why one of its sons, an heroic champion, *SACHEVERELL*; published the *watch-word*! a man of an uncommonly famous character; even so uncommon as to reach to *infamous*! A *worthless* man, of neither learning, sense, nor honesty: but yet a *trumpeter* of sedition. An *engine* of a *Jacobite* ministry! an *enemy* to the civil and religious liberties of mankind. He gave the *watch-word*.—And it served tolerably well, whilst it was seen *religion*, that is, *raving for the Church*, had any influence on the mind. The Church then foamed with *rage*, and displayed her fury upon the tolerated religions; or the other Sects, who were found under the name of *Protestant*. For, during this *religious* season, the *Papist* was in great esteem, a favourite of the Church; and the watch-word equally secured the *Mass-house*, with *St. Andrew's*, from the hands of a destructive mob.

The *religion*, supposed to influence the minds of men, through this happy season, was a jealousy raised in them about keeping the *MONOPOLY* of places of profit and trust, *sacred* to the use of the Church. And the business of pulling down *Meeting-houses*, and giving a sanction to a *Schism-bill*, could not have been carried on so well, without this watch-word, *the*

I

Church's

Church's danger ; and the necessity of a *test-law* to secure her.

Thus it is that you have *the law of nature* confounded, and the rights of men sacrificed to the pleasure of a *majority*, in order to ground a *test-law* upon the law of nations.

Several other views are presented to us.

§ 39. "A test, we are told, is so far from being injurious to *true religion*, that it is, in the whole, highly serviceable to it¹."

How is this proved? Why thus: As supposing the *tolerated religion* to be the true, it discovers men to be most abandoned who will leave it, for the sake of *civil advantages*. "So that it is highly for the interests of *true religion* to have such a *touch-stone* or *criterion*, as the test, to discriminate its *sincere* from its *corrupt members* ^m."

This is, in so many words, to declare, that the Church, by its alliance with the State, and its having a test-law, is the only *furnace* in which true religion is to be tried. For *true religion*, it seems, must only have her abode among those *Non-conformists* who reject the allurements or temptation which the Church holds in her hand, by virtue of the test-law: because if it be for the interest of *true religion* to have such a *touch-stone*, as a test, to discriminate its sincere from its corrupt members; *none but corrupt members* can hold those public advantages—for it is not possible that the *test-law* can discriminate, in the established Church, its members; therefore, if it be for the interest of *true religion* to have this touch-stone, *true religion* can only be among those who reject the bribes which the Church offers to any

who will swallow down her subscriptions, or conform to her *test-law*.

Yet, at times, Mr. *W.* would suppose the established, the *true* religion; contrary to the above reasoning, and to all good sense, i. e. if his notable *alliance* be the standard. But there is not any thing in the world more certain, than that *true* religion needs not the support of *civil power*: or, that it can have any thing to do with a *test-law*, unless it be to shew an abhorrence of it.

And yet, he sais, “ *great, yea vast advantages* accrue to the State from a *test-law*.”

Not indeed that *truth* can be promoted by it, but *civil utility*. What this *utility* is, has been explained above, and needs no repetition.

And yet it must be difficult for us to suppose *civil utility* promoted by a *test-law*, since Mr. *W.* sais, “ that it is that unavoidable consequence of “ an *established Church* in every place where there “ are *diversities* of religions, a TEST-LAW which “ makes the judgments of so many revolt; and “ chuse rather to give up an *establishment* than “ recognize it with so TYRANNICAL an attendant.” And, just before this very remarkable declaration, he tells us, “ that the most “ forcible arguments against a *test* conclude as “ strongly against an *establishment* P.”

Upon these declarations, I would ask, whether it is possible for any pen to have exposed both a *test-law* and an *establishment* more to the ridicule; nay, to the abhorrence of all lovers of truth, than this man hath done, in a few lines? A *test-law*, he sais, by *unavoidable consequence* makes the judgments of so many to revolt; and chuse rather to give up an *establishment* than recognize it with so TYRANNICAL an attendant! admit this

ⁿ *Alliance*, &c. p. 135.

o P. 112.

p *ibid.*

to be the true state of the case, and every one will see, that a *tyranny* must be defended, just so far as a *test-law* is supported. And this is the *public utility*, the vast *advantage* that accrues to the State by a *test-law*. It constitutes a *tyranny* in the public, or national constitution, which it had not without it. And this *tyranny* is the attendant on an establishment. An establishment is not *safe*, farther than a *tyranny* is maintained, that terrifies the consciences of great numbers; and so makes the judgments of many revolt. And this *tyranny* is inseparable from an *establishment*, for “the most forcible arguments against a *test* conclude as strongly against an *establishment*.”

And yet, Mr. *W.* sais, “it appears, at first view, so evident that, when a Church and State are in union, he that cannot give security to *both*, for his behaviour may with as much reason be deprived of some civil advantages, as he, who before the union could not give security to the State alone.”

What can be the meaning of this conclusion, from a *tyranny* erected? Surely a much better security may be given to the State without a *tyranny*, than with one. This I will *pass over*, as having neither *rhyme* nor *reason* in it: but, as it stands, appears to be a *burlesque* on the establishment.

In defence of this establishment and test, he farther sais, “*religion* is likely to thrive much better than when left to itself.”

The term *religion* is here used, but only in a vague sense. It must mean *true religion*, which can have no such thing as an union with the State; as appears from *Definitions* I. II. and from the

¶ *Alliance*, &c. p. 112.

¶ P. 136.

first six *Maxims*, and also the XIth and XIIth. — And Mr. *W.* expressly says the same thing, in the following declaration of his, “ we ingenuously own, that as the *essence of religion* consists in the inward impression it makes upon the mind, the bringing in members, who make only an outward profession, is injurious to religion^s. ”

An establishment and a test-law must of consequence be injurious to religion, as they are directly calculated to *bring in* members, who are influenced only by the benefits and privileges which the alliance has monopolized. It follows, that religion is much more likely to flourish, when left to itself, than by such an unnatural alliance. What confused ideas must he have of religion? — *Religion left to it self!* — Can this be the condition of true religion, that has the almighty, the eternal God for its object and patron? — *Religion*, whose essence or being lies in the minds of men, and is out of the *ken* or *notice* of mortal judges! Cannot this *thrive* without an alliance with the civil power, and the security of all public offices of profit and trust? Is religion capable of any support, any nourishment, from these things? The *bantling* that must have a worldly wet-nurse to suckle it, or it becomes unhealthy, cannot be *religion!* and yet, this writer has represented the condition of RELIGION to be thus *weak, childish, and helpless!*

§. 40. After Mr. *W.* has made this silly this stupid declaration about religion, as not likely to thrive, if left without the supports of an establishment and a test-law, he yet asserts, that the supports they afford, are worthless and insignificant; and that they can only impress the *most*

^s *Alliance*, &c. p. 134.

profligate and abandoned! his words are these—
 “but when these rewards and discouragements
 “[of a test-law] are so small as to tempt only
 “the most profligate and abandoned, no injury
 “is done!”

What then are all the public offices of profit and honour, that are guarded by the *test-law*, only fit temptations for the most profligate and abandoned? This is a very insolent representation of things; and I am afraid that Mr. *W.* has himself felt *much less* temptations than great numbers of these public advantages, so very powerful, as to make him give way through human frailty: and at the same time he would take it very ill to be numbered among the most profligate and abandoned. There is therefore most apparently a *false bias* clapped on the minds of men, by an establishment and a *test-law*. The contrary of which Mr. *W.* has not shewn, even in any part of his *demonstration*.

From the premisses, we learn, that the security given to the State by those members who are admitted into the public administration, happens to be no more than this, *namely*, “that they have
 “received the Sacrament according to such an
 “established form: for the very reason that they
 “could not come at those public benefits, but by
 “such an act of conformity.” That is, they have, under pretence of public authority, ventured to throw contempt on the authority of *Jesus*, the Son of God. So that they are *thoroughly* qualified for all such services as shall be required of them. — — — If the *security*, given by the *test-law* to the State, be of a better nature than this, a *demonstration* of it would be of service.

^t *Alliance, &c.* p. 136.

As things are, it must be owned that Mr. *W.* has *gilded* his alliance with rhetorical flourishes in defence of the rights of conscience; and has pleaded against all violence and force in matters of religion; but he pretends not to see any imminent danger of debauching the minds of men, by the *golden wedge* and the *splendid garments*. He pretends some scrupulosity indeed about the influence *rewards* and *discouragements*, affixed by a *test-law*, may have. But then he eases his conscience, by supposing them too small to tempt any but the *most profligate* and abandoned.

He likewise sees well enough the tendency of this monopoly, by the test-law, to make men *insincere* in that act of religious worship, *eating bread and drinking wine* in thankfulness to God, for the victory gained over the world and death, by the person of the crucified *Jesus*; as it assures men of their deliverance. But then he is not so ingenuous as to own, what he knows not how to avoid the force of, *namely*, that the privileges monopolized by a test-law are adapted, as strongly as they can be, both to *keep in, and bring over* more insincere members than a few, into the inclosures of the establishment. And perhaps he cannot imagine any one thing, that could more influence the minds of men, to make only an *outward profession* of religion, [so much to the injury of true religion] than this one thing, viz. a *test-law*, in his very sense of it. — Because the making of any *religious action* a qualification for civil, worldly advantages, is to prophane and abuse what is, in its own nature, *sacred*: so, for *Protestant Dissenters* to regard their *Christian* character, as giving them a right to places of *honour, power, or profit*, is to pervert the pure, the spiritual design of the *Christian doctrine*, and to expose it to reproach.

It may hence be objected, that where a nation is, by common profession, *Christian*, how will civil government be supported, unless some are allowed to occupy places of civil power and honour?

I answer, there is too much reason to conclude, that there will ever be numbers of such who profess the Christian religion, that will remain very solicitous about these things: there will then *be no want of hands*, who will gladly undertake such offices. And moreover, tho' we allow it to be every way consistent with the *Christian* character, that order and good government should be supported; and that consequently, persons of different ranks and stations, arising from superiority and subordination, will be found in civil life; and although we further allow, that *good Christians* may exercise *power* for the good of civil Society, yet this should never be the result of a *religious*, but of a *civil* qualification. Which will make as great a difference from the state of things which Mr. *W.* introduces, as *light* makes from *darkness*! because what in the one case is a violation of truth, would in the other case be very consistent with it. But, in a just state of things, true *Christians* would accept of offices from a *public spirit*; and by their principles be led to execute them, as the *ministers of God*, accountable to him for their public conduct. They would perceive them to be as *distinct* and *independent* advantages, from what are the result of the *Christian* character, as their *estates* or *titles* are; and would see that these things had no farther connexion with the Christian character, than as they used them for the *utility* and *weal* of the public.

I have never pretended to insinuate, that the *Christian religion* condemns, or is in any degree an enemy to *civil government*. It appears, on the contrary,

contrary, to suggest the very best rules and maxims for the support of it. But then it will by no means suffer its professors to make either civil honours, or power, or any public favours to be the rewards of either its faith or religious practice. Here, in one word, I am persuaded lies the disagreement between Mr. W.'s scheme, and the truth of the case. —

The eagerness shewn, by some *Protestant Dissenters*, about places of civil honour and profit, I pretend not to vindicate. Their *occasional conformity* I as readily condemn, as Mr. W. does. . . . And, had they universally understood the *test*, in the light I see it, not a man of them would have been found in any one corporation in the Kingdom. . . . And yet I have the charity for many of them as to think, they have had the public good as their motive. Their attachment to a *Protestant* government, and to civil and religious liberty, has been the bias upon them. But why should they have gone into such an unreasonable compliance, to qualify themselves for public service? I own, I cannot see the reason of it, and am persuaded it is incapable of defence. — If the Government saw it could not do without them, so well as with their assistance, it must have been the wisdom and interest of the Government to have removed the difficulty from them. And, had they unanimously refused *the present qualification*, the brand of infamy must long ere this have been removed. But, if the Government had no need of them, it is matter of great lamentation, that so many of the public-spirited should have paid the *servile* compliment to an unreasonable law.

If the opinions of some persons have any foundation, who think that the *Protestant* interest, and the security of the present royal family, would

would with great difficulty, if at all, have been preserved to this day, had it not been for the public service of the *Protestant Dissenters*; upon this view of things, I should be apt to conclude, that the continuance of the test-law in force against them, is an *infamous brand*, as it discovers the ingratitude of the public. But, whether such conclusion would be just, or not, I rather leave to those whom it more immediately concerns.

§. 41. Mr. *W.* denies that a *test-law* can endanger *religious liberty*.

And to this purpose he distinguishes between the *test*, and the taking away *religious liberty*; that is, saith he, “freedom to worship God, according to one’s own conscience, which should not be taken away on any pretence whatsoever.” Nay, he saith, “that he has proved the *divine doctrine* of TOLERATION, or the right of worshipping God, according to one’s own conscience.—The two cardinal principles, on which, as on two hinges, our theory is raised and turns, namely,—*that the State hath only the care of bodies*, and the Church only the care of souls—And *that each society is sovereign and independent of the other*, is demonstrably deduced the *indefeasible* right of *religious liberty*.”

That there is a false bias clapped upon the mind of man, by an establishment and a test-law, has been made plain and evident; which, so far as it operates, does debase and inflave the spirit, and so is detrimental to the interests of *religious liberty*. For who can expect, with any reason, to have advancements made in knowledge and piety under an establishment which fixes down a for-

mulary of dogmatic theology, to which all must conform? But as this cramps and enervates, or manacles the human mind in its inquiries, so it must be detrimental to *religious liberty*; since this must have its sphere of activity enlarged, in proportion to the improvement or enlargement of idea and sentiment.—But an *alliance* and *establishment* must confine and limit the mind, as Mr. W. declares, “that, when the State by this “convention covenanted to afford the Church “*protection*, that Covenant was made to a “*particular* Church of *one* denomination of such “*determined* doctrine and discipline*.”

A convention, made with a particular Church of *determined* doctrine, does plainly shew, that the convention can be no friend to liberty, that is, *religious liberty*. It cannot be, since men are tied down to *creeds*, *formula's*, *rites*, *ceremonies*; in conforming to which only, they are intitled to civil protection, public maintenance, and to all places of profit and trust in the civil society.

The assertion then is absolutely false, *viz.* that a *test-law* cannot endanger *religious liberty*; unless we may understand Mr. W.'s sense to be, “that “true religion is to be found no where but “among *Non-conformists*!” And then indeed we might imagine this alliance to be a friend to liberty, as it keeps out of the hands of religious men those *civil honours* and *profits*, that might corrupt the moral sense, and in consequence injure the cause of religious liberty.—But, without this be his sense, I cannot see any truth in his proposition*.

This

* *Alliance*, &c. p. 88.

* That ingenious Gentleman, who has wrote a *Second Letter* to the Reverend Mr. White, p. 37, sais, “that a repeal of the “*test* and *corporation* acts wou'd really be injurious to the in-
“terest

This friend of *toleration* farther says, “all that forcing to *outward conformity* can do, is to make men hypocrites and atheists. Therefore, for the sake of the state, the profession of religion should be FREE.”

If interest of Protestant Dissent. or, he is persuaded that it would rather *injure* than *strengthen* our interest; and that as a Dissenter he has never solicited the repeal.”

I differ from this writer; forasmuch as if the cause of Liberty would be served by the repeal, and the dissenting interest is in support of Liberty, then the repeal must *strengthen* rather than *injure* that interest.—To be under any apprehensions, on account of Protestant Dissenters being put on a level with his Majesty's other liege Subjects, is to pay them no great compliment.

Why should it be said or insinuated, that *high trusts, public offices, and court-employments* are apt to corrupt Protestant Dissenters more than others? Is there an absolute incapacity of being virtuous in high stations? If there be, it would be the happiness of *all men* to be debarr'd from them. But if, on the contrary, there are men in Society capable of managing *ten talents* with as much fidelity as others can *five or two*, virtue or religion will not be more endanger'd by a man's having the *ten talents*, than by the greater number's having the *one, the two, or the five talents*.

Would any man think his conduct justifiable, should he refuse a large estate, which required of him no religious qualification for possession, merely because of the greater danger of his being corrupted by it, and the peril he should be exposed unto from a state of affluence? Would not his family complain, and his friends reproach him?

To have the tree of knowledge of good and evil guarded, by Cherubim and a flaming sword, from one Sett of loyal Subjects, and not from another, is to put men upon an *unequal* foot of trial, with regard both to their Virtue and Loyalty.

A *panic* for Dissenters would be much better grounded, if their dissent was inseparably connected with a mortifiedness to this world. But when many of them, on some account or other, become *occasional conformists*; the repeal of the *test*, and the removal of every *Subscription* of creeds, would be so far from injuring the dissenting interest, that it would remove all that occasion of offence, all that *guilt* that there now is in qualifying for civil and other offices: and of consequence, there would be less corruption, and very probably a much less decay of practical religion among them, and in the public. It

✓ Alliance, &c. p. 138.

If this be right reasoning, that, for the sake of the State, the profession of religion should be free

It will not be wide from the purpose of these expository notes, to cast one's eye on the *Subscription* to which dissenting ministers are obliged, by the laws now in being. The *divine doctrine of toleration* itself not giving them any relief, tho' Mr. W.'s pious Soul is in rapture, when he speaks of it,—*the divine doctrine of toleration*! I presume he has his eye upon *the act of toleration*, when he thus expresses himself. But how does it deserve such an high epithet, whilst it obliges men to *subscribe articles*, which are the peculiar composition of the establishment? And this subscription imposed on Dissenters, is, in order that they may worship God, and administer the ordinances of Christ, according to their own consciences! And in the doing of which they are not qualified for one single civil, or Church emolument! what if the Church of England has a right to impose Subscription, as the term of communion, on her own members? with what shadow of reason can she claim a right of imposing a Subscription on those who are not in her communion? She cannot plead, that this is to secure the favour of the State, her ally, to herself.— And although dissenting ministers are not obliged to subscribe all her 39 articles, yet, 35 and an half are imposed. Is there a proportion of benefit secured to the dissenters by the Subscription, such as will amount to *eight-ninths* of her clerical advantages? Is there any benefit proposed? If there is not, why this imposition? Unanimity in religious opinion cannot be secured thereby: forasmuch as the established clergy themselves by subscribing the whole of the articles, *ex animo*, are manifestly of different Sentiments concerning them, and ever will be, whilst they think at all; and with any freedom make their enquiries. And they all know that these articles of faith are no farther *Christian*, than as they agree with the doctrines of Christ, and of his apostles. That, to Christians, there is but *one faith*, or rule of faith, and that cannot be the articles of the Church of England, but the *New Testament*. So that a man's faith being built on these articles, will not prove that it is built on the New Testament. Nay, this Church has in her XXth article declared, that the believing of her articles is not necessary to Salvation: for she says, "that the Church ought not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of Salvation." Yet the subscribing of her articles is enforced. But since these articles are not necessary to be believ'd in order to Salvation, how are they articles of faith? or what religious end can the enforcing a Subscription of them serve?

A calm and sober consideration of these things, would become

free from all outward force and violence; by the same *ratio* it should be free from all *bribery* and *corruption*: since those allurements to outward conformity have as great, nay, a much greater malignancy in them, in influencing to an hypocritical profession, than external force or violence can have. There should therefore, upon Mr. *W.*'s own principles, be no *test-law*: forasmuch as he thinks the State injured by such measures as have a tendency to make men *hypocrites*. The State must then be injured by that *bias* to outward conformity and an hypocritical profession, which the establishment and a test-law do manifestly produce.

This is the concern Mr. *W.* has to prevent any measures that may tend to make men hypocrites, that is to say, on the side of *force* and *external violence*; but by no means would he have the *more efficacious* measures removed, which lie on the side of *bribery* and *corruption*! and for no other reason, but that he hopes to demonstrate the Equity of a *test-law*. He will give up every thing, that he can consistently with his securing his scheme of an alliance, and preserving the *monopoly* which he would have sacred to the use of the Church — but, if those reasonings be ever so strong against his *monopoly*, he will by no means allow of their weight.

If any one will but cast his eye on Max. VIII, he may greatly divert himself with a view of the civil Magistrate's being made a *common arbiter*,

come the established Clergy; and the removal of this evil from their dissenting, Christian brethren, would be to their everlasting honour. *Fines, imprisonment, the great excommunication* hanging over the heads of pious and peaceable Christians, merely for not subscribing these articles, will not allow one to look upon the *act of toleration*, as that *divine* thing, Mr. *W.* would make it.

endowed

endowed with *impartiality enough* “fairly to apply the rule of Right. — When, by the *test-law*, the Magistrate is to confine his protection and all his favours to *one sect* in the community, that has inveigled him into an alliance, for this very end and purpose!”

It is very merrily told us, “that religion could not operate with *sufficient efficacy* without such an arbiter, endowed with *so much impartiality*!” When I contemplate such glaring absurdities, and manifest contradictions, laid down in Mr. *W.*’s *Alliance*, I am led to conclude, that he could not have more effectually destroyed all credit to his scheme, as a professed defence of an *establishment* and a *test-law*; or have made these things more the subject of *ridicule*, had he laboured out a long age in the employment. —

Religion could not operate with *sufficient efficacy* without such an arbiter as the civil Magistrate, *endowed with impartiality enough fairly to apply the rule of right*; when, by the alliance and *test-law*, none must have a claim to his protection and favour, but his dear ally!

But this sophistical Writer will have it, “that the pain, inflicted by the *test-law*, is no more than necessary to repel the *evil of diversity of sects in the administration*.”

Upon his own principles, no such law ought to have place. “Since the Magistrate has it not in his province to take notice of opinions, or to reward them: reward not being one of the *sanctions of civil society*.” Consequently no regard should be had to *opinions* in the Magistrate’s conferring favour. When I say no regard should be had to opinions, I mean *religious opinions*, as I understand Mr. *W.* — for such

^z See Max. viii.

^a *Alliance*, &c. p. 124.

must be excluded, who deny *the being of a God, — his providence over the world, — and the difference between moral good and evil.* For these principles are allowed to be the care of the Magistrate to protect, support, and cherish. Such *opinions* therefore as are subversive of all order, rule, and government, are inconsistent with the three principles of natural religion, and so cannot be religious opinions. But religious opinions cannot be subversive of the *peace of civil society*: unless *rendering to Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's — or paying tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom is due, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour,* should be injurious to society. The *Christian*, who is under the direction of the Gospel scheme of truth, is guided by *love unconfined, universal benevolence* — he will do nothing through *strife or vain-glory*, but in *lowliness of mind*. He will *esteem others more highly than himself*. He will habitually detest all *proud, haughty, selfish, monopolizing* principles and aims. He will express *meekness and humility*! Surely then the *Christian* principles and aims cannot be subversive of the peace and order of civil society.

The particular differences in sentiment can never be *religious* sentiment, in a true and proper sense, if they influence men to contrary views and pursuits. For when any seek *their own* [or this can be said of any society] and not the comfort, the reputation, and honour of others, they act not as Christians. Nor can any society, tho' ever so large, who monopolize all *protection and favour* to themselves, have the least claim to the character of *Christian*.

Yet Mr. *W.* is afraid of “*diversities of religious societies in having equal privileges.*”

But,

But, if he means, by *diversity of religious societies*, men who embrace one and the same religion, men who are agreed in owning the *same Head*, and in professing to be governed by the same rule, the *diversity of sentiment*, in matters of speculation, will no way disqualify them for *equal privileges*. And truly Mr. *W.* will make no distinction in favour of the *different sects* out of the establishment; they shall only have him prove for them the divine doctrine of toleration, which they shall equally enjoy; tho' their members, when collected together, may happen to be far greater than that sect in alliance: for it is sufficient with him that the sect which has the *majority* claim an alliance with the State. So that the particular *differing sentiments* of this *established sect* may be, as it shall happen, more *sordid* and *base* than as can be found in any other sect. Nay, this *potber* he makes against divers religious sects having equal privileges, might, in the true method of forming a judgment of things, be as well pleaded against his own Church Society having equal privileges for its members; since there is perhaps as *great difference* in religious sentiment among those who make up the established sect, as there is between any of the non-conforming sects; or between any of these and the establishment, with regard to their general characteristic differences. Moreover, the taking in to an alliance with the State any one Christian society, from the very reasoning of this Writer, must be the *bane* of that society, as religious; and, therefore, a diversity of sects professing the same religion should have equal privileges in the same State.

For,

To deny them equal privileges, by vertue of an establishment and a *test-law*, is to defeat the

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end

end of civil government, as appears from *Maxims* II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, and XI. by *Max.* II, Security to the temporal liberty and property of man is the *only end* of civil government. — But the *test-law*, as Mr. *W.* has defined it, gives the lie to this *Maxim*. And, by *Max.* VI, the civil Magistrate's office directly leads him to *protect, cherish, and propagate* the three fundamental articles of natural religion. — But how does he *protect, cherish, and propagate* these, which are professed with as much *purity and activity* by the non-conforming sects, as by the established sect? And yet the Magistrate is rendered incapable of *protecting, cherishing, and propagating* these principles; as his *protection* and favour are confined to the *major* sect, the Church. This very consideration overturns all the foundations of Mr. *W.*'s scheme, and shews him to be a most inconsistent Writer, and his *establishment* and *test-law* to be directly subversive of the *only end* of civil government, and of that which the Magistrate's office *directly leads* him to do.

Where is, or can be the equity of this *monopoly*? For as a *religious* society, in the words of Mr. *W.*, *the Church*, as such, cannot be proved to have more friendly and catholic principles than the other sects have: nor any *qualifications* that arise by virtue of the dogmatic formularies of theology, that render its members capable of executing offices of profit and trust, more for the good of society, or of the State: any persons therefore of large capacities and merit, who are professors of the three fundamental principles of natural religion, and who do not own a *foreign jurisdiction*, have an undoubted claim to the Magistrate's favour; and to hinder him from employing such in public offices, is to deny that

that his office leads him directly to protect, cherish, and propagate these principles. And yet, after all, I am far from envying the *majority* any of those privileges which they have a right to, consistent with the claims of good subjects. But, if they have an establishment, surely it should not be attended with a *test-law*, nor with an obligation on any of its members to *subscribe* articles that are of doubtful sense or meaning. Such *impositions* can never serve the interests of true religion, nor be consistent with the *good* of civil society. —

And although it may be thought that I am pleading for the introduction of *Protestant Dissenters* into places of profit and trust, I am fully persuaded, that their having such places would not make them more religious men; nor, from numbers of them so employed, would their societies appear with greater reputation, as religious societies. On the contrary, I am fully persuaded, that *occasional conformity* has not only shewn that a worldly spirit too much prevail-eth among *Protestant Dissenters*, but it has greatly contributed to the *decay* of real religion among them.

It would therefore, I imagine, be much more for the interest of religion, both in the major and minor sects, to have no *religious test* to qualify for civil offices.

And if these civil advantages of places of profit, &c. must be monopolized; for God's sake, let us have *full toleration*, which Mr. W. has so often spoken of, as a *DIVINE* thing. Let us have it free from all imposition, and from all subscription. And what is more necessary [even on the plan of this Writer] than that all *subscriptions* to articles of faith should be removed? When neither the magistrate, either in alliance or out of it, can be a judge of religious sentiment,

in any man! Nevertheless, by the act of toleration itself, the *Protestant Dissenting-Minister* is not set at liberty from subscription to a public formulary.

§. 43. Mr. *W.* yet sais, “when opinions do directly and necessarily affect the peace of society, they then come within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction.—The opinions, which a *test-law* makes matter of disqualification, directly and necessarily affect the peace of Society^b.”

But what opinions are these? Are they any of the three principles of natural religion, that men deny? No; why then, if they are agreed in these, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction cannot reach them, as Mr. *W.* has assured us. See *Maxims* IV, V, VII, and XI. His business only extends to the care of these three, for *he is no judge of opinions* — and, if he was, *he could not reward* them.

But what are the opinions which directly and necessarily affect the peace of society? I will give as fair an answer as I can collect from this piece of Mr. *W.*’s. — It is rather a *single* opinion, than a number of them; namely, “an opinion which the other Sects have formed, that they have a claim in nature, truth, reason, and equity, to *equal* favour and *equal* protection from the civil magistrate with the major sect; as they can claim, at least, *equal* loyalty, *equal* virtue, *equal* capacity for public service.” —

This, this is the damnable opinion, this is the detestable heresy that threatens the *peace* of the State! And, if the civil Magistrate does not consent to indulge the *majority*, the *greater* sect, in setting a *brand of infamy* upon all non-conform-

ing sects, she, the *Church*, will threaten the *State* with the resuming the exercise of her SUPREMACY. See *Max. xiii.*

§. 44. To soften the unrighteous measure, this Writer tells us, “*that the disqualification is no punishment, because the will is not concerned—*” “*it is then only a brand of mischief, and not of*” “*crime. And therefore the simply repelling must*” “*be called restraint, and not punishment^c.*”—Extremely tender and cautious thou great Casuist^d! —

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Never-

^c *Alliance, &c. p. 122.*

^d Mr. *White* does not seem quite so nice and critical as his brother *Warburton*; for, when it has been objected against communicating with the Church of *England*, “*that it has*” “*often shewn a persecuting spirit.*” *White* says, “*'Tis well*” “*he can't say, it has shewn a dividing spirit, and actually*” “*divided itself by an open schism from a sound part of the*” “*Catholic Church.*—That indeed would have been an

“*unanswerable reason for dissenting.*—But what intelligent Christian or sensible man would ever say, that its having

“*often shewn a persecuting spirit was a plain reason for dissenting from it? Did the Church persecute at any time its*” “*own members?*”—*Letter iii. p. 62, 63.*

This quotation is expressive of the mind of the *Writer*, without mincing the matter at all—and shews, that *persecution* is not to be compared with *schism*! or when compared with it, is truly a *venial* sin.—And, as to this, truly the Church did never persecute herself!—Who would not readily swallow this man's arguments for conformity? Their spirit and force are the very same, as if they came from the *Vatican*.—Here is no such thing, as *disqualification being no punishment*—and a *brand of mischief, not of crime*—but—in plain *English*, *persecution* is a harmless, or lawful thing, when compared with *schism*—and the Church never persecutes her own members. What a blessed tender thing is she! Yet it happens that our own histories will furnish us with most flagrant proofs of the Church of *E. persecuting her own members*! hundreds of godly ministers excommunicated, and their families with them exposed to want, in *Charles the 1st's* reign, and above twenty fined and censured, for not bowing at the name of *Jesus*. Can Mr. *White* be ignorant of the diabolical treatment *Alex.*

Leighton

Nevertheless, "Pain is an idea common both
"to restraint and punishment; for every re-
"straint of a rational agent has some degree of
"pain attending it^e."

Yet, "no more is inflicted by a *test-law*, than
"is necessary to repel the evil of diversity of
"Sects in the administration; and consequently
"it is a restraint only^f."

Who but *Warburton* could have made this distinction between *punishment* and *restraint*, for the ease of tender consciences? The disqualification is not a *punishment*!—no, no,—it is only a *restraint*! And why can it not be reckoned a *punishment*? Why truly, because the person *disqualified* cannot be proved a criminal; his *will* is not concerned in the reason of the disqualification. He may therefore be considered as an innocent, nay, as an honest, virtuous, worthy man, notwithstanding his disqualification.

But for what reason is it called a *restraint*? Why, because it is a brand of *mischief*, and not of *crime*! — The term *mischief* is so very obsolete, that I cannot well give the etymology of it; —however, by the term *restraint* being compared with it, I should reckon that it signified something like a *curb bit* put into the mouths of creatures, by which they are disabled from eating the *corn* and *hay* of the public. — But tho' I have got so good a sense of the term *mischief*, and have so happily settled the idea that belongs to it, yet I am wretchedly puzzled with the term *restraint*

Leighton had from the impious *Land*! and has he no faith in the *Act of Uniformity*, and its effects, when above 2000 worthy ministers were fined, imprisoned, &c.? Did he never read that a papist, the E. of *Castlemain*, upbraided the Church of England for her cruelties towards her own members, as worse than *Romish*? —

^e *Alliance*, &c. p. 123.

^f P. 124.

----- for, ----- if applied to *men*, it seems to offer some *violence* to the *liberty of free agents*. And this *Christian* Writer is very tender of the rights of conscience; *nay*, of the *civil* liberties of men; since by Max. II. he has made it the *only* end of civil government to secure the *TEMPORAL* liberty and property of man. If this *restraint*, intended by the *test-law*, does not import the *eternal* liberties and properties of men, but, in the common acceptation of the word, the liberties and properties of men *in time*, or in this present life; for this I should think he means by *temporal*; and if so, then I find it difficult to understand the word *restraint*, in any consistency with the reasoning of this Writer: since, when it is applied to men, it seems to offer some violence to their *temporal* liberties, as free agents: for it shews, that, notwithstanding the *restraint*, they would eat, if they could.—Yet, surely the brand of mischief, the *curb*, cannot be so understood, forasmuch as *the will is not concerned*.

One would be inclined to think that Mr. *W.* borrowed his ideas from an observance of men's putting *rings* into the snouts of *hogs*, to hinder them from rooting up the earth, when seeking their food—or else, from yokes being put on the necks of beasts, or the logs of wood fastened to the legs of horses, to prevent their leaping into forbidden pastures. It is a brand of *mischief*, and not of *crime*. He must have formed his ideas from the *brutes*, and applied the resemblance of *restraint* to men, forgetting that they were rational, who were out of the establishment, and under the *restraints* of a *test-law*: and this confusion of ideas he was led into, from the great resemblance that there is between those *restraints* of horses, &c. and those of the *Non-*

conformists, who are, by the restraint of the *test-law*, kept from grazing on State-pastures. But when he made the comparison, and said, that *the will was not concerned* in the disqualification, and yet, that the *will* of man was concerned in making the disqualification, and that it is in manifest violation of men's natural rights, and of the *temporal* liberties of men, he forgot himself - - - so that, if there should be found nothing criminal in the *restrained*, but only a mischief, it must, in the truth of things, be more than a mischief in the *restrainers*.

And yet, "as to the difference between *restraint* and *punishment*, they have both *one* idea common to them, namely, PAIN, when applied to rational beings." So that the consolation Mr. *W.* would give, by the distinction, is but a mere bubble: for my own part, I freely consent, that he shall take his cordial back again; and let *mischief* stand for *crime*, and *restraint* for *punishment*; since I fear that the *will* is concerned. For, if it was not, I see no reason for the *restraint*. And if the State cannot be secure without a *test-law*, by which the civil Magistrate must confine his protection and favour to one member, without any paternal regard to any of the other members, the alliance and test-law must e'en stand supported on such a foundation as Mr. *W.* has laid for it. But is not the insolence of this *major sect* very shocking, *viz.* "that, if the State don't thus gratify its unreasonable demand, it will resume its *supremacy* and exert it."

It would be very obliging in Mr. *W.*, would he but write Notes on his own *Alliance*. I dare say it would give him as much reputation as those Notes, written on *Butler's Hudibras*, have done that heavenly Divine, Dr. GREY. He would, one
might

might expect, let us know the compass of terror and danger that would arise to the State by the Church's TAKING BACK HER SUPREMACY.—

And how the resignation of it has merited such an engrossment of public protection and favour!—Till then, these solecisms will remain in his scheme of an alliance, namely, “that religion, if established and protected, by a test-law, only because it is the *true* religion; then opinions are encouraged as opinions. And hence it follows, (1.) that an establishment is *unjust*, because the Magistrate has no right to judge, as a Magistrate, which is the true religion. (2.) Because, if he could, he has no right to reward its followers, or to discourage its opposers.—And such an establishment is *absurd*, it being impossible, that the end of it should be obtained.” See *Max.* XV.

§. 45. This is most certainly a finished view of the convention or contract, *namely*, that the State has made a *blind* bargain. It knows nothing at all, is no manner of judge whether the Church, which it has taken into union or alliance, is a *true*, or a *false* Church—a *Christian*, or an *Anti-christian* one. And hence one would be tempted to conclude, that such a contract was not valid in law, much less in *equity*. Must a man bind himself, at all hazards, to *protect, defend, and support, cherish and indulge* with all his favours, an *ally*, of whose character and temper, of whose views and aims he is no judge?

And what is yet more unaccountable, if possible, the State must do this, because the Church has resigned up all her *supremacy and independency*; which may as well, for aught the State knows, intend the Church's *impotency* as any real power; or may be no other than a sacrifice of

of all her spirituality, innocency, and virtue; or may be nothing more than a mere phantom. If it be any *reality*, it must be a resignation of her *indifferency* to the riches, honours, and pleasures of this world: forasmuch as her *contempt* of them, her victory over the world, is all the *independency* and *supremacy* that the true religion or Church can boast; which is the effect of that divine principle *faith*. So that the *resignation* must be infinitely dangerous to the Church herself, as it is her poison, her death-wound. — And it must also be very injurious to the *State*, as by the alliance, thus made, it has a great number of its subjects quite stripped of their *religious* character, in order to be thus pampered in its bosom.

Mr. *W.* has adapted his scheme full as well for *Popery* or *Paganism*, as for Christianity; and, without doubt, some have thus understood him: nay, it is to be hoped, some have rewarded him for his *demonstration of the necessity and equity of an established religion and a test-law*.

To conclude these *expository notes*, this Churchman says, “Henceforth we hope to hear no more of the *injustice* of civil incapacities on a sect which holds nothing *peculiar* that can injuriously affect the State.” To which I presume to tell him openly, that to abridge a citizen of his *civil rights*, for *matters of opinion*, as they stand between the *CONFORMING sect and the non-conforming Protestant sects*, is a manifest violation of the reason and truth of things, and of the law of nature. That it appears to be so from his own principles. And that, instead of a demonstration of the contrary, which is pretended to in his *Title-page*, there is, in his sophistical performance, a great confusion of ideas, and nothing like a


demonstration of any one part of his scheme. That, instead of doing honour to that Church whose establishment he would defend, and in whose favour he would plead for the equity and necessity of a test-law, he has thrown a load of reproach and scandal upon her, by denying *truth* to be her aim, and by taking from her the reputation of a *religious* society.

These Notes the Author would have Mr. *W.* look upon, as written in compliance with his own request, delivered in his Title-page, in the words of *Lucretius*,

— *Judicio perpende: et, si tibi vera videtur,
Dede manus: aut, si falsa est, accingere contra.*



Some



Some Reflexions may very naturally be made from the Expository Notes, well supported by Mr. Warburton's Principles; as

Reflex. I. THAT a lover of truth has no reason to pride himself with being a member of an established Church, whether English, or Scotch, Italian, or Gallican; since truth is not the aim of an establishment. Too many imagine that there is greater security of their final happiness from being within the pale of an establishment, tho' religion is no other than a personal thing; and has its whole importance from the soul's commerce and intercourse with its Maker: and altho' no acts of homage can be acceptable to the Deity, but such as correspond to those sentiments which arise in us from a meditation on the divine perfections, and those relations which we stand in to God. For saith Dr. JEFFERY^s, Archdeacon of Norwich, " No man, or company of " men whatsoever, can make any part of true " religion: and if any thing be made by men, " and imposed as religion, it is not true religion " but superstition. And such superstition, or " false religion, men have made, and have mixed " that false religion of their own making, with " the true religion which God made. The " Pagans did so with natural religion: the Jews " and Samaritans did so with the Mosaical religion: and the Papists have done so with the

* See his *Religion of the Bible*, Sect. 22.

“*Christian religion.*” — *Truth* is eternal and immutable, and therefore can have no dependence on any *human establishment* whatsoever. Besides, the mind or conscience is the sacred, unalienable property of every man; so that it can admit of no *foreign* dominion or authority, but can only be bound *religiously* by truth, it can acknowledge no *sovereign* but the parent mind, the God of truth. For,

Reflex. II. Religion is no other than an *imitation* or *obedience* of God. For which reason no man can have *right* apprehensions of religion, who has *wrong* apprehensions of God. But the *moral law* is a transcript of the *moral perfections* of God, namely, his holiness, righteousness, and goodness; therefore religion is an *imitation* or *obedience* of him. So that, all authority, which diverts the religious veneration and awe of the human mind from the *one* object of religious regard, is injurious to truth or religion. Hence neither *truth* nor *utility* can be the foundation of an human establishment, in the sense of religion. And of the truth of this Mr. *W.* is conscious, since he has discovered so much concern to preserve *the rights of Conscience*, free from any obligation by an establishment. Nor *need* we any human establishment; for saith the aforementioned excellent Writer Dr. *Jeffery*, “The moral law is
“the law of our *nature*: this religion we are
“made to, by that modesty, tenderness, and
“ingenuity which are natural to men, and *fundamental* to the great duties of sobriety, righteousness, and godliness. Nor can any man
“of an improved understanding become grossly
“wicked and irreligious, till these natural principles are spoiled by violent and unnatural
“practice

“practice^h.” — the very spirit of Dr. *Whitchcote*’s sermons. —

The *Statute laws* of our own nation owe their energy and efficacy to the dignity of natural conscience: they make their appeal to that *vicegerent* of God in man, and manifestly in all cases where *oaths* are required, which is an obvious acknowledgment that the religion of the man is *personal*. Whereas, if an establishment had any use in determining the religion of the man, it would be sufficient to render their testimony valid, that men were known to be the members of an established Church. The *public utility* of an establishment, contended for, cannot then have any thing to do with *religion*. Moreover, religion being no other than an *imitation* or *obedience* of God, and man being his creature, made by him for the purposes of religion, it cannot be that he should want any thing essential to support the character, which has not the evidence of *divine authority*. But nothing merely *human* can be said to have such evidence; therefore *human establishments* cannot be in aid of religion.

Reflex. III. Of whatever *use* an establishment may be to a State, or to civil policy, which I pretend not to determine farther than Mr. *W.*’s reasonings have led me, yet it is demonstrably plain, that a *test-law* must be unjust and iniquitous. — For, (1.) If we should understand, with him, that the established religion is the *true* religion [tho’, by the way, “*truth* was not the aim of “the establishment!”] then, a *test-law* monopolizing all the *protection* and *favour* of the State, is to animate the Church with a principle and view every where condemned by the author of our

* *Religion of the Bible*, § 2.

religion.

religion. The *disposition* to engross all public protection and favour, is, in itself, a *vicious* disposition, and incompatible with a religious character. The *test-law*, so far from being the reputation and credit, is the disgrace and scandal of any establishment. It is unjust and iniquitous, (2.) If we suppose, as Mr. *W.* has done, that true religion lies among *Non-conformists*; forasmuch as *the reason of the alliance* is, that the civil Magistrate may be chosen as a *common arbiter*, that has *impartiality enough fairly to apply the rule of right*. — But, if this be the character of the Magistrate, with what truth does he support it by giving *all* his favours, and making over *all* his protection, to one party only, to the exclusion of all the rest? Will their being the *greater member* defend this his character? It will do very well upon the scheme of *Hobbs*: and, if I mistake not, Mr. *W.* has pretty well copied after that *state-christian* Philosopher. Their schemes tally: for what *Hobbs* has said of *power*, seems to be the *basis* of Mr. *W.*'s establishment. The *iniquity* of a test-law, (3.) is manifest, in the prostitution of a solemn rite to a profane purpose. (4.) From its being the *bait* or *allurement* to hypocrisy; of which Mr. *W.* has been aware, and has endeavoured to elude the force; but with little success. (5.) *Civil advantages*, annexed to the profession of the *Christian* religion, destroy one evidence it originally had of its divinity.

Reflex. IV. The *state* cannot possibly receive *benefit*, any more than *reputation*, by a test-law; since it is not calculated to secure the virtue or piety of any of its officers or servants. — The natural tendency of the present *test* is to make men *irreligious*: for if I can eat and drink bread

bread and wine, separated for a religious remembrance of the death of *Jesus*, in order to qualify me for some place of worldly profit and trust; if I can do this, because enjoined by the civil Magistrate [who has no manner of concern in matters of religion, as Mr. *W.* affirmeth,] I can then make any other *religious thing* subservient to my worldly views. — And, if I can allow the Magistrate to alter the design of one religious institution, I can allow him to alter another. And inasmuch as I find the *Church-Barons* giving their suffrage to this prostitution, if I regard them as *ministers of religion*, I may with as much ease admit of the *corporeal presence* of *Jesus* with those elements, as of a worldly and civil intention in the use of them. The virtue and piety of men must be relaxed in the natural tendency of the *sacramental test*. There cannot therefore be any manner of *security* given to the state by such a prostitution. But, on the contrary, it would bid much fairer for the public security, if only such men were admitted into public employments, who discover a *reverence of God, and of Jesus*, in and by an unblameable moral conduct. Men who *fear God* are the likeliest men in the whole community to *honour the King*.

Reflex. V. It must follow, that virtuous and honest men being the *best subjects* in any state, these (if any) have the *first right* to protection: and not a majority of *good, bad, and indifferent*, to the exclusion of all the rest. Nor is it incumbent on any good Government to make over its favour to any one party of its subjects. *Religion* will make men *good subjects*: and so far they deserve the protection of the state. But, since it is not in the power of the state to make
men

men religious, it should be left in its power to encourage and protect men that are so. But by a *test-law*, as Mr. *W.* has largely shewn us, the hands of the Magistrate are tied up, and it is at his peril that he does *protect* and *encourage* any but those in the alliance: for, if he should, the Church will resume her SUPREMACY! —

Whether this be good policy, or a righteous measure, must be left to the judgment of every person, who is willing to canvas the subject with care and impartiality.

Reflex. VI. As unreasonable discouragements, and arbitrary inequalities respecting privileges and immunities, are the occasion of pride, arrogance, and insolence on the one hand, and of envy and uneasy resentments on the other, is it not demonstratively plain, that the removal of the *test-law* must take away the reason of so much offence? The consequence of which must be a greater flow of benevolence, charity, and good-will among *Protestants*. Whether this would not be the most proper measure to strengthen the hands of his Majesty KING GEORGE's friends, and loyal subjects; whether it would not be greatly to the reputation of the civil Magistrate; whether it would not be much for the honour of the Clergy to promote it, I humbly refer to the public: —

Reflex. VII. Nothing but the BIBLE can be the rule of faith and religious practice to Christians. And every one is to judge for himself of that rule; and no other can judge for him. For so saith *Chillingworth*, in his *Religion of Protestants*, p. 44. “ Every man is to judge for himself with the judgment of discretion, and to choose his religion first, and then his Church—
“ And the rule whereby he is to guide his
L “ choice

“ choice, if he be a natural man, is *reason*; if
 “ he be a *Christian*, Scripture. — But that
 “ there is any man, or any company of men,
 “ to be judge for all men, that we deny.”

Had *Councils* and *Synods* both understood and honestly practised upon this principle, their business would have been *only* to have declared against all power of decreeing or determining for others in matters of faith and religious practice. And would but all Christians, who disown any human authority, unite in supporting the right of private judgment, they would preserve the dignity of the *Christian* name, by holding the *unity of the spirit in the bond of love and peace*.

But whilst men have *worldly interests* to serve by this or the other mode of worship, what can be expected but, *that Christ should be crucified afresh, and put to an open shame!*

The passions and prejudices of men are strong; and especially, when riveted by inveterate custom, which has annexed temporalities to a particular profession: *besides*, the dependencies on the State created thereby. — These things make it highly improbable that there ever will be, till Christ's personal appearance, a manifest *separation* of this world from what is called the Church; — nevertheless, this will never become the least proof of the *reason* of an union; but, so long as an alliance continues, in the very reasoning of Mr. *W*, it will demonstrate his Church and Christ's Kingdom to be two opposite things: for he says,
 “ It is impertinent in a Church to aim at riches,
 “ honours, powers; because these are things
 “ which, as a Church, she can neither use nor
 “ receive profit from. — To imagine these fit
 “ accommodations for a Church, as such, is as
 “ idle a fancy as that of them who were for building sumptuous tabernacles for the three great
 “ messengers

“ messengers of God, at the transfiguration^k.”
 Whilst therefore the Church, as a Church, enjoys these, and under no other appellation than *the Church*, and has no pretence of claim but *as a Church*, or a majority in alliance with the State, distinguished from the other members of the community only by being “ a particular
 “ Church of such *determined* doctrine and discipline, that has covenanted with the State^l:”
 It follows that this Church, monopolizing, by her claim, riches, honours, and powers, is quite an opposite thing to Christ's Kingdom, which is not of this world. Christ's Church has no other standard or rule of faith in it but the scriptures; which supposeth every man is to judge for himself, and that no other can determine for him, in matters of faith, opinion, or religious practice.

Reflex. VIII. From Mr. *W.*'s principles, and from the truth of the case, a peaceable non-conformity or dissent from this Church in union with the State cannot be termed *a schism*. On the contrary, by doing so, men assert religious liberty, put on religious character, and are led to exercise the rights of conscience.

After all, should Mr. *W.* chuse to defend his *Alliance*, I would beg of him seriously to reflect, before he does it, upon the promise made for him in *Baptism*: namely, *that he should renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of the world, with all the covetous desires of the same*:—and that not only *he*, but every one born of conforming Parents, and baptized according to the usage of the Establishment, are under the same engagement: hence Mr. *W.* is obliged to reconcile the Church's accumulating all the *profits* and

^k *Alliance*, p. 69.

^l P. 88.


honours that the State can confer. In the doing of which, he will go a great way towards defending his *Alliance*. But, unless this be done, all his scheme will appear to be no better than egregious trifling with the *common sense* of mankind: and must open a wide door to INFIDELITY, as men will be tempted to think, that the most solemn and religious promises have no meaning at all in them. —

To assist Mr. *W.*, I would humbly recommend to him a frequent repetition of part of that Collect, intitled, *St. Matthew the apostle*: “ O
 “ almighty God, who by thy blessed Son didst
 “ call *Matthew* from the receipt of custom to
 “ be an apostle and evangelist, grant us grace to
 “ forfake all covetous desires, and inordinate
 “ love of riches, and to follow the same thy Son
 “ *Jesus Christ*. — Amen.



F I N I S.

THE



THE INDEX.

CHAP. I.

The nature and end of the ALLIANCE
between Church and State examined, as
laid down by this Writer.

SECT. I.

TRUTH *supposed to lacquey after public
utility : but has nothing to do in the aim
of establishments.*

§. 2. *How far public utility may be expected by
such Alliance.*

*The State cannot receive greater power from
this Alliance.*

*The Church cannot receive either greater
power or safety—Neither can their con-
joint energy be greater : for,*

§. 3. *The*

I N D E X.

- §. 3. *The privilege, that the State gains, is only a SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL.*
- §. 4. *The State can impart a coercive power to the Church; but then the Ecclesiastical Courts are very liable to ABUSE their trust; not so the civil power.—*
- §. 5. *The Magistrate's office has no other end than the security of the temporal liberty and property of man.*
- §. 6. *The Church, a name assumed from men's having a majority of numbers in a State: needs no power but to excommunicate—and by exercising that power injures no member; nor gains any greater efficacy by the alliance: but pays an hypocritical compliment to the State—*
- §. 7. *The Church receives public endowment from the State, &c. yet her aim in the alliance could not be riches, honours, or powers—*
- §. 8. *The Bishops right to sit in parliament the great bond of the alliance. The Church's SUPREMACY resigned, which is the claim to such Baronies.*
- §. 9. *The Church receives from the State the aid of an Ecclesiastical Court for reformation of manners — therefore all Dissenters justly subjected to this court.*
- §. 10. *The Church and State considered in union or alliance—The Church made perfectly free and independent on the State, in order that she might the better come into alliance with various kinds of civil policies.*
- §. 11. *The Church is impertinent, if she aims at riches, honours, or powers by the alliance.*
- §. 12. *The*

I N D E X.

- §. 12. *The Church does in part partake of an human policy.*
- §. 13. *The State could not give the Church any security of protection without an alliance.*
- §. 14. *By the Church's liberty to unite with all kinds of civil policies, a famous prophecy is fulfilled, II. xlix. 23.*
- §. 15. *Civil government defective in not enforcing duties of imperfect obligation.*
- §. 16. *A reason of the Church's seeking an establishment.*

C H A P. II.

What is farther intended by an ESTABLISHED CHURCH; and how it took its rise, its worship, and discipline.

- §. 17. *Tho' the Ecclesiastical Court does not exercise its power, for its own sake, but for that of the State; yet that power is fit to be applied to the immediate end of religious Society, viz. purity of worship, to which uniformity is needful.*
- §. 18. *Simple expulsion all the power the Church has in the alliance: and this expulsion puts men upon being religious.*
- §. 19. *Religion will have a public worship, and a public leading. — Some objections to free prayer stated and considered.*
- §. 20. *The difference between the Jewish and the Christian Church, as to modes being instituted.*

§. 21. Ceremo-

I N D E X.

- §. 21. *Ceremonial-Modes no part of the divine institution of Christianity; nor left to the prescribed rules of human authority — tho' Mr. W. sais they are.*
- §. 22. *The difference between the Jewish and the Christian Church, as to the exercise of power. Of the apostolic rod, and the sense of Matth. xviii. 15, 16, 17. sacred character, what?*
- §. 23. *The sense of Matth. xvi. 18, 19.*
- §. 24. *Another reason for the alliance, from a meditation on the divine nature being drawn out into articles of faith; and an institution of correspondent acts of worship necessary.*
- §. 25. *The Pagan Church inferior to the Christian, on account of its wanting so good a formulary of dogmatic theology.*

C H A P. III.

Of a TEST-LAW.

- §. 26. *What must be understood by it — the terms explained.*
- §. 27. *What by Church.*
- §. 28. *What by Test-law.*
- §. 29. *The reason of it.*
- §. 30. *Its effects — temporal advantages enjoyed by the Church, and secured by the test-law, inflame envy and emulation.*
- §. 31. *The merit of Church-emoluments lies, in the Clergy's being under the civil Magistrate's DIRECTION. An unanswerable reason assigned for Quakers paying of Tythes.*

§. 32. *The*

I N D E X.

- §. 32. *The distinguishing characteristic which the test-law affords to men in society, viz. that of free servants, and that of slaves.*
- §. 33. *How the several claims in the alliance are introduced.*
- §. 34. *By the law of nature, must not be understood the law of nature, but the sense which wise men have understood it in. Demonstrated by two instances.*
- §. 35. *1st, By the law of prescription, a municipal law in direct opposition to the law of nature.*
- §. 36. *2dly, By the Game-laws.*
- §. 37. *Religion being mixed, in the affair of the test-law, hinders men from seeing its justice and equity, as they do in the municipal laws above-mentioned.*
- §. 38. *The test-law so contrived that the party might have a watch-word to carry on its business; namely — THE CHURCH IS IN DANGER.*
- §. 39. *The established Church, secured by a test-law, is a PROPER FURNACE in which to try true religion.*
- §. 40. *Yet the rewards and discouragements are too small to tempt any but the most profligate and abandoned. —*
- §. 41. *The test-law is said not to endanger religious liberty.*
- §. 42. *Diversity of opinions supposed to threaten the peace of a State.*
- §. 43. *The opinions that a test-law makes the matter of disqualification, are, from their directly affecting the peace of a State. —*

M

§. 44. *The*

I N D E X.

§. 44. *The disqualification no punishment, only a restraint. Dissent is a mischief, not a crime.*

§. 45. *The State in the alliance made a blind bargain, being no manner of Judge of the character of that Church she contracted with; for she understood not whether she was a true, or a false Church.——*

Some reflexions made from the Expository Notes.

N. B. *A few citations are put in as Notes, from the Letters of Mr. John White, B. D. in order the better to illustrate the Established-Church-sense in several articles.*





ERRATA


Page. Line.

41. — 16. for *joyned issue*, r. *agreed*!

75. — 23. dele, *Such*.

108. — 22. for *property*, r. *claim*!

129. — 18. dele, *as*.



T. A. T. A.



Page 1851
11-16. 1851. 1851. 1851.
17-23. 1851. 1851. 1851.
18-23. 1851. 1851. 1851.
19-23. 1851. 1851. 1851.

